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EXHIBIT "A"

61-1-6

SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities
Regulation — State § 18.
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regulation § 196.

Key Numbers. — Licenses «= 18V2 (37); Secunties Regulation «=* 272.

61-1-6. Denial, suspension, or revocation of registration —
Grounds — Procedure — Examination.
(1) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Securities
Advisory Board, the executive director may issue an order denying, suspending, or revoking any agent, broker-dealer, or investment adviser registration
if he finds that the order is in the public interest and that the applicant or
registrant or, in the case of a broker-dealer or investment adviser, any partner, officer, or director, or any person occupying a similar status or performing
similar functions, or any person directly or indirectly controlling the brokerdealer or investment adviser:
(a) filed an application for registration that was incomplete in any
material respect or contained any statement that was, in light of the
circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading with respect
to any material fact;
(b) willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with any provision of
this chapter or a predecessor act or any rule or order under this chapter or
a predecessor act;
(c) was convicted, within the past ten years, of any misdemeanor involving a security or any aspect of the securities business, or any felony;
(d) is permanently or temporarily enjoined by any court of competent
jurisdiction from engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice involving any aspect of the securities business;
(e) is the subject of an order of the executive director or any predecessor
denying, suspending, or revoking registration as a broker-dealer, agent,
or investment adviser;
(f) (i) is the subject of an order entered within the past five years by
the securities administrator of any other state or by the Securities
and Exchange Commission denying or revoking registration as a
broker-dealer, agent, or investment adviser, or the substantial equivalent of those terms as defined in this chapter, or is the subject of an
order of the Securities and Exchange Commission suspending or expelling him from a national securities exchange or national securities
association registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or
is the subject of a United States Post Office fraud order.
(ii) The division may not institute a revocation or suspension proceeding under this Subsection (0 more than one year from the date of
the order relied on, and the executive director may not enter an order
under this Subsection (f) on the basis of an order under another state
act unless that order was based on facts that would currently constitute a ground for an order under this section;
(g) engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business;
8
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(h) is insolvent, either in the sense that his liabilities exceed his assets
or in the sense that he cannot meet his obligations as they mature. However, the executive director may not enter an order against a brokerdealer or investment adviser under this Subsection (h) without a finding
of insolvency as to the broker-dealer or investment adviser; or
(i) is not qualified on the basis of such factors as training, experience,
and knowledge of the securities business, except as otherwise provided in
Subsection (3).
(2) (a) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Securities Advisory Board, the executive director may issue an order denying,
suspending, or revoking any registration, if he finds that the order is in
the public interest and that the applicant or registrant:
(i) has failed reasonably to supervise his agents if he is a brokerdealer or his employees if he is an investment adviser; or
(ii) has failed to pay the proper filing fee.
(b) The division may enter a denial order under this subsection, but
shall vacate the order when the deficiency has been corrected.
(c) The division may not institute a suspension or revocation proceeding on the basis of a fact or transaction known to it when registration
became effective unless the proceeding is instituted within the next 30
days.
(3) The following provisions govern the application of Subsection
61-1-6(1X1):
(a) The executive director may not enter an order against a brokerdealer on the basis of the lack of qualification of any person other than
the broker-dealer himself if he is an individual or an agent of the brokerdealer.
(b) The executive director may not enter an order against an investment adviser on the basis of the lack of qualification of any person other
than the investment adviser himself if he is an individual or any other
person who represents the investment adviser in doing any of the acts
which make him an investment adviser.
(c) The executive director may not enter an order solely on the basis of
lack of experience if the applicant or registrant is qualified by training or
knowledge.
(d) The executive director shall consider that an agent who will work
under the supervision of a registered broker-dealer need not have the
same qualifications as a broker-dealer.
(e) The executive director shall consider that an investment adviser is
not necessarily qualified solely on the basis of experience as a brokerdealer or agent. When he finds that an applicant for initial or renewal
registration as a broker-dealer is not qualified as an investment adviser,
he may by order condition the applicant's registration as a broker-dealer
upon his not transacting business in this state as an investment adviser.
(f) The division shall by rule provide for examinations, which may be
written or oral or both, to be taken by all applicants.
(4) The division may take emergency action with respect to registration
applications according to the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b,
Title 63.
(5) If the division finds that any registrant or applicant for registration is
no longer in existence, has ceased to do business as a broker-dealer, agent, or
9
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investment adviser, is subject to an adjudication of mental incompetence or to
the control of a committee, conservator, or guardian, or cannot be located after
reasonable search, the division may by order cancel the registration or application according to the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63.
(6) (a) Withdrawal from registration as a broker-dealer, agent, or investment adviser becomes effective 30 days after receipt of an application to
withdraw or within such shorter period of time as the division may determine, unless a revocation or suspension proceeding is pending when the
application is filed or a proceeding to revoke or suspend or to impose
conditions upon the withdrawal is instituted within 30 days after the
application is filed.
(b) If a proceeding is pending or instituted, the division shall designate
by order when the withdrawal becomes effective.
(c) (i) If no proceeding is pending or instituted, and withdrawal automatically becomes effective, the division may initiate a revocation or
suspension proceeding under Subsection 61-l-6(l)(b) within one year
after withdrawal became effective.
(ii) If the division decides to issue a revocation or suspension order,
the executive director shall enter the order as of the last date on
which registration was effective.
(7) The division, board, and executive director shall comply with the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, before issuing any order
under any part of this section.
History: C. 1953, 61-1-6, enacted by L.
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 9; 1987,
ch. 161, § 233.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective January 1, 1988, rewrote Subsection (4) to such an extent as to make a detailed analysis impracticable; in Subsection (5)
added "according to the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63"; in Subsection (6) added the internal subsection designations and in Subsection (b) substituted "the
division shall designate by order when the

withdrawal becomes effective" for "withdrawal
becomes effective at such time and upon such
conditions as the division by order determines"; rewrote Subsection (7) to such an extent as to make a detailed analysis impracticable; and made minor changes in style and
phraseology throughout the section.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. — The
federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, referred to in Subsection (l)(f), appears as 15
U.S.C. § 78a et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Scope of inquiry.
Commission had authority to inquire into
applicant's or registrant's conduct with respect
to unworthiness to carry on business that he or
it was registered to carry on, irrespective of

fact that securities to which inquiry was specifically directed did not need to be registered.
Lauren W. Gibbs, Inc. v. Monson, 102 Utah
234, 129 P.2d 887 (1942) (decided under former
law).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities
Regulation — State §§ 19 to 24.
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regulation §§ 223 to 226.
A.L.R. — Churning: stockbroker's liability
for allegedly "churning" or engaging customer's account in excessive activity, 32
A.L.R.3d 635.
Law practice: what activities of stock or se-

curity broker constitute unauthorized practice
of law, 34 A.L.R.3d 1305.
Mistake: effect, as between stockbroker and
customer, of broker's mistaken sale of stock or
other security other than that intended by customer, 48 A.L.R.3d 513.
Key Numbers. — Licenses <s= 18V2 (38), 38;
Securities Regulation «=» 270, 274, 277.
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be prepared and filed in accordance with t h e
following requirements:
(A) T h e financial s t a t e m e n t s shall be
certified by an independent certified public
a c c o u n t a n t or an i n d e p e n d e n t p u b l i c
accountant.
(B) T h e audit shall be made in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards;
the examination shall include a review of
the accounting system, the internal
accounting controls and procedures for t h e
s a f e g u a r d i n g of s e c u r i t i e s a n d f u n d s
including appropriate tests thereof since the
prior examination.
(C) T h e audit shall be accompanied by an
unqualified opinion of the accountant as to
the financial condition. In addition, t h e
accountant shall submit as a supplementary
opinion any comments, based upon t h e
audit, as to any material inadequacies found
to exist in t h e accounting system, t h e
internal accounting controls and procedures
for safeguarding securities and shall indicate
any corrective action taken or proposed.
(3) T h e financial statements required by
this section shall be filed within 90 days
following t h e end of the broker-dealer's
fiscal year.

(b) Investment

Adviser

Required

Financial
Reports. (1) Every investment
adviser who has custody or possession of
c l i e n t ' s funds or securities or requires
payment of advisory fees six m o n t h s or
more in advance and in excess of $500 per
client shall file with the Division audited
financial statements as of the end of the
investment adviser's fiscal year.
(2) E a c h f i n a n c i a l s t a t e m e n t filed
pursuant to this section shall be prepared
and filed in accordance with the following
requirements:
(A) T h e audit shall be certified by an
independent certified public accountant or
independent public accountant.
(B) T h e audit shall be made in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards;
the examination shall include a review of
the accounting system, the internal
accounting controls and procedures for the
s a f e g u a r d i n g of s e c u r i t i e s a n d f u n d s
including appropriate tests thereof since t h e
prior examination.
(C) T h e audit shall be accompanied by an
unqualified opinion of the accountant as to
t h e r e p o r t of f i n a n c i a l c o n d i t i o n . In
addition, the accountant shall submit as a
supplementary opinion any comments based
upon audit, as to any material inadequacies
found to exist in the accounting system, the
Blue Sky Law Reports
020 - 5 9

50,507

Blue Sky Regulations

internal accounting controls and procedures
for safeguarding securities and funds, and
shall indicate any corrective action taken or
proposed.
(3) T h e financial statements required by
this section shall be filed with the Division
within 90 days following the end of t h e
investment adviser's fiscal year.
(Adopted eff. 2-15-86.]
[1 57,403]

R 1 7 7 - 6 - l g . Rules of c o n d u c t for
broker-dealers, investment advisers
and agents.
Preliminary Notes: 1. Rl77-6-lg is intended to
define certain acts and practices which the Utah
Securities Division (the "Division") deems
violative of Section 6(lXg) of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act (the "Act"). The list contained
herein should not be considered to be all-inclusive
of acts and practices which violate that section,
but rather is intended to act as a guide to brokerdealers and agents as to the types of conduct which
are prohibited.
2. Broker-dealers and agents are reminded that
conduct which violated Section 1 of the Act may
also be considered to violate Section 6(1 Kg) under
certain circumstances.
3 This Rule is patterned after well-established
standards in the industry which have been
adopted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the NASD, NASAA, the national
exchanges and various courts. It represents one of
the purposes of the securities lavss: to create viable
securities markets m which those persons involved
are held to a high standard of fairness with respect
to their dealings with the public.
(a) Broker-Dealers. T h e following acts and
practices, when performed by a brokerdealer or a person over whom t h e brokerdealer has supervisory authority, are
considered contrary to Section 6(1 )(g) of the
U t a h Uniform Securities Act and may
constitute grounds for denial, suspension or
revocation of registration.
(1) Engaging in a pattern of unreasonable
and unjustifiable delays in t h e delivery of
securities purchased by any of its customers
a n d / o r in t h e payment, upon request, of free
credit balances reflecting completed
transactions of any of its customers.
(2) I n d u c i n g t r a d i n g in a c u s t o m e r ' s
a c c o u n t w h i c h is excessive in size or
frequency in view of t h e financial resources
and character of the account.
(3) Recommending to a customer t h e
purchase, sale or exchange of any security
without reasonable grounds to believe t h a t
such t r a n s a c t i o n or r e c o m m e n d a t i o n is
suitable for the customer based upon rea-

H 57,403

50,508

Utah

sonahle inquiry concerning the customer's
investment objectives, financial situation
and needs, and any o t h e r relevant
information known by the broker-dealer.
(4) Executing a transaction on behalf of a
customer without prior authorization to do
so.
(5) Exercising any discretionary power in
effecting a transaction for a customer's
account w i t h o u t first obtaining written
discretionary authority from the customer,
unless the discretionary power relates solely
to the time a n d / o r price for the execution of
orders.
(6) Executing any transaction in a margin
account without securing from t h e customer
a properly executed written margin
agreement p r o m p t l y after t h e initial
transaction in the account.
(7) Failing to segregate customers' free
securities or securities held in safekeeping.
(8) Hypothecating a customer's securities
without having a lien thereon unless the
broker-dealer secures from the customer a
properly executed written consent promptly
after t h e initial transaction, except as
permitted by t h e rules and regulations of
the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission.
(9) Entering into a transaction with or for
a customer at a price not reasonably related
to the current market price of the security
or receiving an unreasonable commission or
profit.
(10) Failing to furnish to a customer
purchasing securities m an offering, no later
t h a n t h e d a t e of c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e
transaction, either a final prospectus or a
preliminary prospectus and an additional
d o c u m e n t , w h i c h t o g e t h e r include all
i n f o r m a t i o n s e t f o r t h in t h e f i n a l
prospectus.
(11) Charging fees for services without
prior notification to a customer as to the
nature and amount of the fees.
(12) C h a r g i n g u n r e a s o n a b l e and
inequitable lees for services performed,
including miscellaneous services such as
collection of monies due for principal,
dividends or interest, exchange or transfer
of securities, appraisals, safekeeping, or
custody of securities and other services
related to its securities business
(13) Offering to buy from or sell to any
person any security at a stated price unless
such broker-dealer is prepared to purchase
or sell, as the case may be. at surh price and
under such conditions as are stated at the
time of such offer to buv or sell.

H 57,403
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(14) Representing t h a t a security is being
offered to a customer " a t the m a r k e t " or a
price relevant to t h e market price unless
such broker-dealer knows or has reasonable
grounds to believe t h a t a market for such
s e c u r i t y exists o t h e r t h a n t h a t m a d e ,
created or controlled by such broker-dealer,
or by any person for whom he is acting or
with whom he is associated in such dist r i b u t i o n , or any person controlled by,
controlling or under common control with
such broker-dealer.
(15) Effecting a n y t r a n s a c t i o n in, or
inducing t h e p u r c h a s e or sale of, any
security by means of any manipulative,
deceptive or fraudulent device, practice,
plan, program, design or contrivance, which
may include but not be limited to:
(A) Effecting any transaction in a security
which involves no change in t h e beneficial
ownership thereof;
(B) Entering an order or orders for t h e
purchase or sale of any security with t h e
knowledge t h a t an o r d e r or o r d e r s of
substantially t h e same size, at substantially
the same time and substantially t h e same
price, for t h e sale of any such security, has
been or will be entered by or for t h e same or
different parties for t h e purpose of creating
a false or misleading appearance of active
t r a d i n g in t h e s e c u r i t y or a false or
misleading appearance with respect to t h e
market for t h e security; provided, however,
nothing in this subsection (B) shall prohibit
a broker-dealer from entering bona fide
agency cross transactions for its customers;
or
(C) Effecting, alone or with one or more
other persons, a series of transactions in any
security creating actual or apparent active
t r a d i n g in s u c h s e c u r i t y or raising or
depressing the price of such security, for the
purpose of inducing t h e purchase or sale of
such security by o t h e r s .
(16) Guaranteeing a customer against loss
in any securities account of such customer
carried by t h e broker-dealer or in any
securities transaction effected by the brokerdealer with or for such customer.
(17) Publishing or circulating, or causing
to be published or circulated, any notice,
circular, advertisement, newspaper article,
investment service, or communication of
any kind which: (A) purports to report any
transaction as a purchase or sale of any
security unless such broker-dealer believes
t h a t such t r a n s a c t i o n was a bona fide
purchase or sale of such security; or (B)
purports to quote t h e bid price or asked
price for any security, unless such broker1988, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
00^
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dealer believes t h a t such quotation
represents a bona fide bid for, or offer of,
such security.
(18) U s i n g a n y a d v e r t i s i n g or s a l e s
presentation in such a fashion as to be
deceptive or misleading. An example of such
p r a c t i c e would be d i s t r i b u t i o n of a n y
nonfactual data, material or presentation
b a s e d on c o n j e c t u r e , u n f o u n d e d o r
u n r e a l i s t i c claims or assertions in any
b r o c h u r e , flyer, or d i s p l a y by w o r d s ,
pictures, graphs or otherwise designed to
supplement, d e t r a c t from, supersede or
d e f e a t t h e p u r p o s e or effect of a n y
prospectus or disclosure.
(19) Failing to disclose to a customer t h a t
t h e b r o k e r - d e a l e r is c o n t r o l l e d b y ,
c o n t r o l l i n g , a f f i l i a t e d w i t h or u n d e r
common control with t h e issuer of any
security before entering into any contract
with or for a customer for t h e purchase or
sale of such security, and if such disclosure is
n o t m a d e in w r i t i n g , i t s h a l l b e
supplemented by the giving or sending of
w r i t t e n d i s c l o s u r e a t or b e f o r e t h e
completion of the transaction.
(20) Failing to make a bona fide public
offering of all of the securities allotted to a
broker-dealer for d i s t r i b u t i o n , w h e t h e r
acquired as an underwriter, a selling group
member, or from a member participating in
the distribution as an underwriter or selling
group member.
(21) F a i l u r e or refusal to furnish a
customer, upon reasonable request,
information to which he is entitled, or to
respond to a formal written request or
complaint.
(22) P e r m i t t i n g a person to open an
account for a n o t h e r person or transact
business in such account unless there is on
file written authorization for such action
from the person in whose name t h e account
is carried.
(23) P e r m i t t i n g a person to open
transact business in a fictitious account.

or

(24) P e r m i t t i n g an agent to open or
transact business in an account other than
his own. unless disclosed in writing (to
include the reason therefor) to the brokerdealer or issuer he represents.
(b) Agents.
T h e following a c t s a n d
practices, when performed by agents of
broker-dealers or agents of issuers, are
considered contrary to Section 6(1 )(g) of the
U t a h Uniform Securities Act and may
constitute grounds for denial, suspension or
revocation of registration.
Blue Sky Law Reports
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(1) Engaging in the practice of lending or
b o r r o w i n g m o n e y or s e c u r i t i e s from a
customer, or acting as a custodian for
money, securities or an executed stock
power of a customer.
(2) Effecting securities transactions not
recorded on the regular books or records of
the broker-dealer which the agent
represents, in the case of agents of brokerdealers, unless the transactions are
authorized in writing by the broker-dealer
prior to execution of the transaction.
(3) Establishing or maintaining an account
containing fictitious information in order to
execute transactions which would otherwise
be prohibited.
(4) Sharing directly or indirectly in profits
or losses in t h e account of any customer
without t h e prior written authorization of
the customer and t h e broker-dealer which
the agent represents.
(5) Dividing or otherwise splitting t h e
a g e n t ' s c o m m i s s i o n s , p r o f i t s or o t h e r
compensation from t h e purchase or sale of
s e c u r i t i e s w i t h any person not also
registered as an agent for t h e same brokerdealer, or for a broker-dealer under direct or
indirect common control.
(6) Engaging in conduct specified in
subsection (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6).
(a)(9), (a)(10), (a)(15), (a)(16). (a)(17), or (a)(18).
[1157,404]
R177-9-1. Registration
by
c o o r d i n a t i o n , (a) Who May File. Any
security for which a registration statement
or a notification under Regulation A has
been filed under the Securities Act of 1933
in connection with the same offering may be
registered by c o o r d i n a t i o n p u r s u a n t to
Section 9 of the Utah Uniform Securities
Act (the "Act").
(b) Documents to Be Filed. Applicant shall
file one copy each of the following and t h e
appropriate fee pursuant to Rl77-18-4:
(1) Uniform consent to service of process;
(2) One copy of the disclosure statement,
i n c l u d i n g e x h i b i t s , t o g e t h e r w i t h all
a m e n d m e n t s as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission under t h e Securities
Act of 1933;
(3) An application on Form U-l which
c o n t a i n s t h e u n d e r t a k i n g r e q u i r e d by
Section 9(1 )(d) of the Act.
(c) Additional
Documents
T h e applicant
shall provide to the Division any additional
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such stock. Guaranty Mtg. Co. v. Wilcox, 62
Utah 184, 218 P. 133, 30 A.L.R. 1324 (1923).
"Sale" did not include a gift of stock because
of use of words'Tor value." Therefore an agreement with a statistician to promote the disposition of such stock was not in violation of the
Blue Sky Law. Fact that it was understood at

time of gift that there would be an assessment
did not transform transaction into sale, where
donees were not liable to pay the assessment,
Andrews v. Chase, 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938
(1935), afTd on rehearing in 89 Utah 73, 57
p 2d 702 (1936).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Securities Law and
the Franchise Agreement, 1980 Utah L. Rev.
311.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities
Regulation — State §§ 16, 26 to 29, 31, 69 to
85, 102.
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regulation §§ 201 to 221.
A.L.R. — Sales as "isolated" or "successive"
or the like under state securities acts, 1
A.L.R.3d 614.
Dealer: who is "dealer" under state securities acts exempting sales by owners other than

issuers not made in course of successive transactions, and the like, 6 A.L.R.3d 1425.
Investment contract: what constitutes an
"investment contract" within the meaning of
state Blue Sky Laws, 47 A.L.R.3d 1375.
"Common enterprise" element of Howey test
to determine existence of investment contract
regulable as "security" within meaning of federal Securities Act of 1933 (15 USCS §§ 77a et
seq.) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
USCS §§ 78a et seq.), 90 A.L.R. Fed. 825.
Key Numbers. — Licenses *=> I8V2 (5) to
(30); Securities Regulation «=» 248 to 269.

61-1-14. Exemptions.
(1) The following securities are exempted from Sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15:
(a) any security, including a revenue obligation, issued or guaranteed
by the United States, any state, any political subdivision of a state, or any
agency or corporate or other instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, or any certificate of deposit for any of the foregoing;
(b) any security issued or guaranteed by Canada, any Canadian province, any political subdivision of any such province, any agency or corporate or other instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, or any other
foreign government with which the United States currently maintains
diplomatic relations, if the security is recognized as a valid obligation by
the issuer or guarantor;
(c) any security issued by and representing an interest in or a debt of,
or guaranteed by, any bank organized under the laws of the United
States, or any bank, savings institution, or trust company supervised
under the laws of any state;
(d) any security issued by and representing an interest in or a debt of,
or guaranteed by, any federal savings and loan association, or any building and loan or similar association organized under the laws of any state
and authorized to do business in this state;
(e) any security issued or guaranteed by any federal credit union or
any credit union, industrial loan association, or similar association organized and supervised under the laws of this state;
(f) any security issued or guaranteed by any railroad, other common
carrier, public utility, or holding company which is subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission; a registered holding company under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or a subsidiary of such a company within the meaning of that act; regulated in
respect of its rates or in its issuance by a governmental authority of the
United States, any state, Canada, or any Canadian province;
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(g) any security listed on the National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotation System, the New York Stock Exchange,
the American Stock Exchange, or on any other stock exchange or medium
approved by the division, provided that the division may at any time
suspend or revoke this exemption for any particular stock exchange, medium, security, or securities under Subsection 61-1-14(3); any other security of the same issuer which is of senior or substantially equal rank to
any security so listed and approved by the division; any security called for
by subscription rights or warrants so listed or approved; or any warrant
or right to purchase or subscribe to any of the foregoing;
(h) any security issued by any person organized and operated not for
private profit but exclusively for religious, educational, benevolent, charitable, fraternal, social, athletic, or reformatory purposes, or as a chamber
of commerce or trade or professional association; and any security issued
by a corporation organized under Chapter 1, Title 3 and any security
issued by a corporation to which the provisions of such chapter are made
applicable by compliance with the requirements of Section 3-1-21;
(i) any commercial paper which arises out of a current transaction or
the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current transactions,
and which evidences an obligation to pay cash within nine months of the
date of issuance, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal, guarantee, or
guarantee of renewal of the paper which is likewise limited;
(j) any investment contract issued in connection with an employees'
stock purchase, savings, pension, profit-sharing, or similar benefit plan;
(k) any security as to which the division, by rule or order, finds that
registration is not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors.
(2) The following transactions are exempted from Sections 61-1-7 and
61-1-15:
(a) any isolated transaction, whether effected through a broker-dealer
or not;
(b) any nonissuer transaction in an outstanding security if: (i) it is
listed in a recognized securities manual such as Moody's and Standard &
Poor's securities manuals where the listing contains the names of the
issuer's officers and directors, a balance sheet of the issuer as of a date
within 18 months, and a profit and loss statement for either the fiscal
year preceding that date or the most recent year of operations; or (ii) the
security has a fixed maturity or a fixed interest or dividend provision and
there has been no default during the current fiscal year or within the
three preceding fiscal years, or during the existence of the issuer and any
predecessors if less than three years, in the payment of principal, interest,
or dividends on the security. The division may by rule or order approve
certain manuals as recognized within the meaning of this subsection;
(c) any nonissuer transaction effected by or through a registered broker-dealer pursuant to an unsolicited order or offer to buy;
(d) any transaction between the issuer or other person on whose behalf
the offering is made and an underwriter, or among underwriters;
(e) any transaction in a bond or other evidence of indebtedness secured
by a real or chattel mortgage or deed of trust, or by an agreement for the
sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire mortgage, deed of trust, or
agreement, together with all the bonds or other evidences of indebtedness
secured thereby, is offered and sold as a unit;
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(f) any transaction by an executor, administrator, sheriff, marshal, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, guardian, or conservator;
(g) any transaction executed by a bona fide pledgee without any purpose of evading this chapter;
(h) any offer or sale to a bank, savings institution, trust company,
insurance company, investment company as defined in the Investment
Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing trust, or other financial
institution or institutional buyer, or to a broker-dealer, whether the purchaser is acting for itself or in some fiduciary capacity;
(i) any offer or sale of a preorganization certificate or subscription if: (i)
no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting any prospective subscriber; (ii) the number of subscribers acquiring any legal or beneficial interest therein does not exceed
ten; and (iii) there is no general advertising or solicitation in connection
with the offer or sale;
(j) (i) any transaction pursuant to an offer by an issuer of its securities
to its existing securities holders, if no commission or other remuneration, other than a standby commission is paid or given directly or
indirectly for soliciting any security holders in this state, if the transaction constitutes: (A) the conversion of convertible securities; (B) the
exercise of nontransferrable rights or warrants; (C) the exercise of
transferrable rights or warrants if the rights or warrants are exercisable not more than 90 days after their issuance; or (D) the purchase
of securities under a preemptive right;
(ii) the exemption created by Subsection (2)(j)(i) is not available for
an offer or sale of securities to existing securities holders who have
acquired their securities from the issuer in a transaction in violation
of Section 61-1-7;
(k) any offer, but not a sale, of a security for which registration statements have been filed under both this chapter and the Securities Act of
1933 if no stop order or refusal order is in effect and no public proceeding
or examination looking toward such an order is pending;
(1) a distribution of securities as a dividend if the person distributing
the dividend is the issuer of the securities distributed;
(m) any nonissuer transaction effected by or through a registered broker-dealer where the broker-dealer or issuer files with the division, and
the broker-dealer maintains in his records, and makes reasonably available upon request to any person expressing an interest in a proposed
transaction in the security with the broker-dealer information prescribed
by the division under its rules;
(n) any transactions not involving a public offering;
(o) any offer or sale of "condominium units" or "time period units" as
those terms are defined in the Utah Condominium Ownership Act,
whether or not to be sold by installment contract, if the provisions of the
Utah Condominium Ownership Act, or if the units are located in another
state, the condominium act of that state, the Utah Uniform Land and
Timeshare Sales Practices Act, and the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit
Code are complied with;
(p) any transaction or series of transactions involving a merger, consolidation, reorganization, recapitalization, reclassification, or sale of assets,
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if the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is the issuance of
securities of a person or persons, and if:
(i) the transaction or series of transactions is incident to a vote of
the securities holders of each person involved or by written consent or
resolution of some or all of the securities holders of each person involved;
(ii) the vote, consent, or resolution is given under a provision in:
(A) the applicable corporate statute or other controlling statute; (B)
the controlling articles of incorporation, trust indenture, deed of
trust, or partnership agreement; or (C) the controlling agreement
among securities holders;
(iii) (A) one person involved in the transaction is required to file
proxy or informational materials under Section 14(a) or (c) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Section 20 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and has so filed; (B) one person involved in the
transaction is an insurance company which is exempt from filing
under Section 12(g)(2)(G) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
has filed proxy or informational materials with the appropriate regulatory agency or official of its domiciliary state; or (C) all persons
involved in the transaction are exempt from filing under Section
12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and file with the
division such proxy or informational material as the division requires
by rule;
(iv) the proxy or informational material is filed with the division
and distributed to all securities holders entitled to vote in the transaction or series of transactions at least ten business days prior to any
necessary vote by the securities holders or action on any necessary
consent or resolution; and
(v) the division does not, by order, deny or revoke the exemption
within ten business days after filing of the proxy or informational
materials;
(q) any transaction as to which the division, by rule or order, finds that
registration is not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors.
(3) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Securities
Advisory Board, the executive director may by order deny or revoke any
exemption specified in Subsection (l)(h) or (l)(j) or in Subsection (2) with
respect to: (a) a specific security, transaction, or series of transactions; or (b)
any person or issuer, any affiliate or successor to a person or issuer, or any
entity subsequently organized by or on behalf of a person or issuer generally.
No such order may be entered without appropriate prior notice to all interested parties, opportunity for hearing, and written findings of fact and conclusions of law, except that the division may by order summarily deny or revoke
any of the specified exemptions pending final determination of any proceeding
under this subsection. Upon the entry of a summary order, the division shall
promptly notify all interested parties that it has been entered and of the
reasons therefor and that within 15 business days of the receipt of a written
request the matter will be set down for hearing. If no hearing is requested and
none is ordered by the executive director or division, the order will remain in
effect until it is modified or vacated by the executive director. If a hearing is
requested or ordered, upon approval by the executive director and a majority
of the Securities Advisory Board the executive director, after notice of and
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opportunity for hearing to all interested persons, may affirm, modify, or vacate the order or extend it until final determination. The executive director
may not extend any summary order for more than ten business days No order
under this subsection may operate retroactively No person may be considered
to have violated Section 61-1-7 or 61-1-15 by reason of any offer or sale effected after the entry of an order under this subsection if he sustains the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the order.
History: C. 1953, 61-1-14, enacted by L.
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1979, ch. 218, <} 5; 1983,
ch. 284, * 17; 1987, ch. 92, * 106.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment corrected the statutory reference in Subsection (2)(jXn), substituted "Utah Uniform
Land and Timeshare Sales Practices Act" for
"Utah Uniform Land Sale Practices Act" in
Subsection (2)(o), and made minor stylistic
changes
Federal law. — The federal acts cited in
this section are codified as
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
15 U S C k 79 et seq For provisions regarding
registration of holding companies, see 15
U S C § 79e
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U S C
** 80a-1 et seq For definition of investment

company, see 15 U S C *} 80a-3 Section 20 of
that act, referred to in Subsection (2)(p)(ui),
appears as 15 U S C § 80a-20
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U S C ^ 77a et
seq
Section 12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, referred to in Subsection (2)(p)(ni),
appears as 15 U S C § 78/(g)(l) Section
12(g)(2)(G) of that act appears as 15 U S C
§ 78/(g)(2)(G) Sections 14(a) and (c) of that act
appear as 15 U S C §S 78n(a) and (c)
Cross-References. — Condominium Ownership Act, § 57-8-1 et seq
Utah Consumer Credit Code, * 70C-M01 et
seq
Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act,
k 57-11-1 et seq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Debentures of cemetery association
Isolated transaction
Stock dividends or distribution out of earnings
Debentures of cemetery association.
Debentures of an incorporated cemetery association were not exempt from registration
where the articles of incorporation did not contain language reasonably interpretable to categorize the corporation as one whose purpose
was exclusively for educational, benevolent,
fraternal, charitable, or reformatory pursuits
State ex rel Securities Comm'n v Lake Hills,
14 Utah 2d 14, 376 P2d 540 (1962)
Isolated transaction.
The exchange by the incorporators of a min-

ing company of shares of stock for mining
claims, where the transaction involved the simultaneous issuance of shares to the plaintiff
and a third person, did not involve a transaction requiring registration because it was exempt as an isolated transaction Johnson v
Crail, 11 Utah 2d 392, 360 P 2d 485 (1961)
Stock dividends or distribution out of
earnings.
To claim exemption, it had to be shown that
corporation was distributing shares to its
shareholders as a stock dividend out of earnings or surplus, or that it was increasing its
capital stock Harper v Tn-State Motors, Inc ,
90 Utah 212, 58 P 2d 18 (1936), rehearing denied, 90 Utah 226, 63 P 2d 1056 (1937) (decided under former law)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — The Elusive Limited Offering Exemption of the Utah
Uniform Securities Act, 1976 B Y U L Rev
825
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am J u r 2d Securities
Regulation — State ^ 69 to 85
C.J.S — 79 C J S Supp Securities Regula
tion ^ 201 to 221

A.L.R. — Sales as "isolated" or "successive"
or the hke under state securities acts, 1
A L R 3 d 614
Dealer who is 'dealer" under state securities acts exempting sales by owners other than
issuers not made in course of successive trans
actions, and the like, 6 A L R 3d 1425
Who may exercise voting power of corporate
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61-1-22. Sales and purchases in violation — Remedies —
Limitation of actions.
(1) Any person who:
(a) offers or sells a security in violation of Section 61-1-3(1), 61-1-7, or
61-1-17(2) or of any rule or order under Section 61-1-15 which requires
the affirmative approval of sales literature before it is used, or of any
condition imposed under Subsection 61-1-10(4) or 61-1-11(7); or
(b) offers, sells, or purchases a security by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading, the buyer not knowing of the
untruth or omission, and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of the untruth or omission, is liable to the person selling the
security to or buying the security from him, who may sue either at law or
in equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together with
interest at 12% per year from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable
attorney's fees, less the amount of any income received on the security,
upon the tender of the security or for damages if he no longer owns the
security. Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon a
tender less the value of the security when the buyer disposed of it and
interest at 12% per year from the date of disposition.
The court in a suit brought under Subsection (l)(b) may award an
amount equal to three times the consideration paid for the security, together with interest, costs, and attorney's fees, less any amounts, all as
specified in Subsection (l)(b) upon a showing that the violation was reckless or intentional.
(2) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer liable
under Subsection (1), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller or
buyer, every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of such a seller or buyer who materially aids in the sale
or purchase, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale
are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the seller
or purchaser, unless the nonseller or nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains
the burden of proof that he did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the
liability is alleged to exist. There is contribution as in cases of contract among
the several persons so liable.
(3) Any tender specified in this section may be made at any time before
entry of judgment.
(4) Every cause of action under this section survives the death of any person who might have been a plaintiff or defendant.
(5) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability under this section
unless brought before the expiration of four years after the act or transaction
constituting the violation or the expiration of two years after the discovery by
the plaintiff of the facts constituting the violation, whichever expires first. No
person may sue under this section: (a) if the buyer or seller received a written
offer, before suit and at a time when he owned the security, to refund the
consideration paid together with interest at 12% per year from the date of
payment, less the amount of any income received on the security, and he
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failed to accept the offer within 30 days of its receipt; or (b) if the buyer or
seller received such an offer before suit and at a time when he did not own the
security, unless he rejected the offer in writing within 30 days of its receipt.
(6) No person who has made or engaged in the performance of any contract
in violation of this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, or who has acquired any purported right under any such contract with knowledge of the
facts by reason of which its making or performance was in violation, may base
any suit on the contract.
(7) Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring
any security to waive compliance with this chapter or any rule or order hereunder is void.
(8) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter are in addition to any
other rights or remedies that may exist at law or in equity, but this chapter
does not create any cause of action not specified in this section or Subsection
61-1-4(5).
History: C. 1953, 61-1-22, enacted by L.
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1979, ch. 218, § 7; 1983,
ch. 284, § 32; 1986, ch. 107, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, in Subsection (1Kb), added the last paragraph; in Subsection (5), substituted the
present first sentence for the former first sen-

tence which read: "No person may sue under
this section more than two years afler the contract of sale"; and made minor stylistic
changes.
Cross-References. — Limitation of actions
generally, § 78-12-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
against fraud perpetrated in violation of act,
and not solely for protection of state, and assignee of purchaser of securities could maintain action on bond. Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah
193, 63 P.2d 611, 110 A.L.R. 837 (1936).
In suit against securities dealer and surety
on his bond for fraud of dealer in sale of stock,
where complaint alleged sufficient facts to support judgment against dealer independent of
Securities Act, surety was a proper party to the
proceedings. Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63
P.2d 611, 110 A.L.R. 837 (1936).

ANALYSIS

Assignability of cause of action.
Attorney fees.
Bond of dealer.
Evidence.
Foreign contracts.
Laches and estoppel.
Participating or aiding in sale.
Proof of misconduct.
Statute of limitations.
Cited.
Assignability of cause of action.
Causes of action for return of money paid to
securities dealer on sale of stock, claimed to
have been fraudulent, were assignable. Mayer
v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63 P.2d 611, 110
A.L.R. 837 (1936).

Evidence.
In action to rescind sale of corporate stock on
ground of fraudulent representat ions as to condition of company, report of state auditor or
audit made by state banking department was
not admissible in evidence on theory that it
was a public record. Wilson v. Guaranteed Sec.
Co., 82 Utah 224, 23 P.2d 921 (1933).
In action to recover purchase price of shares,
in which defendant corporation defended on
ground that stock sold was owned by secretary
of corporation, evidence held to make prima
facie case that shares sold belonged to corporation so that court erred in nonsuiting plaintiff,
and fact that notes in payment for stock were
payable to secretary held not to show conclusively that shares belonged to secretary.
Hansen v. Abraham Irrigation Co., 82 Utah
361, 25 P.2d 76 (1933).

Attorney fees.
Recovery of attorney fees pursuant to a state
securities law claim is not limited to the time
reasonably spent prosecuting only that claim.
City Consumer Servs. Inc. v. Home, 631 F.
Supp. 1050 (D. Utah 1986).
A court is not bound by agreements as to
attorney fees between the parties, though it
«*£ consider them. City Consumer Servs., Inc.
v
- Home, 631 F. Supp. 1050 (D. Utah 1986).
Bond of dealer.
Blue Sky Law and bond therein required
w
*re for protection of purchasers of securities
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Securities Act—Law Text

1266 12-3087

EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS
Sec. 4. The provisions of section 5 shall not apply to—
[As amended by Act of August 20, 1964, Sec. 12, 78 Stat. 580 ]

[H 552]

[Transactions by Persons Other than Issuers, Underwriters and Dealers]
(1) transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.
[As amended by Act of June 6, 1934, 48 Stat. 906; Act of August 10, 1954, effective
October 9, 1954, 68 Stat. 683; Act of August 20, 1964, Sec. 12, 78 Stat. 580.]

[11 553]

[Private Offerings]
(2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.
[As amended by Act of June 6, 1934, 48 Stat 906; Act of August 10, 1954, effective
October 9, 1954, 68 Stat. 683; Act of August 20, 1964, Sec. 12, 78 Stat. 580.]

[H 554]

[Dealers Transactions]
(3) transactions by a dealer (including an underwriter no longer acting as an underwriter
in respect of the security involved in such transaction), except—
(A) transactions taking place prior to the expiration of forty days after the first date
upon which the security was bona fide offered to the public by the issuer or by or through
an underwriter,
(B) transactions in a security as to which a registration statement has been filed
taking place prior to the expiration of forty days after the effective date of such
registration statement or prior to the expiration of forty days after the first date upon
which the security was bona fide offered to the public by the issuer or by or through an
underwriter after such effective date, whichever is later (excluding in the computation of
such forty days any time during which a stop order issued under section 8 is in effect as
to the security), or such shorter period as the Commission may specify by rules and
regulations or order, and
(C) transactions as to securities constituting the whole or a part of an unsold
allotment to or subscription by such dealer as a participant in the distribution of such
securities by the issuer or by or through an underwriter.
With respect to transactions referred to in clause (B), if securities of the issuer have not
previously been sold pursuant to an earlier effective registration statement the applicable
period, instead of forty days, shall be ninety days, or such shorter period as the Commission
may specify by rules and regulations or order.
[As amended by Act of June 6, 1934, 48 Stat. 906; Act of August 10, 1954, effective
October 9,1954, 68 Stat. 683; Act of August 20, 1964, Sec. 12, 78 Stat. 580.]

[H 555]

[Brokers' Transactions]
(4) brokers' transactions, executed upon customers' orders on any exchange or in the
over-the-counter market but not the solicitation of such orders.
[As amended by Act of August 20,1964, Sec. 12, 78 Stat. 580.]

[H 556]

[Securities Originated by Certain Mortgagees]
(5) (A) Transactions involving offers or sales of one or more promissory notes directly
secured by a first lien on a single parcel of real estate upon which is located a dwelling or
other residential or commercial structure, and participation interests in such notes—
(i) where such securities are originated by a savings and loan association,
savings bank, commercial bank, or similar banking institution which is supervised
and examined by a Federal or State authority, and are offered and sold subject to
the following conditions:
(a) the miminum aggregate sales price per purchaser shall not be less than
$250,000;
(b) the purchaser shall pay cash either at the time of the sale or within
sixty days thereof; and
(c) each purchaser shall buy for his own account only; or
(ii) where such securities are originated by a mortgagee approved by the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development pursuant to sections 203 and 211 of

1f 5 5 1

§ 4

©1987, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.

1422 n-21-90

Interstate Commerce Prohibitions— § 5

1575

the National Housing Act and are offered or sold subject to the three conditions
specified in subparagraph (AXO to any institution described in such subparagraph
or to any insurance company subject to the supervision of the insurance
commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like function, of any State or
territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, or the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, the Federal National Mortgage Association, or the
Government National Mortgage Association
(B) Transactions between any of the entities described in subparagraph (AXO or
(AXii) hereof involving non-assignable contracts to buy or sell the foregoing securities
which are to be completed within two years, where the seller of the foregoing securities
pursuant to any such contract is one of the parties described in subparagraph (A)(i) or
(AXii) who may originate such securities and the purchaser of such securities pursuant to
any such contract in any institution described in subparagraph (A)(i) or any insurance
company described in subparagraph (AXii), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Association, or the Government National Mortgage
Association and where the foregoing securities are subject to the three conditions for sale
set forth in subparagraphs (AXiXa) through (c)
(C) The exemption provided by subparagraphs (A) and (B) hereof shall not apply to
resales of the securities acquired pursuant thereto, unless each of the conditions for sale
contained in subparagraphs (AXi)(a) through (c) are satisfied.
[As added by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 30,89 Stat.
169.]

[H 557]

[Offers or Sales to Accredited Investors]

(6) transactions involving offers or sales by an issuer solely to one or more accredited
investors, if the aggregate offering price of an issue of securities offered in reliance on this
paragraph does not exceed the amount allowed under section 3(b) of this title, if there is no
advertising or public solicitation in connection with the transaction by the issuer or anyone
acting on the issuer's behalf, and if the issuer files such notice with the Commission as the
Commission shall prescribe.
[As added by Act of October 21, 1980 (Small Business Issuers* Simplification Act of
1980), Sec. 602, Pub. Law 96477, 94 Stat. 2294.]

[H 561]

PROHIBITIONS RELATING TO INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND THE

MAILS
Sec. 5. (a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly—
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of any
prospectus or otherwise; or
[As amended by Act of August 10, 1954, effective October 9, 1954, Sec. 7, 68 Stat. 684.]
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any
means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or for
delivery after sale.

[D 564]

[Prospectus Requirements]
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly—

(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospectus relating to any
security with respect to which a registration statement has been filed under this title, unless
such prospectus meets the requirements of section 10, or
[As amended by Act of August 10, 1954, effective October 9, 1954, Sec. 7, 68 Stat. 684.]
(2) to carry or to cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce any
such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless accompanied or preceded
by a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of section 10.
[As amended by Act of August 10, 1954, effective October 9, 1954, Sec. 7, 68 Stat. 684.]
Federal Securities Law Reports
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Limitation of Actions— § 13
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underwriter (unless such underwriter shall have knowingly received from the issuer for acting
as an underwriter some benefit, directly or indirectly in which all other underwriters
similarly situated did not share in proportion to their respective interests in the underwnt
ing) be liable in any suit or as a consequence of suits authorized under subsection (a) for
damages in excess of the total price at which the securities underwritten by him and
distributed to the public were offered to the public In any suit under this or any other section
of this title the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the
costs of such suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, and if judgment shall be rendered
against a party litigant, upon the motion of the other party litigant, such costs may be
assessed in favor of such party litigant (whether or not such undertaking has been required) if
the court believes the suit or the defense to have been without merit, in an amount sufficient
to reimburse him for the reasonable expenses incurred by him, in connection with such suit,
such costs to be taxed in the manner usually provided for taxing of costs in the court in which
the suit was heard
[1668]

[Joint and Several Liability]

(f) All or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection (a) shall be jointly and
severally liable, and every person who becomes liable to make any payment under this section
may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who, if sued separately,
would have been liable to make the same payment, unless the person who has become liable
was, and the other was not, guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation
[H 669]

[Limitation on Amount of Damages]

(g) In no case shall the amount recoverable under this section exceed the price at which
the security was offered to the public
[Sec 11 was amended generally by Act of June 6, 1934 48 Stat 907 ]
[H 681 ]

[D 683]

CIVIL LIABILITIES ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH PROSPECTUSES
AND COMMUNICATIONS
Sec 12 Any person who—
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 5 or
[As amended by Act of August 10,1954, effective October 9, 1954, Sec 8, 68 Stat 685 ]
Offers or Sells by Use of Interstate Communications or Transportation

(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 3, other
than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) thereof), by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of
such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall
be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such
security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the
tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security
[H 691 ]

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
Sec 13. No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 11
or section 12(2) unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or
the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under section 12(1), unless brought
within one year after the violation upon which it is based In no event shall any such action
be brought to enforce a liability created under section 11 or section 12(1) more than three
years after the security was bona fide offered to the public, or under section 12(2) more than
three years after the sale
[As amended by Act of June 6,1934,48 Stat 908 ]
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Exchange Act—Registration; Reports

[H 23,361]

[Denial, Suspension, or Revocation of Registration of Security]

I
I
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HIS 10-23-90

Sec. 12(j) The Commission is authorized, by order, as it deems necessary or appropriate
for the protection of investors to deny, to suspend the effective date of, to suspend for a
period not exceeding twelve months, or to revoke the registration of a security, if the
Commission finds, on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the issuer of
such security has failed to comply with any provision of this title or the rules and regulations
thereunder No member of a national securities exchange, broker, or dealer shall make use of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction
in, or to induce the purchase or sale of, any security the registration of which has been and is
suspended or revoked pursuant to the preceding sentence

.001 Historical comment.—
The Act of June 4, 1975, Sec 9, 89 Stat 118,
added Sec 120) CCH
.10 Failure of issuer to comply with registration requirements—1975 amendments.—
Subsection 0) would provide a more logical placement of the authority the SEC already has under
present section 19(aX2) to deny, to suspend the
effective date of, to suspend for a period not
exceeding twelve months, or to withdraw the
registration of any security if it finds, on the
record after notice and opportunity for hearing,
that the issuer of such security has failed to comply with any provision of the Exchange Act or the
rules and regulations thereunder It would also
make unlawful any trading in any such security
[H 23,371 ]

by any broker or dealer With this change, the
Commission is expected to use this section rather
than its ten-day suspension power in cases of
extended duration —Senate Committee Report
No 94-75 (1975), page 106
20 Tacking of suspension orders.—The SEC
may not utilize successive ten day suspension
orders to order the suspension of trading in a
security for more than ten days—Sloan v SEC
(CA-2 1976), 547 F2d 152, 76-77 CCH Dec.
f95,757 mod'g(CA-2 1975), 527 F2d 11
Rehearing —Upon rehearing, the portion of the
opinion dealing with the 90-day suspension provision were excised —See 7 6 - 7 7 CCH Dec
f 95,783

[Suspension of Trading]
Sec. I2(k) TRADING SUSPENSIONS, EMERGENCY AUTHORITY —

(1) TRADING SUSPENSIONS—If in its opinion the public interest and the protection of
investors so require, the Commission is authorized by order—
(A) summarily to suspend trading in any security (other than an exempted security)
for a period not exceeding 10 business days, and
(B) summarily to suspend all trading on any national securities exchange or
otherwise, in securities other than exempted securities, for a period not exceeding 90
calendar days
The action described in subparagraph (B) shall not take effect unless the Commission notifies
the President of its decision and the President notifies the Commission that the President
does not disapprove of such decision
.001 Historical comment.—
Act of October 16, 1990 (Market Reform Act of
1990), Sec 2, Pub Law 101-432, 104 Stat 963,
amended Sec 12(k) which formerly read
"If in its opinion the public interest and the
protection of investors so require, the Commission
is authorized summarily to suspend trading in
any security (other than an exempted security)
for a period not exceeding ten days, or with the
approval of the President, summarily to suspend
all trading on any national securities exchange or
otherwise, in securities other than exempted
securities, for a period not exceeding ninety days
No member of a national securities exchange,
broker, or dealer shall make use of the mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate com
merce to effect any transaction in, or to induce
the purchase or sale of, any security in which
trading is so suspended "
The Act of June 4 1975, Sec 9, 89 Stat 118,
added Sec 12(k) CCH

1123,361 Law §120)

.10 Suspension of trading—1975 amendments.—Subsection (k) would consolidate in one
place the power the SEC presently has under
sections 15(cX5) and 19(a)(4) of the Exchange
Act to suspend summarily trading in any security
(other than an exempted security) for a period not
exceeding ten days The SEC's power, with the
approval of the President, to suspend summarily
all trading on a national securities exchange
would be continued and extended to mtiude the
power to prohibit trading in all securities, other
than exempted securities, otherwise than on an
exchange —Senate Committee Report No 94-75
(1975), page 106
.15 Transactions effected by brokerdealer —A broker dealer's purchase of attached
shares of a Canadian company, subject to a sus
pension of all trading in the U S , at a public
auction held to satisfy a judgment of the broker
dealer, and the subsequent sale of the purchased
shares in Canada would be a broker dealer within
©1990, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
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the meaning of Section 12(k) However, the SEC
.20 Persons affected by trading suspenStaff would not recommend enforcement action if sion—Procedure adopted.—Any
person
the transaction were carried out, provided that
adversely affected by a summary suspension of
the broker-dealei acts in good faith and has no t r a ( j
'b
hl about b
the S £ C
suant
connection with the activities surrounding the c
,,,.,?
. ~
t ;
S ctl
12 k
ma
11
lhe
suspension -Canadian Javelin, Ltd (SEC 1975),
* °" < >
y P" '™
Commission to
sno
75-76 CCH Dec 1180 417
* t n a t s u c n a suspe^ 1 0 0 »s not in the public
_
.
,.
_ ,
, ,
interest or for the protection of investors—Procet
.16 Suspermon of trading-Broker-deald
f
persom
M
ted b
Sum
s
ers—Purchase of warrants.—The private
r» «
XT ~>A I - > ^ / A -«
/ C T ,~ ^n^^
purchase of warrants of a suspended security
*«»<SEC 1976) Release No 34-12361, Apr 23,
7
through newspaper advertisements by a person
^ - ' " CCH Dec ]| 80,480
who is not a broker or dealer is not prohibited bv
Section \2(k)~—Equity Funding Corp of America
.21 Tacking of suspension orders.—See
(SEC 1975), 7 5 7 6 CCH Dec If 80,420
f 23,361 20
[H 23,372]
[Emergency Orders]
Sec. 12(k)
(2) EMERGENCY ORDERS—(A) The Commission, in an emergency, may by order summarily take such action to alter, supplement, suspend, or impose requirements or restrictions
with respect to any matter or action subject to regulation by the Commission or a selfregulatory organization under this title, as the Commission determines is necessary in the
public interest and for the protection of investors—
(1) to maintain or restore fair and orderly securities markets (other than markets in
exempted securities), or
(n) to ensure prompt, accurate, and safe clearance and settlement of transactions in
securities (other than exempted securities)
(B) An order of the Commission under this paragraph (2) shall continue in effect for the
period specified by the Commission, and may be extended, except that in no event shall the
Commission's action continue in effect for more than 10 business days, including extensions
In exercising its authority under this paragraph, the Commission shall not be required to
comply with the provisions of section 553 of title 5, United States Code, or with the provisions
of section 19(c) of this title
Historical comment.—
Sec 12(kX2) was added by Act of October 16,
1990 (Market Reform Act of 1990), Sec 2, Pub
Law 101-432, 104 Stat 963
[11 23,373]

[Termination of Emergency Actions]
Sec. 12(k)

4
I

(3) TERMINATION OF EMERGENCY ACTIONS B\ PRESIDENT —The President may direct that

action taken by the Commission under paragraph (1KB) or paragraph (2) of this subsection
shall not continue in effect

Historical comment.—
Sec 12(kX3) was added by Act of October 16,
1990 (Market Reform Act of 1990), Sec 2, Pub
Law 101-432, 104 Stat 963
[1123,374]

[Compliance]
Sec. 12(k)

|
I

(4) COMPLIANCE WITH ORDERS—No member of a national se< unties exchange, broker, or
dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or mstrui.ientaliiy of interstate commerce to
effect ?ny transaction in, or to induce the purchase or sale of, any security in contravention of
an order of the Commission under this subsection unless such order has been stayed, modified,
or set aside as provided in paragraph (5) of this subsection or ha'> ceased to be effective upon
direction of the President as provided in paragraph (3)

Historical comment.—
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Sec 12(k)(4) was added by Act of October 16,
1990 (Market Reform Act of 1990), Sec 2, Pub
Law 101-432, 104 Stat 963

Law§12(k)(4)

1123,374

EXHIBIT "H"

2014

NASD Manual—Rules of Fair Practice

303 7-90

"Act"

(1) The term "Act" means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
"Fixed Price Offering"

(m) The term "fixed price offering" means the offering of securities at a stated
public offering price or prices, all or part of which securities are publicly offered in the
United States or any territory thereof, whether or not registered under the Securities
Act of 1933, except that the term does not include offerings of "exempted securities" or
"municipal securities" as those terms are defined in Sections 3(a)(12) and 3(a)(29),
respectively, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or offerings of redeemable
securities of investment companies registered pursuant to the Investment Company
Act of 1940 which are offered at prices determined by the net asset value of the
securities.
H 2102
Definitions in By-Laws
Sec. 2. Unless the context otherwise requires, or unless defined in this Article,
terms used in the Rules and provisions hereby adopted, if defined in the By-Laws, shall
have the meaning as defined in the By-Laws.
ARTICLE III
Rules of Fair Practice
H 2151
Business Conduct of Members
Sec. 1. A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of
commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.
• • • Cross References
"Filing of Misleading Information as to Membership or Registration" ..
U1791
"Failure to Register Personnel"
K 1791
"Fair Dealing with Customers"
1f 2152
"NASD Mark-Up Policy"
H2154
"Manipulative and Deceptive Quotations"
U 2155
"Policy with Respect to Firmness of Quotations"
If 2156
" Third Market' Confirmations"
U 2162
"Refusal to Abide by Rulings of the Uniform Practice Committee" . . . .
K3502
"Failure to Act Under Provisions of Code of Arbitration Procedure" . . . .
H3744
"Prompt Payment by Members for Shares of Investment Companies"
H5265
" 'Breakpoint' Sales"
1f 5266
Annotations of selected SEC decisions
Execution and Delivery
.10 Failure to Execute Customer Orders.—
In 1977, the firm acted as managing underwriter
of a registered public offering of 385,000 Jhirmack
Enterprises, Inc , securities The underwriting
syndicate distributed 398,200 shares, resulting in
a short position of 13,200 shares when distribution
closed on March 24, 1977 Subsequently, BEHR
1f 2102.10

Aft.

llf

SeC. 2

became Jhirmack's primary market maker and
placed quotations in the NASDAQ System On
March 25, BEHR began trading the stock in the
OTC market The conduct of which NASD complained occurred in after-market trading by
BEHR on March 25, 28, and 29
On March 25, BEHR had customer orders to
buy 40,000 shares of Jhirmack However, BEHR
©1990, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
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Financial Responsibility—§ 15(c)
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Equity Funding Coriwration of AmtruA (SIX
197^> 197^ CCH Dec f 79 S37
40 Transactions in suspended securities—
While it is possible for a broker dealer transacting
all its business on a national securities exchange
to sell securities for which trading has been sus
pended, the practical problems arc considerable
In that resect, the prohibition against the use of
anv instrument of interstate commerce includes
the transfer of the securities, telephone discus

[H 25,139]

18,379

MODS during niKotidlions fur the %al« and \\u
mailing of confirmations of v»i< —Sprt^uc <{
Nammack (SEC 1973), 1973 CCH 1X< «| 79 \\A
,
,
,
A~ 0
0
47
Suspension of trading—Private
sa es—
,
. ^7
,
*i u
i c
n
Broker-dealer involvement—Although SMII«»M
,- K v c .
, ,
. .
ui
i .
l>u>o)ut the hvehange Act urohihits a hr<»k< r
. . '
,
*
*
<lea cr from taking anv at lion in arraniiini;
or
.
.
. u,,,,,'*in^
ionsummating a transaction invoKmg a sicuniv
,
. . , 7
u i
* i . •
uni<n trading has been sus{>cnd(.d a hol<)< r oi
such sccuntits ma> make a private disfxisition uf
his shares — McVugh (ShC 1972) 72 7~\ ( ( 11
Dec *| 79 27^
.
.
Dou^Ls R Grahnm (SFC 197^1 7S ?'» ( ( 11
Dec <1 80 2^2 (private individual could cow r hi^
short (Motion in warrants even though SUSJM nMon
<>t trading in s u u n t ) was stilhn force)

Consummation of Securities Transactions by
Broker-Dealers When Trading Is Suspended

Release No 34-7920, July 19, 1966, 31 F R 10076
JW r The release below is based on the law in effect prior to the Securities Acts
Amendments
of 1975 Sec 12(k) at tf 23,371 consolidates former Sections 15(cX5) and 19(aX*) See 1j23 371 10
CCH

17 CFR 241.7920.
The Securities and Exchange Commission todav made public a policy statement ot
its Division of Trading and Markets relating to the post-suspension consummation of
securities transactions entered into by brokers and dealers before the Commission
suspended trading in the security pursuant to Section 15(c)(5) or Section 19(a)(4) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
The text of the statement, issued by Irving M Pollack, Director of the Division,
follows
"A number of questions have been presented recently as to whether, during the
period when trading is suspended by order of the Commission pursuant to Section
15(c)(5) or Section 19(aX4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a broker or dealer
may complete (e g , by payment or delivery) an agency or principal contract entered
into pnoi to the suspension
"It is the position of the Division that where the broker or dealer is himself acting
in good faith, where he is not connected with the activity announced by the Commission as a basis for suspension pursuant to Section 15(c)(5) or Section 19(a)(4) and
where he has no reason to believe that his customer is so connected, no objection need
be raised under such sections because the broker dealer completes his contractual
obligations in the particular transaction ( e g , by pa>ment or delivery) while the
suspension is still in effect The Division believes that in each such case, however, he
should inform his customer, prior to consummating the transaction, that trading in the
security is suspended and of the reasons announced by the Commission for suspending
trading
"A broker-dealer, in deciding whether to consummate such a transaction, must of
course consider not only the provisions of Sections 15(c)(5) and 19(a)(4) but also all
other applicable provisions of the Federal securities laws "
[Release No 34-7920, July 19, 1966, 31 F R 10076 )
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John C Baldwin, Director
Patricia Louie, Director of
Registration
Securities Division
Utah Department of Business Regulation
160 East 300 South
Post Office Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-45802
Telephone: (801) 530-6600
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF
USA MEDICAL CORPORATION

t
:
:

SUMMARY ORDER DENYING
AVAILABILITY OF EXEMPTIONS
FROM REGISTRATION

t

FILE NUMBER 8T 1619

I

CASE NUMBER SD-89-030

Pursuant to 8 61-1-14(3) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act
(Title 61, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 1983) ("the
Act"), the Utah Securities Division ("the Division") has found that
this Summary Order is in the public interest.

It appears to the

Division m a t :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. S.M.I., Inc. was incorporated under the laws of the state
of Wyoming on January 12, 1979.

On or about December 8, 1987,

S.M.I.,

Medical

Inc.

Corporation.

merged

with

USA

Corporation,

a

Utah

The surviving company is domiciled in the state of

Wyoming under the name USA Medical Corporation ("USA").

00002! W
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2. The anti-fraud provisions contained in § 61-1-1 of the Act
prohibits (1) employment of any device, scheme or artifice to
defraud, (2) the making of any untrue statement of a material fact,
or omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading and (3) engaging in any act, practice
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person*
3.

Section 61-1-7 of the Act states that it is unlawful for

any person to offer or sell any security in Utah unless it is
registered or exempt from registration under § 61-1-14 of the Act.
4.

Offers and sales of the securities of USA have been made

in the state of Utah during the period June 1, 1988 through this
date.
A.
5.

Failure to Register Securities

A search of the Division's records indicates that a

registration statement pursuant to § 61-1-8, § 61-1-9 or § 61-1-10
of the Act has never been filed by USA with the Division.
B.
6.

Failure to Qualify for Exemptions from Registration
Section

transactional

61-1-14(2)

exemptions

from

of

the

Act

contains

registration,

several

including

the

exemptions commonly referred to as the "manual listing" exemption
contained in § 61-1-14(2)(b) and the "secondary trading" exemption
contained in § 61-1-14(2)(m) of the Act.

0000^5)1
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7. On or about February 17, 1989, USA filed with the Division
an application for confirmation of the availability of the manual
listing exemption pursuant to § 61-1-14(2)(b) of the Act and Rule
177-14-2b of the Division. However, the listing for USA contained
in Moodyfs OTC Industrial did not contain the minimal information
required by § 61-1-14 (2) (b) of the Act and Rule 177-14-2b of the
Division.

Specifically, the listing did not contain a profit and

loss statement for either the fiscal year preceding the date of the
balance sheet, or the most recent year of operations.

By letter

dated February 21, 1989, the Division notified USA that the filing
was incomplete and that additional information was required.
8.

Section 61-1-14(2) (m) of the Act provides a transactional

exemption for fl[a]ny nonissuer transaction effected by or through
a registered broker-dealer where the broker-dealer maintains in his
records, and makes reasonably available upon request to any person
expressing an interest in a proposed transaction in the security
with the broker-dealer information prescribed by the division under
its rules and regulations."
9.

Rule 177-14-2m of the Division sets forth the exclusive

method of claiming the transactional exemption contained in § 611-14(2) (m) of the Act.

In particular, the rule requires that

specific information, i.e., a "due diligence package" be filed with
the Division. A search of the Division's records does not reflect
that USA has ever made a "due diligence" filing with the Division
pursuant to Rule 177-l4-2m of the Division.

0000292
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C.
10.

Fraudulent Scheme to Defraud

In the matter of Johnson Bowles Company. Inc. v. USA

Medical Corporation, et alP Case No. C89-157, (U.S. District Court,
Central Division) (March lr 1989), the court found, after having
heard testimony on the matter, that:
. . . that the stock of USA Medical was unlawfully
issued, has never been registered with any proper
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such requisite
registration and has been and is continuing to be traded
illegally.
Further that the stock of USA Medical has been and
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and
device to manipulate and artificially inflate the price
of that stock in violation of the securities laws.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Division hereby
issues the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
11.

Failure of USA Medical Corporation to register its

securities, or claim an appropriate exemption from registration as
provided in § 61-1-14 of the Act, is a violation of § 61-1-7 of the
Act;
12.

Offers and sales of the securities of USA Medical

Corporation have been made a» part of a device, scheme or artifice
to defraud in violation of § 61-1-1(1) of the Act;
13. Untrue statements of material facts and omission to state
material

facts have been made in the offer and sale of the

securities of USA Medical Corporation in violation of § 61-1-1(2)
of the Act; and

0000^)3
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14.

Persons engaged in the offer and sale of the securities

of USA Medical Corporation have engaged in acts, practices and/or
a course of business which has operated as a fraud or deceit in
violation of § 61-1-1(3) of the Act.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, it is in the public interest to issue the following
SUMMARY ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with the provisions set
forth in § 61-1-14(3) of the Act, that the availability of any and
all transactional exemptions contained in § 61-1-14(2) of the Act,
be and hereby are, summarily denied.
Pursuant to § 61-1-14(3) of the Act, notice is hereby given
that within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a written request,
this matter will be set down for hearing.
DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of March, 1989.
SECURITIES DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION

DIRECTOR

0 0 0 t'ZX\

EXHIBIT "K"

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF
USA MEDICAL CORPORATION

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DEFAULT ORDER

Respondent,

CASE NUMBER SD-89-031

By the Presiding Officer:
The instant proceeding was initiated via a Petition for Order
Denying Availability of Transactional Exemptions from Registration
dated March 1, 1989. A Notice of Agency Action was sent, certified
mail, return receipt requested to Respondent and Respondent's
authorized representative on March 2, 1989, The Notice of Agency
Action and Petition was also sent, postage prepaid, regular mail,
to the parties listed on Exhibit A, attached hereto and made a part
hereof.

A hearing has not been requested by Respondent or any

other interested party within twenty (20) days of the date of the
Notice of Agency Action as required pursuant to the provisions of
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
«=<
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Section 63-46b-ll of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
provides that failure of a party to participate in an adjudicative
proceeding may result in an order of default against such party.
The Presiding Officer, being fully advised in the premises,
now enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Default Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. S.M.I., Inc. was incorporated under the laws of the state
of Wyoming on January 12, 1979.

On or about December 8, 1987,

S.M.I.,

Medical

Inc.

corporation.

merged

with

USA

Corporation,

a

Utah

The surviving company is domiciled in the state of

Wyoming under the name USA Medical Corporation ("USA"). Offers and
sales of the securities of USA have been made in the state of Utah.
2.

In the matter of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. v. USA

Medical Corporation, et al. Case No. C89-157, (U.S. District Court,
Central Division) (March 1, 1989), the court found, after having
heard testimony on the matter, that:
2.
[T]he stock of USA Medical was unlawfully
issued, has never been registered with any proper
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such requisite
registration and has been and is continuing to be traded
illegally.
3. The stock of USA Medical has been and continues
to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and device
to manipulate and artifically inflate the price of that
stock in violation of the securities laws.
Such findings of fact are adopted herein. A copy of the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Motion for
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Preliminary Injunction and Granting Motion to Stay Action and
Compel Arbitration is attached hereto as Exhibit B and made a part
hereof.
3.

The securities of USA, or its predecessor S.M.I., Inc.,

have never been registered in Utah pursuant to the provisions of
§ 61-1-8, § 61-1-9 or § 61-1-10 of the Act.
4.

The exemption from registration contained in § 61-1-

14(2)(b) of the Act is unavailable for nonissuer transactions of
the securities of USA inasmuch as the listing, in Moodyf s OTC
Industrial manual for USA did not contain the information required
by § 61-1-14(2)(b) of the Act and Rule 177-14-2b of the Division.
Specifically, the listing did not contain a profit and loss
statement for either the fiscal year preceding the date of the
balance sheet, or the most recent year of operations.
5.

USA

did

not

file

an

application

for

any

other

transactional exemption from registration contained in 61-1-14(2)
of the Act with the Division.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
6.

Offers and sales of the securities of USA Medical

Corporation have been made in violation of § 61-1-7 of the Act;
7.

Offers and sales of the securities of USA Medical

Corporation have been made as part of a device, scheme or artifice
to defraud in violation of § 61-1-1(1) of the Act;
8. Untrue statements of material facts and omissions to state
material facts have been made in the offer and sale of the
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securities of USA Medical Corporation in violation of § 61-1-1(2)
of the Act; and
9.

Persons engaged in the offer and sale of the securities

of USA Medical Corporation have engaged in acts, practices and/or
a course of business which has operated as a fraud or deceit in
violation of § 61-1-1(3) of the Act,
DEFAULT ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the availability of the
transactional exemptions from registration contained in § 61-114(2) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act be, and hereby are, denied
for the securities of USA Medical Corporation, any affiliate or
successor to USA Medical Corporation, or any entity subsequently
organized by or on behalf of USA Medical Corporation.
AGENCY REVIEW
A defaulted party may seek to set aside the Default Order by
filing a request for agency review within ten (10) days after the
issuance of the order in accordance with the procedure set forth
in Rule 151-4 6b-12 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act rules.
DATED this

2 T ^ day of March, 1989.
SECURITIES DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

/huOhMhiii.
^-JOHN C. BALDWIN
PRESIDING OFFICER
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-5BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default
Order are hereby accepted, confirmed and approved by the Executive
Director of the Department of Commerce.
DATED this

27 th

day of

March

, 1989.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

DAVID L. BUHLER
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
BY THE SECURITIES ADVISORY BOARD:
The foregoing Default Order is hereby accepted, confirmed and
approved by the Utah Securities Advisory Board.
DATED this

th 1

day of

^YlM

1989

I^AAAKM
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EXHIBIT "L"

R. Paul van cam
Attorney General
Mark J. Griffin 4329
Assistant Attorney General
115 State Capital
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
(801) 538-1331
KAYCEE MCGINLEY 2187
Securities Division
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF
THE REGISTRATION OF

A M E N D E D

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY,

P E T I T I O N

INC

CRD NUMBER 7578

CASE NUMBER S D - 8 9 - 4 6 B D

IN THE MATTER OF
THE REGISTRATION OF
MARLEN JOHNSON

A M E N D E D

CRD NUMBER 259888

CASE NUMBER 8D-89-47AG

P E T I T I O N

The Securities Division of the Department of Commerce of the
State of Utah ("the Division"), by and through its Director, John
C. Baldwin, upon knowledge and belief, hereby complains and alleges
as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The cause of action was investigated by the Division upon
complaints that Marlen Johnson and Johnson Bowles Company, Inc.
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("Johnson Bowles") have engaged

in acts and practices which

constitute violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (Title 61f
Chapter 1, et sea., Utah Code Annotated, 1953f as amended) ("the
Act").
JURISDICTION
1.

Jurisdiction is vested in the Executive Director and the

Securities Advisory Board of the Department of Commerce pursuant
to § 61-1-6(1) of the Act.
2.

Section 61-1-6(1) of the Act provides that the Executive

Director, upon approval of a majority of the Securities Advisory
Board, may by order deny, suspend, or revoke any agent or brokerdealer registration if he finds that such order is in the public
interest and the agent or broker-dealer:
(g) Has engaged in dishonest or unethical
practices in the securities business.
3.

Johnson Bowles is a securities broker dealer duly

registered by the state of Utah under CRD registration 7578.
4.

Marlen Vernon Johnson

("Johnson"), CRD registration

259888, is a registered securities agent by the state of Utah and
principal of Johnson Bowles and acted as such at all times relevant
to this action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
5. On or about January 1988, Johnson, acting as an agent and
principal for Johnson Bowles began effecting and attempting to
effect transactions in the securities of USA Medical Corporation,
a Wyoming corporation

("USA

Medical"), whose securities were
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offered and sold in the state of Utah.
6.

On or about February 16, 1989, Johnson Bowles, by and

through its agent Johnson, filed suit in federal district court to
obtain an injunction to prevent trading of in the securities of USA
Medical.
7. On March 1, 1989, in the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company,
Inc. v, USA Medical Corporation, et al. Case No. C89-157, (U.S.
District Court, Central Division) the Court found:
. . . that the stock of USA Medical was unlawfully
issued, has never been registered with any proper
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such requisite
registration and has been and is continuing to be traded
illegally.
Further, that the stock of USA Medical has been and
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and
device to manipulate and artificially inflate the price
of that stock in violation of the securities laws.
8.
(Case

On March 1, 1989, the Division issued a Summary Order,
Number

SD-89-030)

denying

the

availability

of

all

transactional exemptions from registration for the securities of
USA Medical pursuant to the authority granted to the Division in
§ 61-1-14(3) of the Act.

A copy of the Summary Order was hand

delivered to Johnson Bowles on March 1, 1989. The Order is and has
been in effect continuously since its issuance on March 1, 1989.
The Summary Order is attached hereto and made a part of these
proceedings (Exhibit A ) .
9. On March 1, 1989, the Division commenced an administrative
action to deny the availability of all transactional exemptions
from registration pursuant to § 61-1-14(3) of the Act for the
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securities of USA Medical (Case Number SD-89-031) • A copy of the
Notice of Agency Action and Petition was mailed to Johnson Bowles
on March 2, 1989.
10.
Executive

Upon approval of the Securities Advisory Board, the
Director

of

the

Department

of

Commerce

accepted,

confirmed and approved the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Default Order on March 27, 1989.

The Default Order denied the

availability of the transactional exemptions from registration
contained in § 61-1-14(2) of the Act for the securities of USA
Medical, any affiliate or successor to USA Medical or any entity
subsequently

organized

by or on behalf

of USA Medical.

A copy of

the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default Order was
mailed to Johnson Bowles on March 27, 1989.
11.

On March 31, 1989, the Division caused a letter to be

mailed to Johnson Bowles restating the findings of the federal
district court and the Division's Summary Order and Default Order.
12.

On or about April 3, 1989 through April 18, 1989,

Johnson, acting in his capacity as an agent and principal for
Johnson Bowles, attempted to effect or effected transactions in the
securities of USA Medical as follows:
a. On or about April 3, 1989 and April 13, 1989, Johnson
contacted Mr. John Dawson, a shareholder of USA Medical, to
purchase shares of USA Medical owned by Mr. Dawson. Johnson
informed

Mr.

Dawson

that

such

arrangement

would

be

a

handwritten agreement between Mr. Dawson and a New York firm.
Johnson offered Mr. Dawson $.10 per share and instructed Mr.
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Dawson to deliver his stock certificate to Johnson Bowles
whereupon a check for the shares of USA Medical would be given
to him.
b.

On or about April 6, 1989, Johnson purchased 12,000

shares of USA Medical for the sum of $1,200.00 from Sheldon
and Lois Flateman in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
c. On or about April 14, 1989, Johnson purchased 18,000
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $1,800.00

from Richard

Sax in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
d. On or about April 18, 1989, Johnson purchased 80,000
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $8,000.00 from Paul Jones
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
e. On or about April 18, 1989, Johnson purchased 69,500
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $6,950.00 from Nick
Julian in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
f.

On information and belief, the Division believes

Johnson has purchased approximately 226,500 additional shares
of USA Medical since March 1, 1989.
COUNT

l

13. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference its
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 12 as specifically
set out herein.
14.

Section 61-1-6(1) of the Act provides that the Division

may issue an order suspending or revoking the registration of a
broker-dealer if it finds that such order is in the public interest
and the broker-dealer:

6
tg; nas enyayeu in dishonest or unethical practices in the
securities business.
15.

The above described sales of USA Medical shares were

sales effected without registration or exemption in violation of
Section 61-1-7 of the Act.
16.

The actions of Johnson, in soliciting and/or purchasing

the USA Medical shares during the pendency of the Division's order,
encouraged or otherwise aided in the violation of Section 61-1-7
of the Act.
17.

The above actions of Johnson, acting on behalf of

Johnson-Bowles, in soliciting, encouraging or aiding the violation
of the Division's Order constitute violations of § 61-1-6(1)(g) of
the Utah Uniform Securities Act.

COUNT II
23. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference its
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 22 as specifically
set out herein.
24.

Section 61-1-6(1) (g) of the Act provides that the

Division may issue an order suspending or revoking the registration
of a broker-dealer if it finds that such order is in the public
interest and that the broker-dealer "has engaged in dishonest or
unethical practices in the securities business."
25. Rule R177-6-lg(a)(3) of the Division, promulgated under
the authority of § 61-1-6(1)(g) of the Act, establishes that the
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following acts and practices by broker-dealers constitute grounds
for suspension or revocation of registration:
11

(3) Recommending to a customer the purchase, sale
or exchange of any security without reasonable grounds
to believe that such transaction or recommendation is
suitable for the customer based upon reasonable inquiry
concerning the customerfs
investment objectives,
financial situation and needs, and any other relevant
information known by the broker-dealer."
26.

Johnson

and

Johnson-Bowles,

as

described

above,

recommended, solicited or effected for customers the sales of
securities of USA Medical which sales would necessarily involve a
violation of Section 61-1-7 of the Act.
27. The above actions by Johnson Bowles constitute dishonest
and unethical practices within the meaning of Section 61-1-6(1)(g)
of the Act and Division Rule R177-6-lg in that transactions which
involve a violation of the Act are not suitable.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief:
1.

A finding that Johnson Bowles Company, Inc., engaged in

the acts and practices alleged above;
2.

A finding that Marlen Johnson engaged in the acts and

practices alleged above;
3. That by engaging in the above acts and practices, Johnson
Bowles Company, Inc. be adjudged and decreed to be found in
violation of § 61-1-6(1) (g) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and
Rule R177-6-lg of the Division;
4.

That by engaging in the above acts and practices, Marlen

Johnson be adjudged and decreed to be found in violation of § 61-

OOOoibV
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1-6(1) (g) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and Rule R177-6-lg of
the Division;

act

5*

That the registration of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. to

as

a

securities

broker-dealer

be

suspended

or

revoked

accordingly.

act

6.

That the registration of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. to

as

a

securities

broker-dealer

be

this

day of July, 1989.

suspended

or

revoked

accordingly.
Dated

R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General

Griffin
Attorney General
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EXHIBIT "M"

BEFORETHE DIVISION OP SECURITIES
OFTOEDEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Registration of
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.
CRD No. 07678

:
-:
:

In the Matter of the Registration of
Marten Vernon Johnson
CRD No. 2598888

:
:
:

MOTION TO CONVERT PROCEEDINGS
AND ACCOMPANYING ORDER
Case No. SD-89-46BD
Case No. SD-89-47AG

Appearances:
Mark J. Griffin for the Division of Securities
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents
By the Administrative Law Judge:
Pursuant to motion, dated May 24,1989, die division seeks to convat the above-referenced cases
to formal adjudicative proceedings. On May 31,1989, Respondents filed an objection to the pending
motion. Said objection was further supplemented by a June 2,1989 letter.
Oral argument was conducted on June 19,1989 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law
Judge for die Department of Commerce.
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following
Conclusions of Law and Order.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The division contends these proceedings should be converted because it appears that Respondents
will vigorously contest any adverse ruling issued on die merits in this forum. Given that informal
adjudicative proceedings are subject to judicalreviewby trial de novo, the division urges it would then be
necessary to conduct another evidentiary proceeding ami assem that expertise by thefeetfinder in the
interpretation of securities laws and theregulationof the securities industry would be lost if the instant
adjudicative proceedings are not conducted on aformalbasis and, thereby, subject to judicialreviewon the
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record The division thus contends that conversion of these proceedings is in the public interest and, since
the pending motion has been made in the early stages of these proceedings, the division also urges that
neither party would be unfairly prejudiced if the motion is granted.
Section 63-46b-4(3), Utah Code Ann. (1953), provides as follows:
Any time before afinalorder is issued in any adjudicative proceeding, the
presiding officer may convert... an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal
adjudicative proceeding if:
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the
rights of any party.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (Section 63-46b-1 et seq.) provides for three kinds of adjudicative
proceedings: formal, informal and emergency. Pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(l), agencies may designate,
by rule, those categories of adjudicative proceedings which are to be conducted informally. Section 63-46b4(2) provides that all agency adjudicative proceedings which are not designated as informal are to be
conducted on a formal basis.
The division has engaged in the rulemaking process authorized by Section 63-465-4(1).
Specifically, R177-46b-6B provides as follows:
All adjudicative proceedings under the Act, enumerated in this Rule, are
designated as informal adjudicative proceedings.
R177-46b-6E sets forth when hearings will be conducted in adjudicative proceedings. Specifically, the juststated rule provides as follows:
2. In the following proceedings, a hearing will be held only if timely
requested:
(a) 61-1-6(1) or (2) Denial, suspension, revocation of registration of
broker-dealer, agent, investment advisor,
Although it has designated the instant proceedings to be conducted on an informal basis, the division argues
that all of its adjudicative proceedings were so designated on the assumption that the vast majority of such
proceedings would be perfunctory in nature and that the proposed agency action in those matters would not
be contested. However, the division urges that if there is a dispute as to proposed agency action and the
party toward whom that action is directed determines to actively defend its interests, a motion to convert the
proceeding is appropriate.

The Utah Administrative Proce^

State agency

rulemaking is a necessary prerequisite to effectively implement various provisions of that Act, the most
significant of which involves the matter now under review. Given its recent origin, the Act has not yet
been the subject of judicial review as to the issue now presented. Nevertheless, comments of the Utah
Administrative Law Advisory Committee, pertinent to Section 63-46b-4, are instructive. Those comments
provide as follows:
If a party moves to convert an adjudicative proceedingfrominformal to
formal..., the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the
requirements of Section 63-46b-4(3) have been satisfied The intent of the
Advisory Committee is that these requirements be narrowly construed to
encourage agencies to decide which classes of adjudicative proceedings will be
formal and which will be informal and to designate in advance the classes of
adjudicative proceedings that will be informal. The propriety of conversion is
decided by the presiding officer.
The Committee has further stated as follows:
There may be cases where a party moves to convert an adjudicative
proceedingfromformal to informal and the category of adjudicative proceedings
involved has not been designated as a categoryforinformal adjudication by the
agency in advance through rulemaking. Conversion is possible under these
circumstances. Each case, however, is fact sensitive. The decision of the
presiding officer in such a case to convert the adjudicative proceeding from
formal to informal should not be used as precedent for subsequent cases in the
same category of adjudicative proceedings. An ad hoc approach to the
formal/informal question is not a substitute for rulemaking. Agencies should
regularly reassess the classes cf cases that they intend to conduct informally in
light of their own experience.
Many of the agency actions which could be taken by the Diviskxi, as evidenced throughout the
rules which have been promulgated, are matters of a mundane and noncontroversial nature. However, the
suspension or revocation of registration for a boko/dealer, agent or investment advisor would impact an
existingrightto practice in that capacity. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that any given
registrant would actively and aggressively defend against an interruption of their livelihood Nevertheless,
the designation as to whether any proceeding should be conducted on a formal or informal basis should not
turn on whether individuals to whom a notice of agency action have been directed arc inclined to respond
actively or passively. Granting a motion to convert amply because there is active resistance by the party
to whom the notice of agency action has been issued would be capricious and not justified
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Despite the foregoing, (he pending motion has serious merit in an important respect Given the
relative complexity of securitiesregulation,expertise in the application and interpretation of the statutes and
rules which govern the securities industry could prove to be invaluable to any factfindercharged with the
responsibility to determine whether certain conduct is violative of the governing statutes and rules in that
regard. In fact, the existence and effectiveness of agency adjudicative proceedings is primarily predicated
upon the exercise of such specialized skills by boards and commissions similar to the Securities Advisory
Board. In light of the proposed agency action incident to these proceedings, it is in the public interest to
conduct these cases on a formal basis.
Respondent urges that greater attorney's fees and costs would be incurred in defending formal
proceedings. Respondent further asserts that conversion of these proceedings would talw away a "significant
right" to judicialreviewby trial de novo and suggests that the pending motion has been made because the
Division desires that any evidentiary proceedings in this forum be subject to judicial review on the record.
Respondent thus contends that the "forced and unreasonable swap of rights would be inherently unfair" and
that the motion underreviewis "designed merely to 'unfairly prejudice'" its' interests in all respects.
Respondent's concern with costs which could be incurred on appeal and the nature of judicial
reviewfromany order entered in this forum implies that Respondents may believe the outcome of these
proceedings is a foregone conclusion. Although the division has undertaken proceedings which could
prompt entry of a disciplinary sanction against Respondents, there is no basis to conclude that Respondents
will not be fully accorded (hie process in these proceedings, whether conducted en aformalor informal
basis. The "unfair prejudice"referencedin Section 6346b^3Xb) partknilariyrelatesto therequirementthat
adjudicative proceedings be conducted as to afford all parties due process. Simply put, the costs incurred by
Respondent as a litigant in these proceedings are a matter of choice. Neither said costs nor the nature of
judicial review and associated costs in thatregardarerelevantto die issue of "unfair prejudice". Given the
early stage of these proceedings, a favorable ruling on the pending motion would not adversely affect the
substantial rights of either party. Thus, the Division's motion is well taken and should be granted.
Nevertheless, two further matters should be addressed Nothing herein should be construed to
suggest that subsequent motions of this nature will be customarily granted, on an ad hex: basis, upon the

000 v,!

uigence thattoeDivision desires to avoid evidentiary proceedings in both the a d m i n ^ ^
forum and the concomitant loss of agency expertise during de novo review in the latter instance. The
Division should re-evaluate the nature of the various agency actions it can take and assess those cases where
expertise by the factfinderin adjudicative proceedings is necessary and/or desirable. Thereafter, the Division
should modify its rules to accordingly differentiate the manner in which adjudicative proceedings will be
conducted.
Respondent has requested that any order granting the pending motion be certified as "final", so that
any necessary review of that order can be sought Section 6346b-12, which provides that parties to any
adjudicative proceeding may seek review "of an order by the agency", sets forth the procedure to obtain any
such review. R151-46b-12(A) is further applicable in that respect Presumably, Respondents'request is
directed toward the provisions of Section 63-46b-14, which provides:
(1) Any party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency
action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited
by statute. (All emphasis herein added).
Whether the order set forth below is "final", as to allow for subsequent judicial review, is not for this Court
to decide. However, the order herein is subjecttoagency review, as set forth above.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the May 24,1989 motion to convert these proceedings is
granted.

Dated this

r / ^ ^

day of July, 1989.

sveftEklutfil
illustrative Law Judge
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STA1E OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Registration of
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.
CRD No. 07678

:
:
:
:

In the Matter of the Registration of
Marien Vernon Johnson
CRD No. 2598888

:
:
:

MOTION TO DISMISS AND
ACCOMPANYING ORDER
Case No. SD-89-46BD
Case No. SD-89-47AG

Appearances:
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents
Mark J. Griffin for the Division of Securities
By the Administrative Law Judge:
By Motion, dated July 3,1989, Respondents seek a dismissal of the instant adjudicative
proceedings. A memorandum in opposition thereto was filed by Ae Division on July 13,1989. On the
just-stated date, Respondents also filed an affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss.
Oral argument on the pending motion was conducted on July 14,1989, at which time Respondents
filed a reply memorandum and copies of six (6) letters relative thereto.
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. is a securities broker and Respondent Marien
Vernon Johnson is a securities agent and principal of the just-named company. Respondents are duly
registered by the Division of Securities of the State of Utah.
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2. By Summary Order, dated March 1,1989, the Division denied the availability of all
transactional exemptions relative to the securities of U.S.A. Medical Corporation. The Summary Order has
been in effect on a continuous basis since the just-stated date.
3. Prior to entry of the March 1,1989 Summary Order, Respondent Johnson, as an agent and
principal for Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., had effected transactions in the securities of
U.S A . Medical Corporation. Sparing detail, outstanding contracts existed between Respondent JohnsonBowles Company, Inc. and various third parties respecting the sale of the securities in question by
Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. to those third parties. Specifically, said contracts existed prior
to issuance of the March 1,1989 Summary Oder.
4. Given the just-described contracts, and in order to effect the delivery of the securities in question
to various third parties, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., through Respondent Marten Vernon
Johnson, purchased approximately 364,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation stock from seven (7)
individuals between April 3,1989 and April 13,1989. Respondents were aware of die March 1,1989
Summary Order when the just-described purchases were made.
5. On April 27,1989, the Division filed a Notice of Agency Action and Petition, wherein it was
alleged that Respondents had willfully violated or willfully fedled to comply with the Miarch 1,1989
Summary Order and that they had engaged in dishonest or unethk^ practices in the securities business.
Pursuant to an Amended Petition, dated July 19,1989, the Division has withdrawn the allegation that
Respondents had either willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with the March 1,1989 Summary
Oder. However, based on die allegation that Respondents have engaged in dishonest oi unethical practices
in the securities business, the Division seeks entry of an order suspending or revoking the respective
registration of Respondents Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. and Marlen Vernon Johnson.
CX>NeLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents assert that the Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction to initiate the instant
proceeding and to enter any disciplinary sanction as to their existing registration. Specifically, Respondents
contend that rules of conduct promulgated by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
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required thai they complete their existing contracts by either payment a deUvery (rfd^
question. Respondents further contend that compliance with diatdiitcrivepnm^
US.A. Medical Corporation securities from certain Utah residents subsequent to the issuance of the March
1,1989 Summary Order and that said Order prohibited only the sak, but not the puidiase,^
securities. In essence, Respondents urge that die pertinent NASD rules of conduct promulgated pursuant to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 necessarily supercede the operation of the March 1,1989 Summary
Order and, thus, the instant proceeding should be dismissed.
During oral argument on the pending motion, counsel for Respondents extensively addressed those
rules of conduct which govern NASD members and whether Respondents could have been subject to
disciplinary sanction regarding their membership in that organization for any failure to comply with said
rules. In rejoinder, counsel for the Division has urged that Respondents could have fulfilled their
contractual obligations to third parties by means other than a purchase of U.S.A. Medical Corporation
securities, but that it wasfinanciallyadvantageous for Respondents to act as they did. The Division has
also asserted that Respondents solicited die sale of U.S .A. Medical Corporation securities and that any such
solicitation is relevant to whether Respondents engaged in dishonest and unethical securities practices.
Notwithstanding the belabored arguments which were presented as to the foregoing matters, the
operative effect of die March 1,1989 Summary Order was to prevent the sale of unregistered securities to
Utah residents. Bodi parties concede that those securities had been the subject of market manipulation and
securities fraud. Under such circumstances, issuance of die Summary Order was clearly intended lo preclude
any subsequent sale of those securities within this state.
With knowledge of the existence of the Summary Order, Respondents purchased said securities
from certain Utah residents. In so doing. Respondents' conduct effectively frustrated die attempts of die
Division to preclude the trading of those unregistered securities. Whether Respondents solicited die sale of
U.S A. Medical Corporation securities (and Respondents have strenuously urged that they did not), it is
obvious that their participation in those transactions as a purchaser of those securities facilitated a violation
of the Summary Order as to potentially subject them to disciplinary sanction in these proceedings.
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Respondents' assertion that NASD rules of conduct should be accorded the force and effect of federal
law, as to thus obviate compliance with the March 1,1989 Summary Order, is not well-founded.
Coocededly, had Respondents owned the securities prior to March 1,1989 and merely delivered those
securities to third parties after the Summary Order had been issued, such a ministerial act may not have
exposed Respondents to possible revocation or suspension of their registration. However, Respondents'
purchase of the securities after March 1,1989 to effect their subsequent delivery of those securities to third
parties was squarely at odds with the operative effect of the March 1,1989 Summary Order. Simply put,
any necessary compliance by Respondents with NASD rules as a member of that self-regulatory
organization does not lend support to the conclusion that the Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction in
this case.
Two further matters should be addressed. Both parties have noted certain aggravating and/or
mitigating factors in this case and have urged that such factors should be considered relative to the merits of
the pending motion. Without doubt, such circumstances are relevant as to any possible entry of a
disciplinary sanction at some subsequent stage in these proceedings. However, thosefactorsarc not
germane to die matter presently before the Court
Respondents have also requested that any order denying the pending motion be certified as "final",
so that necessary review of that order can be sought Section 63-465-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as
amended, provides that parties to any adjudicative proceeding may seek review "erf an order by the agency"
and sets forth die procedure to obtain any such review. R151-46b-12(A) is further applicable in that
respect Presumably, Respondents' request that any order issued on the pending motion be certified as final
is one directed toward the provisions of Section 63-46b-14, which provides:
(1) Any party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. (All
emphasis herein added)
It is not within the province of this Court to decided whether the order set forth below is "final", as to allow
for subsequent judicial review, nor to certify any such order as being final for purposes of such review.
However, the order herein is subject to agency review, as setforthabove.

4

ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondents' motion to dismiss the July 19,1989
Amended Petition is denied
Dated this

t*A'*^

dav of August 1989.

JlArteven Ekluni
tw Judge
listrative Law

^^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Accompanying
Order, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to John Michael Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111; to Craig F. McCullough, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 8th Floor, Kennecott
Building, 10 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84113, co-counsel for Respondents; and to
Mark J. Griffin, Assistant Attorney General for the Division of Securities at Tax & Business Regulation
Division, 130 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
Dated this

O?^

day of August, 1989.
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EXHIBIT

"0"

901
DISHONEST OR UNETHICAL BUSINESS PRACTICES
Adopted on April 23, 1983

[11401]
kts ana practices, including but
not limited to the following, are considered contrary to such standards and may
constitute grounds for denial, suspension or revocation of registration or such other
action authorized by statute.
ft 1402]
1. BROKER-DEALERS
a.
Engaging in a pattern of unreasonable and unjustifiable delays in the
delivery of securities purchased by any of its customers and/or in the
payment upon request of free credit balances reflecting completed
transactions of any of its customers;
b.
Inducing trading in a customer's account which is excessive in size or
frequency in view of the financial resources and character of the account;
c.
Recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security
without reasonable grounds to believe that such transaction or
recommendation is suitable for the customer based upon reasonable inquiry
concerning the customer's investment objectives, financial situation and
needs, and any other relevant information known by the broker-dealer;
d.
Executing a transaction on behalf of a customer without authorization to do
so;
e.
Exercising any discretionary power in effecting a transaction for a
customer's account without first obtaining written discretionary authority
from the customer, unless the discretionary power relates solely to the time
and/or price for the execution of orders;
f.
Executing any transaction in a margin account without securing from the
customer a properly executed written margin agreement promptly after the
initial transaction in the account;
g.
Failing to segregate customers' free securities or securities held in
safekeeping;
h.
Hypothecating a customer's securities without having a lien thereon unless
the broker-dealer secures from the customer a properly executed written
consent promptly after the initial transaction, except as permitted by Rules
of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
i.
Entering into a transaction with or for a customer at a price not reasonably
related to the current market price of the security or receiving an
unreasonable commission or profit;
j.
Failing to furnish to a customer purchasing securities in an offering, no later
than the date of confirmation of the transaction, either a final prospectus or
a preliminary prospectus and an additional document, which together
include all information set forth in the final prospectus;
k.
Charging unreasonable and inequitable fees for services performed, including
miscellaneous services such as collection of monies due for principal,
dividends or interest, exchange or transfer of securities, appraisals,
NASAA Reports
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1.

m.

n.

Statements of Policy

safekeeping, or custody of securities and other services related to its
securities business;
Offering to buy from or sell to any person any security at a stated price
unless such broker-dealer is prepared to purchase or sell, as the ease may be,
at such price and under such conditions as are stated at the time of such
offer to buy or sell;
Representing that a security is being offered to a customer "at the market"
or a price relevant to the market price unless such broker-dealer knows or
has reasonable grounds to believe that a market for such security exists other
than that made, created or controlled by such broker-dealer, or by any
person for whom he is acting or with whom he is associated in such
distribution, or any person controlled by, controlling or under common
control with such broker-dealer;
Effecting any transaction in, or inducing the purchase or sale of, any
security by means of any manipulative, deceptive or fraudulent device,
practice, plan, program, design or contrivance, which may include but not be
limited to:
(1) Effecting any transaction in a security which involves no change in the
beneficial ownership thereof;
(2) Entering an order or orders for the purchase or sale of any security with
the knowledge that an order or orders of substantially the same size, at
substantially th€ same time and substantially the same price, for the
sale of any such security, has been or will be entered by or for the same
or different parties for the purpose of creating a false or misleading
appearance of active trading in the security or a false or misleading
appearance with respect to the market for the security; provided,
however, nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a broker-dealer from
entering bona fide agency cross trans-actions for its customers;

o.
p.

q.

U 1402

(3) Effecting, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of
transactions in any security creating actual or apparent active trading
in such security or raising or depressing the price of such security, for
the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others;
Guaranteeing a customer against loss in any securities account of such
customer carried by the broker-dealer or in any securities transaction
effected by the broker-dealer with or for such customer;
Publishing or circulating, or causing to be published or circulated, any
notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper article, investment service, or
communication of any kind which purports to report any transaction as a
purchase or sale of any security unless such broker-dealer believes that such
transaction was a bona fide purchase or sale of such security; or which
purports to quote the bid price or asked price for any security, unless such
broker-dealer believes that such quotation represents a bona fide bid for, or
offer of, such security,
Using any advertising or sales presentation in such a fashion as to be
deceptive or misleading. An example of such practice would be a distribution
of any nonfactual data, material or presentation based on conjecture,
unfounded or unrealistic claims or assertions in any brochure, flyer, or
display by words, pictures, graphs or otherwise designed to supplement,
©1986, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
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Dishonest or unethical Business Practices

r.

s.

t.

9U3

detract from, supersede or defeat the purpose or effect of any prospectus or
disclosure; or
Failing to disclose that the broker-dealer is controlled by, controlling,
affiliated with or under common control with the issuer of any security
before entering into any contract with or for a customer for the purchase or
sale of such security, the existence of such control to such customer, and if
such disclosure is not made in writing, it shall be supplemented by the giving
or sending of written disclosure at or before the completion of the
transaction;
Failing to make a bona fide public offering of all of the securities allotted to
a broker-dealer for distribution, whether acquired as an underwriter, a
selling group member, or from a member participating in the distribution as
an underwriter or selling group member; or
Failure or refusal to furnish a customer, upon reasonable request,
information to which he is entitled, or to respond to a formal written request
or complaint.
[11 H03]

2. AGENTS
a.
Engaging in the practice of lending or borrowing money or securities from a
customer, or acting as a custodian for money, securities or an executed stock
power of a customer;
b.
Effecting securities transactions not recorded on the regular books or records
of the broker-dealer which the agent represents, unless the transactions are
authorized in writing by the broker-dealer prior to execution of the
transaction;
c.
Establishing or maintaining an account containing fictitious information in
order to execute transactions which would otherwise be prohibited;
d.
Sharing directly or indirectly in profits or losses in the account of any
customer without the written authorization of the customer and the brokerdealer which the agent represents;
e.
Dividing or otherwise splitting the agent's commissions, profits or other
compensation from the purchase or sale of securities with any person not also
registered as an agent for the same broker-dealer, or for a broker-dealer
under direct or indirect common control; or
f.
Engaging in conduct specified in Subsection l.b, c, d, e, ft i, j, n, o, p, or q.
(11404]
[CONDUCT NOT INCLUSIVE.] The conduct set forth above is not inclusive.
Engaging in other conduct such as forgery, embezzlement, non-disclosure, incomplete
disclosure or missutement of material facts, or manipulative or deceptive practices
shall also be grounds for denial, suspension or revocation of registration.
[The next page is 1001.]
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EXHIBIT "P"

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
March 6, 1989
U.S.A. Medical Corporation
File No.

ORDER OF SUSPENSION
OF TRADING

500-1

It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that
there is a lack of adequate and accurate current information
concerning the securities of USA Medical Inc., and that questions
have been raised about recent market activity in USA Medical, and
about the adequacy and accuracy of publicly disseminated
information concerning, among other things, the financial
condition of the company, the identities of its shareholders, and
the beneficial ownership and control of the company's shares.
The Commission is of the opinion that the public interest and the
protection of investors require a suspension of trading in the
securities of the above-listed company.
Therefore, it is ordered, pursuant to Section 12 (X) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that trading in the above-listed
company, over-the-counter or otherwise, is suspended for the
period from
9 : 30 a.nu EST, March € $ 1989 through 13: 59 p.m.
EST, on March is 1989.
By the Commission.

Jonathan G. Katz

Secretary

'JlK<^io9

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington D.C.
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
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The Securities and Exchange Commission announced pursuant to
Section 12 (k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act") the temporary suspension of over-the-counter trading of the
securities of USA Medical Corp. for a ten day period commencing
at 9: 30 a.m. (EST) , March 6r 1989 and terminating at n: 59 p.m.
(EST) on March 15, 1989,
The Commission temporarily suspended trading in the securities of
USA Medical in view of questions that have been raised about recent
market activity in the securities of USA Medical, and about the
adequacy and accuracy of publicly disseminated information
concerning, among other things, the financial condition of the
company, the identities of its shareholders, and the beneficial
ownership and control of the company's shares.
The Commission
cautions broker-dealers, shareholders, and
prospective purchasers that they should carefully consider the
foregoing information along with all other current available
information and any information subseouentlv issued by the company.
Further, brokers and dealers should be alert to the fact that,
pursuant to Rule 15c2~ll under the Exchange Act, at the termination
of the trading suspensions, no quotation may be entered unless and
until they have strictly complied with all of the provisions of
said rule. If any broker or dealer has any questions as to whether
^r no*- Vu» H*R nowpl i«d with said rule, he should not enter any
quotation but immediately contact the staff of the Securities and
Exchange Commission in Salt'Lake City, Utah. If any broker or
dealer is uncertain as to what is required by Rule 15c2-ll, he
should refrain from entering quotations relating to the securities
in question until such time as he has familiarized himself with
said rule and is certain that all of its provisions have been met.
If any broker or dealer enters any quotation which is in violation
of said rule, the Commission will consider the need for prompt
enforcement action.
If any broker-dealer or other person has any information which may
relate to this matter, the Salt Lake Branch Office of the
Securities and Exchange Commission should be telephoned at (801)
524-5796.

^^70
1

EXHIBIT "Q"

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ORDER ON AGENCY REVIEW
REGISTRATION OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC.
CRD No. 07678

Case No. SD-89-46B

IN THE MATTER OF THE
REGISTRATION OF:
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
CRD No. 259888

Case No. SD-89-47AG

On September 11, 1989, Respondents Johnson-Bowles Company,
Inc. and Marlen Vernon Johnson, pursuant to §63-46b-12 Utah Code
Ann. and R151-46-b-12A of the Rules of Procedure for Adjudicative
Proceedings before the Department of Business Regulation, requested
agency review of an August 29, 1989 Order, and asked for an oral
hearing thereon.
Motion

to

Dismiss

The August 29, 1989 Order denied Respondents
the

Amended

Petition

of

the

Division

of

Securities (the Division).
Respondents have also requested certification of the August
29, 1989 Order as a "final agency action,11 or, in the alternative,
asked for an order declaring that Respondents had exhausted their
administrative

remedies regarding the issue of subject matter

jurisdiction.
Respondents also requested that any order issued on review
also be certified as a "final agency" action.
Finally, Respondents requested that the Division disclose
whether the Securities Advisory Board constitutes the Appellate
Body performing this review, in order to determine the existence
of any conflicts of interest by David Eccles Hardy, a member of
that Board.
On September 11, 1989, Respondents filed a brief in support
of their request for agency review and oral hearing thereon.

On

September 26, 1989, the Securities Division filed a brief in reply
to Respondents' request for agency review and hearing.

On October

6, 1989 Respondents filed a reply brief in support of their request
for agency review.

THE DIRECTOR, AS PRESIDING OFFICER, now enters the following:

Section 63-46b-12 Utah Code Ann. sets forth the procedure
which governs administrative review of agency orders. That statute
vests agencies with the discretion to provide, by rule, whether
parties to any adjudicative proceeding may seek "review of an order
by the agency or by a superior agency".

R151-46b-12A of the Rules

of Procedure for Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of
Business Regulation allows such requests to be made as follows:
A request for agency review may be filed...after the issuance
of findings of fact, conclusions of law and the order entered
in a formal adjudicative proceeding... .

Section 63-46b-13 provides that if agency review of "an order" is
not available pursuant to Section 63-46b-12 "and if the order would
otherwise constitute final agency action", a party may request
agency reconsideration of "the order"•

Section 63-46b-14 also

provides that an aggrieved party "may obtain judicial review of
final agency action...".
Section

63-46b-12

and R151~46b-12 do not expressly

agency review to orders which constitute

limit

final agency action.

Thus, a party aggrieved by orders of an interim nature (i.e., an
order denying a request for a continuance or an order denying a
motion to dismiss) could arguably request agency review of such
matters.
68

However, in Sloan v. Board of Review, 118 Utah Adv. Rep

(October 2, 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals distinguishes

orders, which are not reviewable because they are not "final", from
orders which do constitute "final agency action", by stating that
"an order of the agency is not final so long as it reserves
something to the agency for further decision".

Id. at 68.

In the

Sloan case, the Court dismissed an appeal due to the lack of a
final agency order.
Given the nature of the August 29, 1989 Order, Respondents'
request represents an interlocutory appeal and, following Sloan,
would

not

be

considered

a

final

agency

action.

Review

of

interlocutory matters would necessarily deprive agency adjudicative
proceedings

of

the

simplicity

and

speed

contemplated

by

the

Administrative Procedures Act and the rules governing adjudicative
proceedings in this Department, and would inappropriately interpose
an interlocutory appeal process within the Department.

< •: .. ,:>s

In essence, absent a rule permitting agency review pursuant
to Section 63-46b-12, agency reconsideration pursuant to Section
63-46b-13 is only available as to an order which constitutes final
agency action. The availability of judicial review is also limited
to such orders.

In light of the provisions which govern agency

reconsideration and judicial review, and mindful of the rationale
expressed in Sloan v. Board of Review, it is ill-advised to conduct
agency

review of orders which do not constitute final agency

action. Although Section 63-46b-12 and R151-46b-12 do not so limit
the availability of agency review, the efficient administration of
agency adjudicative proceedings compels the conclusion that such
interpretation be given.

ORDER
WHEREFORE, THE FOLLOWING ARE HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Respondents1 Request for Agency Review and oral argument

thereon are denied.
2.

Respondents' Requests that both the August 29, 1989 order

and this Order on Review, be certified as "final agency action",
are denied because it is not considered to be within the province
of the Presiding Officer to so certify or declare.
3.
Securities

Respondents'
Advisory

consideration

of

concerns

Board

these

regarding

member

requests

David
are

the

Eccles

involvement
Hardy

inapplicable,

of

in

the

since

the

Director has acted as the Presiding Officer, and accordingly,
Respondents' request for an order to disclose any conflicts of
interest is also denied.

( C. .A/J

Dated this

*0»
J*

day of October, 1989.

da:

rohn C. Baldwin
Director, Division of Securities
Presiding Officer
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed the foregoing
Order on Agency Review properly addressed, postage prepaid, to John
Michael Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111; to Craig F. McCullough, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 8th
Floor, Kennecott Building, 10 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84113, co-counsel for Respondents; and to Mark J.
Griffin, Assistant Attorney General for the Division of Securities
at Tax & Business Regulation Division, 130 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114.
Dated this O ^

day of October, 1989,

Te/ri Farn^worth

±L
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EXHIBIT "R"

•envq
N0V2ZRETO
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:

AMENDED ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIM

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.
CRD NO. 07678

Case No. SD-89-46BD

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
Case No. SD-89-47AG

MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
CRD NO. 2598888

Respondents herewith respond to the amended petitions in the above matters,
affirmatively allege, and counterclaim against the Division as follows.
ANSWER
1. Respondents deny 51 of the amended petitions in that the Division does not
have any Jurisdiction over these proceedings.
2. Respondents admit 12 as a blanket statement of the law taken out of
context but allege that §61-1 -6(1 )(g). Utah Code Ann., and the rules promulgated

0'U> /US
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thereunder based on NASD rules and NASAA Guidelines, are inapplicable to these
proceedings and the conduct of Respondents.
3. Respondents admit 13 of the amended petitions. Respondents deny 14 to
the extent that Respondent Marlen V. Johnson was acting at all times relevant to this action
as an individual and not as either a securities principal or agent.
4. Respondents deny 15 in that Respondent Johnson-Bowles was effecting
transactions in the securities of U.S.A. Medical in January, 1989, not 1988.
5. Respondents deny 16 of the amended petitions to the extent that such was
the sole purpose of Respondents' filing of a federal lawsuit ultimately assigned to Judge J.
Thomas Greene. On the contrary, the primary reason Respondent Johnson-Bowles filed the
federal action was to have a U.S. District Court declare Respondents' outstanding Exchange
Act contracts void for illegality — something the Court ultimately declined to do on
February 28, 1989.
6. Respondents admit 17 of the amended petitions but allege that such is not
the full extent of Judge Greene's ruling in Case No. C-89-157-G and 17 is thus misleading
to the extent that it is taken out of context. What Judge Greene essentially ruled relative to
these proceedings was that Respondents' outstanding Exchange Act contracts were neither
"void" nor "voidable" and therefore, Respondents would be required by law to purchase
enough U.S.A. Medical stock, as they ultimately did, to complete such interstate contracts
previously entered into in the course of their Exchange Act business.
7. Respondents admit 18 of the amended petitions to the extent that the
Division's Order of March 1, 1989, revoked the availability of exemptions in Utah only for the
offer and sale of U.S.A. Medical stock. The Order, however, either legally, or by its own

terms, is irrelevant to and otherwise has no effect whatsoever on purchases of U.S.A.
Medical stock by anyone as a matter of law. Respondents do not recall whether the Order
was "hand-delivered" to them or not on March 1. and whether it was or not, such Order, by
its own unambiguous terms, does not and did not put Respondents on either actual or
constructive notice that their subsequent purchase of U.S.A. Medical stock to fulfill
Exchange Act obligations would, or could, result in the instant proceedings. As to whether
the March 1, Order has been in effect continuously since its issuance, this is debatable and
therefore denied.
8. Respondents have no personal knowledge of that contained in 19 of the
amended petitions and therefore, they deny the same. They also have no recollection of
whether a Notice of Agency Action and Petition was mailed to them by the Division on either
March 2, 1989, or at all.
9. Respondents have no personal knowledge of that contained in Ts 10 and 11
and therefore, on that ground, deny the same.
10. Relative to 112a, Respondent Johnson admits that he called John Dawson
but such only occurred after he was informed by one Karl Smith that Dawson was anxious to
sell his "worthless" U.S.A. Medical stock to anyone who wanted to buy it. The remainder of
112a is inaccurate and irrelevant to these proceedings as a matter of law and therefore, the
same is denied.
11. Respondents deny Ts 12b-12f of the amended petitions insofar as they
are inconsistent with various Representation Letters furnished Respondents by each of their
sellers, true and correct copies of which were similarly furnished the Division and the
Administrative Law Judge at the hearing on Respondents' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss.
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Such Representation Letters and their respective contents are incorporated herein by
reference. In particular, however, Respondents deny the applicability and relevance of all of
512 to these proceedings.
12. Paragraphs 13 and 23 of the amended petitions do not call for a response.
13. Respondents admit 514 of the amended petitions to the extent such an
order would be "in the public interest" but deny that any part or portion of these
proceedings are either "in the public interest" or in the interests of public policy.
Respondents thus deny this allegation and allege that these entire proceedings are against
both "the public interest" and public policy.
14. Respondents deny 515 of the amended petitions in that it is an inaccurate
and misleading statement of the law relative to the facts of this case. Whether the "sales"
to Respondents were unlawful or not in and of themselves is irrelevant to whether or not
Respondents, as purchasers, have any legal liability or otherwise did anything wrong or
remotely improper in their capacities as broker-dealers and agents.
15. Respondents deny 5's 16 and 17 of the amended petitions.
16. There are no 5's 18-22, inclusive, in the amended petitions calling for an
answer or response.
17. Respondents admit I s 24 and 25 of the amended petitions as blanket
statements of the law taken out of context, but deny their applicability in any respect to the
instant proceedings.
18. Respondents deny 5's 26 and 27 of the amended petitions.
WHEREFORE, Respondents pray for an "adversary adjudication" as
contemplated in the Equal Access to Justice Act and an order of no cause in their favor on
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both Counts I and II of the amended petitions. Respondents further pray for an award of all
costs, expenses, and attorney's fees in accordance with Rule 11. §78-27-56, Utah Code
Ann., as amended, and as otherwise fully contemplated in the Equal Access to Justice Act.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
1. The Division lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over these proceedings and
as otherwise contemplated in Rule 12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. The amended petitions fail to state any claim on which relief may be granted
and as otherwise contemplated in Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. The amended petitions fail to state a claim and are otherwise barred for
each and every reason conceivably contemplated in and by any and all pleadings heretofore
filed by Respondents in these proceedings, the contents of which are each and all
incorporated herein by reference.
4. The amended petitions are barred by the doctrines of waiver and estoppel.
5. The amended petitions are barred by their own unlawfullness and illegality.
6. The amended petitions are barred by the illegal conduct, bad faith, and
overall malicious and improper motives of employees of the Division.
7. The amended petitions are barred in that they have unlawfully damaged
Respondents in their business and reputations. Such amended petitions have further
deprived Respondents of liberty and property by individuals acting under color and power of
state law based upon powers granted to them as a result of their employment by the state.
8. The amended petitions fail to state a claim and are otherwise barred by
virtue of a No-Action Letter of the Division relative to U.S.A. Medical addressed to Utah
securities agent Susan Slattery and Utah broker-dealer P.B. Jameson dated August 9,1989,
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a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as
Exhibit "A". Such Letter completely undermines the Division's March 1939, Orders in that it
creates an "unsolicited order" or trading exemption in the securities of U.S.A. Medical for a
Utah broker-dealer and agent. Such Letter is further inconsistent as a matter of law with
the instant amended petitions in that such Letter authorizes the very same conduct that is
proscribed and attributed to Respondents in the amended petitions. Such Letter — a policy
statement of the Division directed solely to certain privileged individuals — is thus further
evidence that the amended petitions violate various constitutional rights guaranteed
Respondents and as otherwise set forth in their Memorandum in Support of their Rule
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss on file herein.
In addition, the foregoing No-Action Letter, Exhibit "A" hereto, ironically puts
the Division in the untenable and precarious position of aiding and abetting the so-called
"U.S.A. Medical Co-Conspirators" identified in the Judge Greene litigation. This is because
Susan Slattery has been named as a co-defendant in the class action securities fraud,
racketeering, and insider trading case identified as Arena Land & Investment Co., Inc., et al.
v. Petty, Strand, Global Oil, Slattery, et al., U.S. District Court Case No. 89-C-144-S, a true
and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "B".
In such case, Susan Slattery is an alleged co-conspirator in the U.S.A. Medical stock fraud
and market manipulation. See 148, page 23 and 1280, page 85 of Exhibit "B" hereto.
Reference is also made to Respondents' Memorandum of Law in Support of their Rule
12(b)(6) Motion dated September 27,1989, pages 16 and 17 thereof, which makes reference
to P.B. Jameson and its alleged participation in the U.S.A. Medical fraud, even after March
1. Thanks to the Division's secret No-Action Letter (which Respondents only discovered on
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September 29. by accident). Slattery. P.B. Jameson, convicted felon Michael William Strand,
and any and all other U.S.A. Medical Co-Conspirators have been given a state license to
engage in "dishonest and unethical practices'* by distributing its "unsuitable" stock
out-of-state in obvious furtherance of the U.S.A. Medical fraudulent scheme. The
foregoing is significant in that it demonstrates not only that the Division does not know
what "in the public interest" means but that it is otherwise discriminating against
Respondents in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 and otherwise.
9. The amended petitions fail to state a claim and are otherwise barred in that
Respondents have now completed their Exchange Act contracts and there is no showing
that the conduct complained of will or may occur in the future or. that it is otherwise
capable of being repeated by Respondents. Therefore, the entire case is moot. This
defense is consistent with the weight of authority which holds that the SEC cannot obtain
an injunction or issue a cease and desist order without an adequate showing of not only
irreparable harm but a substantial showing that the conduct complained of is highly likely to
occur in the future. Since revocation is on the nature of an injunction, the same principles
apply in these proceedings.
10. The amended petitions fail to state a claim and are otherwise barred in
that Respondents did not need the protection of the securities laws in purchasing U.S.A.
Medical stock from certain individuals who arguably lacked exemptions. SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co.. 346 U.S. 119 (1953)(holding that securities laws are inapplicable to a person who
does not need the protection afforded by them).
11. The amended petitions are violative of or otherwise invoke Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Section §78-27-56. Utah Code Ann., and the Equal Access to
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Justice Act ("EAJA"). 5 U.S.C. §504, "Costs and Fees of Parties", Fed. Sec. L. Rep., Vol. 5.
*60.104, as amended, effective August 5,1985, Sec. 1, Public Law 99-80, 99 Stat. 183.
Based on the violation or applicability of the authority referred to in this paragraph,
Respondents are entitled to reimbursement of all costs, expenses, and attorney's fees
incurred in connection with these unlawful proceedings.
12. The Division's amended petitions fail to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted because the Division has no power or authority to summarily suspend all
exemptions from registration under §61-1-14(2). Utah Code Ann., particularly when not
even the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has such power or authority to suspend
al] exemptions under the Securities Act of 1933. In the alternative, it is an abuse of agency
discretion under the circumstances for the Division to have suspended all §14(2)
exemptions, even if the Division had such power or authority, which it does not. Further, the
Division's findings of fact relative to their March, 1989 Orders do not support the wholesale
and ruthless suspension of all §14(2) exemptions from registration under the Utah Uniform
Securities Act.
13. The Division's amended petitions fail to state a claim because
Respondents' sellers had "exemptions" regardless of the Division's March, 1989, Orders.
This is because such sellers were "bona fide purchasers" who acquired their U.S.A. Medical
stock in good faith, without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of
the Uniform Commercial Code and otherwise, they paid value. The Division thus cannot
prohibit the sale of such stock to Respondents and this exemplifies the Division's regulatory
overreaching with respect to its March 1989 Orders. The burden is also on the Division in
these proceedings to prove that Respondents' sellers were not "bona fide purchasers" of
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the U.S.A. Medical stock in issue or that Respondents themselves were not "bona fide
purchasers".
COUNTERCLAIM
1. Respondents incorporate each and every allegation hereinabove as if each
were set forth more fully hereafter verbatim.
2. The original and amended petitions have been brought and filed in violation
of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann.
3. These proceedings have been brought for an improper purpose and are
based on personal, malicious, vindictive, and retaliatory motives on the part of Division
employees and personnel.
4. Respondents have been deprived of liberty and property as a result of the
instant proceedings.
5. Respondents have been substantially damaged in their business and
reputations by the initiation of the instant proceedings.
6. Respondents have incurred substantial unwarranted and unnecessary
attorney's fees, expenses, and costs in being required to defend the instant proceedings.
7. As a direct and proximate result of these proceedings. Respondents have
been substantially damaged as aforesaid.
8. Neither the Division nor any of its personnel, including the Utah Attorney
General, has statutory immunity or any lawful exemption from the operation of either Rule
11, §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., or the spirit of the Equal Access to Justice Act.
9. The equity and other powers and authorities of this court enable it to make
the type of award to Respondents, if warranted, as specifically contemplated in the Equal
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Access to Justice Act. regardless of whether said Act directly applies to these particular
proceedings. The spirit of such Act therefore does and should apply to these proceedings
regardless.
10. The amended petitions have not been brought with a reasonable
investigation of the facts or the law. nor have they been brought after a reasonable inquiry
into whether the allegations contained therein are well grounded in fact or whether they are
otherwise warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the modification or
reversal of existing law.
11. These proceedings have been brought by the Division and its personnel In
bad faith.
WHEREFORE, Respondents pray for an award of all costs, expenses, and
attorney's fees incurred by them in any respect in connection with the existing proceedings.
DATED this

The undersigned hereby certifies that on t h e ^ / d a y of November, 1989. (s)he
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
with attendant Exhibits by regular mail, postage prepaid to John C. Baldwin. Director and
Kathleen C. McGinley, Director of Broker-Dealer Section. Securities Division. Utah
Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah
84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge and Presiding Officer J. Stephen Eklund, Esq..
Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0802; Mark J. Griffin. Esq.. Assistant Attorney General. 115 South State Capitol. Salt
Lake City. Utah 84114; and to Craig F. McCullough. Esq.. Callister. Duncan. & Nebeker,
Co-Counsel to Respondents, 8th Floor, Kennecott Bjdg^, 10jE^st South T^prjple Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84133.

J:ANSWER.1-3
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"S"

State 01 Utah
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Division of Securities
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor

160 Easl 300 South

David L Buhler
Exccuttw Director

P O Box 4£>aa?
SattLafceGty Utah B4145-OB0?

John C. Baldwin
l)»r«U»r

t
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August 9, 1989
Ms. Susan Slattery
P.B. Jameson, Inc.
175 South Main Street
Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

U.S.A. Medical Corporation

Dear Ms. Slattery:
John Baldwin asked me to respond to your letter regarding
trading in U.S.A. Medical. The division's position is that if a
Utah agent, also licensed in other states, causes the firm to
execute unsolicited orders on an agency basis with customers from
any of those other states, and the transaction is executed outside
the state of Utah, then the division probably has no jurisdiction
over the trades.
Please be aware, however'; of several caveats: First, if any
transaction is conducted with a customer in any state in which the
agent is not licensed, that state may have grounds to take action
against the agent and firm. That other state's order, as well as
the fact of unlicensed activity in another state, may be the basis
of an action by this division against the agent and firm. Second,
virtually every state (and federal) law applicable requires that
there be no active trading in a stock until there is full
disclosure of all material facts.
We believe that adequate
disclosure would at a minimum include discussion of the federal
temporary restraining order in the U.S.A. Medical case and the
reasons therefor. Before executing many transactions you may want
to ensure that an amended Form 15c-2(ll) is on file.
This letter is not an official opinion of the division and is
based on the facts as presented in your letter.
Should any facts
change, or should the transaction occur differently than described
in your letter and this response, then this letter will not be
binding upon the division.
If you have any questions, please contact the division.
Sincerely,

%

Constance B. White
Assistant Director

EXHIBIT

<*,,

EXHIBIT "T"

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Registration of
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.
CRD No. 07678

:
:
:
:

In the Matter of the Registration of
Marlen Vernon Johnson
CRD No. 2598888

:
:
:

MOTION TO DISMISS AND
ACCOMPANYING ORDER
Case No. SD-89-46BD
Case No. SD-89-47AG

Appearances:
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents
Mark J. Griffin and Kathleen C. McGinley for the Division of Securities
By the Administrative Law Judge:
By Motion, dated September 27,1989, Respondents seek a dismissal of the instant adjudicative
proceedings. A memorandum in opposition thereto was filed by the Division on October 13,1989.
Respondents filed a reply to that memorandum on October 25,1989. On October 27,1989, the Court
advised respective counsel that the pending motion would be addressed on the basis of thefiledmemoranda
and that no oral argument was deemed necessary.
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters die following
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents contend that the July 19,1989 Amended Petition fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted Sparing detail, Respondents urge that the amended petition should be d i s m i s s
because: (1) it violates numerous constitutional provisions; (2) Respondents' conduct was not a dishonest
or unethical practice as a matter of law; (3) the Division has no authority to prohibit purchases of stock for
any reason; (4) the Division has no statutory authority to revoke a license based on Respondents'
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participation in a securities transaction occurring in interstate commerce and undertaken to complete
obligations imposed by federal law; (5) issuance of the amended petition serves no public interest and, thus,
is not within the Division's polios power, (6) a person cannot aid and abet or solicit a sale of securities to
himself, as alleged in Count I; (7) Respondents' purchase of USA Medical Corporation securities was
suitable and the concept of suitability, as alleged in Count n, is irrelevant because that concept is only
applicable to a purchase of securitiesfroma broker; (8) this proceeding is barred by reason of an August 9,
1989 no-action letter issued by the Division; (9) there is no evidence that Respondents are capable of
repeating the alleged improper conduct and, thus, this case is moot; (10) Respondents did not need the
protection afforded by the securities law relative to their purchase of the above-stated securities.
The July 19,1989 Amended Petition sets forth various factual allegations. For the purpose of
addressing the pending motion, all of the factual allegations contained in the amended petition are
incorporated herein by reference. To generalize, the amended petition contains allegations that (1)
Respondents purchased USA Medical Corporation securities during such time that all transactional
exemptionsfromregistration of those securities were unavailable; (2) the unavailability of transactional
exemptionsfromregistration as to the securities in question was based on a Summary Order, issued March
1,1989, and a Default Order, issued March 27,1989; (3) Respondents' purchase of the securities occurred
within the S tate of Utah; and (4) Respondents contacted an existing shareholder of USA Medical
Corporation securities in an attempt to purchase said securities, actually purchased USA Medical
Corporation securities from five other named individuals and may have also purchased USA Medical
Corporation securities from other unnamed sources after the March 1,1989 Order. Based on the factual
allegations set forth in the amended petition, the Division asserts that a disciplinary sanction should enter as
to Respondents' registration because such an order is in die public interest and Respondents have engaged in
dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business, violative of Section 61-1-6(1) and R177-6-l(g).
Prior to a review of the pending motion, a preliminary matter should be noted. Nobeneficial
purpose would be served by addressing this motion in any manner similar to either of the extremes reflected
in the memoranda which has been submitted by the parties in this case. Simply put, am attempt will be
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made to rule on the pending motion without recourse to either legal puffery and/or baldfaced conclusions.
Thefilingof any subsequent matters for consideration during these proceedings by counsel for either party
should adhere to the same standard.
Section 63-46b-l(4), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, provides as follows:
This chapter does not preclude... the presiding officer during an
adjudicative proceeding from:
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss . . . if the
requirements of Rule 12(b)... of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure are met by the moving party
Comments of the Utah Administrative Law Advisory Committee on the drafting and interpretation of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act further provide as follows:
A presiding officer i s . . . authorized to grant a timely motion either to
dismiss or for summary judgment, if die requirements of Rule 12(b) or 56 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the UAPA are met The well-developed caselaw
concerning Rules 12(b) and 56 should assist presiding officers in deciding [such]
motions . . . .
In Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Service Inc., 24 Utah 2d 165,467 P.2d 605 (1970), the
Utah Supreme Court noted the standard which governs the consideration of a motion to dismiss made
pursuant to Rule 12(b), to wit:
A complaint does not fail to stale a claim unless it appears to a certainty that
the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be
proved in support of the claim. Id at 168. (Emphasis added.)
With one exception, Respondents' assertions that issuance of the amended petition violates various
constitutional provisions are wholly lacking in any merit The March 27,1989 Default Order was issued to
prohibit any subsequent trading of USA Medical Corporation securities within this state. The regulation of
securities transactions conducted within the confines of this state, as well as the regulation of conduct
undertaken by registered agents and broker-dealers in thai respect, is a proper exercise of die police power
authorized by the provisions of Section 61-1*1 et seq. As generally stated in 79 C J.S. Securities
Regulation, Section 188:
A state has the power to regulate and control the traffic in securities which is
conducted within the borders of the state, the regulation and control of such traffic
being regarded as a proper exercise of the police power of the state....
Therein, it is further stated as follows:
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The Federal Securities Act of 1933 specifically provides that the Act shall not
affect the jurisdiction of the states where the regulation is not in conflict with the
Act This indicates the clear intention of Congress to leave the states free to exercise
such regulatory control over the sale of securities as does not conflict with the
provisions of the federal Act, and, in the absence of such a conflict, it is
contemplated that the states and the federal government shall exercise concurrent
jurisdiction in this field.
In Hall vs. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917), the United States Supreme Court held that a state
statute regulating the disposition of securities within the borders of a state which only incidentally affects
interstate commerce is not violative of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Therein, the Court
stated as follows:
The provisions of the law, it will be observed, apply to dispositions of
securities within the state... this certainly is only an indirect burden upon them as
objects of interstate commerce, if they may be regarded as such. It is a police
regulation strictly, not affecting them until there is an attempt to make disposition of
them within the state. To give them more immunity than this is to give them more
immunity than more tangible articles are given, they having no exemption from
regulations the purpose of which is preventfraudor deception. Such regulations
affect interstate commerce in them only incidentally. Id. at 557-558. (Emphasis in
original.)
A considered review of the amended petition clearly reflects two matters which must be recognized.
First, the factual allegation of critical relevance in the amended petition is that Respondents purchased USA
Medical Corporation securities. It is that conduct which potentially subjects Respondents to disciplinary
sanction in these proceedings. Respondents' subsequent disposition of those securities and the satisfaction
of Respondents' outstanding contractual obligations to third parties, while matters potentially affecting
Respondents' NASD membership, are not relevant to whether the amended petition states a cause of action.
Simply put, there is no rationally discernible conflict between the initiation of these proceedings and
existing federal securities law or most of the various constitutional provisions referenced in Respondents'
memorandum in support of the pending motion.
Further, if die facts alleged in the amended petition were proved, it could be concluded that
Respondents participation as a purchaser of the securities facilitated the violation of art March 27,1989
Order issued by the division to suspend the trading (both buying and selling) of securities which had been
the subject of market manipulation and securities fraud. limiting the operative effect of that order to one
which precludes only the sale of USA Medical Corporation securities, as Respondents have repeatedly
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urged, would be patently unreasonable. Thus, the amended petition properly raises the issue whether
Respondents' purchase of the securities in question constituted dishonest or unethical practices in the
securities business.
For the record, the Court notes Respondent's contention that the division has not sought to
discipline others who may have engaged in conduct violative of the March 27,1989 Order. The Court also
notes the division's response in that regard. Whether the division has engaged in arbitrary and capricious
enforcement of that order and whether entry of a disciplinary sanction as to Respondents could thus violate
their right to equal protection are matters which cannot be adequately addressed at this time upon review of
the pending motion. On its' face, the amended petition states a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Nevertheless, any relevant and substantial evidence of arbitrary or capricious enforcement of the March 27,
1989 Order, if offered as a defense during the hearing on the merits of this case, could be properly addressed
at that time.
Respondents assert that the amended petition serves no public benefit because there is no evidence
that any Utah resident "has been or can be in the least damaged or injured by the conduct of Respondents".
The simple rejoinder to that contention is as follows:
There are numerous grounds for denying, suspending or revoking the
registration of persons engaged in the securities business. Under the Uniform
Securities Act, and most blue sky laws, an order depriving a person of die
registration can only be entered if it is in die "public interest" to do so. This
requirement is intended to insure that minor or technical violations will not be the
subject of disciplinary actions by administrators. When a denial, suspension or
revocation is in the public interest, it has been said to mean that it is necessary to
protect the investing public. However, this does not mean that just because no
member of the public has been injured that the loss ofprivilege is not warranted.
The distinction seems to be whether the violation was insubstantially technical and
inadvertent or whether it was willful. 1 lC-Part 2, Business Organizations, Section
8.09, Sowards & Hirsch Blue Sky Regulation. (Emphasis added.)
If no damage was occasioned by Respondents' conduct, such would be a relevant mitigating factor with
respect to any disciplinary sanction which may be imposed. However, whether entry of such a sanction "is
in the public interest" is not dependent upon proof of injury to the public and it is not necessary to allege
damage in order to state a cause of action in these proceedings.

0<>U >ob3
5

Paragraph 12(a) of the amended petition contains allegations as to Respondents' actions regarding
the possible purchase of USA Medical Corporation securities from a John Dawson. Paragraphs 16 and 17
contain allegations that: (1) Respondent Johnson solicited and/or purchased USA Medical Corporation
securities; (2) Respondent Johnson thus encouraged or otherwise aided in the violation of Section 61-1-7;
and (3) Respondents solicited, encouraged or aided the violation of the March 27,1989 Order.
Notwithstanding Respondents' assertions, Count I is not based on an allegation that Respondents aided and
abetted or solicited a sale of the securities to themselves. Rather, the essence of Count I is that
Respondents' purchase of the securities resulted in the violation of the March 27,1989 IDefault Order and, as
a corollary, Section 61-1-7. Whether Respondents urged USA Medical Corporation shareholders to sell
their securities is a matter adequately and properly pled in the amended petition and relevant as an
aggravating factor with respect to whatever disciplinary sanction should enter if it is found that Respondents
engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business.
R177-6-l(gXB) provides as follows:
The following acts and practices, when performed by a broker-dealer... are
considered contrary to Section 6(lXg) of the Act and may constitute grounds for
denial, suspension or revocation of registration.
(3) Recommending to a customer the . . . s a l e . . . of any
security without reasonable grounds to believe that such
transaction or recommendation is suitable for the customer
based upon seasonable inquiry concerning the customer's
investment objectives,financialsituation and needs, and any
other relevant information known by the broker-dealer.
With reference to Count II, the allegations of the amended petition are not sufficient to state a cause of
action. Concededly, Paragraph 26 contains a general allegation that a broker-dealer and customer
relationship existed between Respondents and those individuals who sold USA Medical Corporation
securities to Respondents. However, there is no allegation that Respondents recommended to any
individuals that they sell the securities in question. Paragraph 12(a) only alleges that Respondent Johnson
contacted a shareholder with the intent to purchase USA Medical Corporation securities owned by that
individual and then informed that shareholder as to the amount offered for the securities; and the manner in
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which a sale could be finalized. Paragraphs 12(b) through 12(f) only allege Respondents' purchase of USA
Medical Corporation securities from other various shareholders.
Of greater concern is the assertion in the Division's memorandum that recommending "to a
customer that he engage in conduct violative of law is unsuitable per se". Taken at face value, it may be
true that such a recommendation would not be a "suitable" or a "proper" practice in a generic sense.
However, a fair reading of R177-6-l(g)(B)(3) suggests that the rule in question is one directed to whether a
securities transaction is advisable, given particular reference to a customer's financial circumstances,
investment objectives and the likelihood that either a purchase or sale of the security would be beneficial to
the customer under those circumstances. As used in the rule, the word "suitable" has a more specialized and
technical meaning than that implied by the Division in its' memorandum. An unlawful securities
transaction is not, ipso facto, unsuitable within the meaning of R177-6-l(g)(B)(3). Given the foregoing,
there is a proper basis to dismiss Count II of the amended petition.
Respondents' final three assertions can be summarily addressed. The August 9,1989 no-action
letter was issued with respect to an inquiry concerning securities transactions "executed outside the state of
Utah". Under such circumstances, the letter correctly notes that "the division probably has no jurisdiction
over the trades". In the instant case, Respondents' purchase of USA Medical Corporation securities was a
matter wholly executed within this state. Thus, the August 9,1989 no-action letter is not relevant to
whether the amended petition states a cause of action.
The possible entry of a disciplinary sanction in these proceedings is based on allegations of prior
misconduct and the amended petition adequately states a claim in that respect Allegations of continuing
misconduct could have been necessary if injunctive relief were being sought However, entry of a
disciplinary sanction is a matter completely distinctfromsuch relief and Respondents' assertion that this
case is moot because the conduct in question is not likely to recur is without merit
Finally, whether Respondents required the protection afforded by securities laws relative to their
role as a purchaser of USA Medical Corporation securities is not at issue in these proceedings. Rather, it is
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whether Respondents' alleged conduct properly subjects them to potential disciplinary sanction by reason of
the statute and rules which govern their status as registrants of the division.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the July 19,1989 Amended Petition fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted with regard to Count II set forth therein and, thus, that count is hereby
dismissed. In all other respects, Respondents' motion is denied.
Dated this

day of December, 1989.

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Accompanying
Order, properly addressed, postage prepaid to: Mark J. Griffin, assistant attorney genend for the Division of
Securities at Tax & Business Regulation Division, 130 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; to
John Michael Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and to Craig F.
McCullough, Callister Duncan & Nebeker, 8th Boor, Kennecott Building, 10 East South Temple Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84113, co-counsel for Respondents. A copy of the Motion to Dismiss and
Accompanying Order was also hand delivered to Kathleen C. McGinley, Director, Broker/Dealer Section,
Division of Securities, Department of Commerce.
Dated this

. day of December, 1989
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EXHIBIT "U"
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

NOV 2 9 RECTI

^

DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:

AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENTS
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.
Case No. SD-89-46BD

CRD NO. 07678

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
Case No. SD-89-47AG

MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
CRD NO. 2598888

STATE OF UTAH

)

SALT LAKE COUNTY

)ss.
)

Marlen Vernon Johnson, being first put on his oath, deposes and says the
following on behalf of himself and Respondent Johnson-Bowles Co., Inc., in support of
Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment on file herein:
1. That your affiant is a respondent in the above-matters and he has personal
knowledge of that which is contained herein. He is also a principal of Johnson-Bowles
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Company, Inc., also a respondent in these matters, and he has personal knowledge, power
and authority to make this affidavit on its behalf as well as on his own behalf.
2. That in order to consummate various out-of-state Exchange Act contracts
entered into by Respondent Johnson-Bowles in interstate commerce prior to March 1,
1989, your affiant purchased U.S.A. Medical stock from certain individuals. [Emphasis
added.]
3. That based on the lawsuit Respondent Johnson-Bowles filed in federal
court in February 1989, it became well known in the local brokerage community that
Respondent Johnson-Bowles was "short" securities of U.S.A. Medical. As a result of this
litigation and the fact that a market for the stock of U.S.A. Medical ceased to exist, your
affiant was contacted by several individuals in March and April 1989, each expressing a
desire to sell U.S.A. Medical stock that they owned and held.
4. Because Respondent Johnson-Bowles believed that it had no choice but to
honor its outstanding Exchange Act contracts entered into prior to March 1,1989, your
affiant agreed to purchase U.S.A. Medical stock for the exclusive purpose of consummating
such contracts previously entered into in interstate commerce.
5. Prior to effecting any purchases of such stock, however, your affiant made
certain that each such seller was well aware of the Division's March 1989 Orders and that
the Division could contend that such prospective sellers lacked Utah exemptions from
registration, and further, your affiant made certain that each was aware of Judge J.
Thomas Greene's ruling on February 28, 1989. At such time, each prospective seller
conveyed his personal knowledge of the immediately foregoing as further confirmed in the
additional supporting affidavits filed contemporaneously herewith.
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6. At no time did either Respondent, or any one of their agents or employees,
ever -solicit-, "aid", "counsel", "command", "induce", "recommend", or otherwise "encourage",
in any respect, any of such sellers to sell or otherwise part with any portion of their U.S.A.
Medical stock to or for the benefit of either Respondent. In fact, to the very best of your
affiant's recollection, each such seller contacted your affiant first and offered to sell or
otherwise, each "solicited" him to purchase stock of U.S.A. Medical. At one point, your
affiant did initiate a call to one John Dawson but such was only after your affiant was
informed independently from one Karl Smith that Mr. Dawson was anxious to sell his U.S.A.
Medical stock. However, such conversation with Mr. Dawson did not result in the purchase
or sale of any U.S.A. Medical stock and your affiant believes that under the First Amendment
to the Constitution he certainly has the right to talk to anyone he desires, including John
Dawson. Your affiant can further attest that everyone from whom he ultimately purchased
U.S.A. Medical stock contacted him first, either directly or indirectly, offering to sell him
such person's U.S.A. Medical stock as each knew that Johnson-Bowles had a federal
requirement for it. In addition, those from whom your affiant ultimately purchased U.S.A.
Medical stock after March 1,1989, were not only anxious to sell their U.S.A. Medical stock,
but each (with the exception of Sheldon Flateman, a New York resident) personally and
voluntarily ventured into the office of Respondent Johnson-Bowles for the express purpose
of selling their U.S.A. Medical stock. Further, at the time of the purchases, each such
person, with the exception of Paul Jones and Sheldon Flateman (both licensed securities
brokers registered with the NASD), executed Representation Letters, true and correct
copies of which are on file herein and which are further attached to the supporting
affidavits of Richard Sax, Leo Pavich, Philip Tanzini, Nick Julian, and Jim Coleman.
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7. That two of those individuals from whom your affiant purchased U.S.A.
Medical stock, namely Paul Jones and Sheldon Flateman, were and are licensed securities
brokers with the States of Utah and New York, respectively, and each are NASD registered
representatives and therefore, your affiant did not think it necessary to obtain
Representation Letters from them. This is because your affiant understands that as a
matter of law, including Utah law, and, on advice of counsel, a broker cannot "solicit"
another broker to do anything. Moreover, both Messrs. Jones and Flateman informed your
affiant that they were well aware of the Division's March 1989 Orders, including Judge
Greene's ruling, and, because both are licensed and knowledgeable securities brokers, each
was naturally aware of the effect of such.
8. That of those from whom your affiant purchased U.S.A. Medical stock after
March 1, 1989, each seller informed your affiant that he was fully aware of what had gone
on and what was going on with respect to U.S.A. Medical and its stock and each
represented that the prospective sales to your affiant were "suitable" to each one's
financial or investment needs or objectives, particularly when each knew and acknowledged
to your affiant that the stock of U.S.A. Medical was virtually worthless, there being no
market for it. That each such seller also informed your affiant that he was a "bona fide
purchaser" of the stock and that he was and had been unaffiliated in any respect with
U.S.A. Medical or the so-called "U.S.A. Medical Conspirators". Thus, your affiant believed
and was informed that he was purchasing stock from "bona fide purchasers'* for mere
transfer or delivery as fully contemplated in Article 8, U.U.C.C. — stock which was in no
way "tainted" by the U.S.A. Medical fraud.
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9. That none of the purchases that occurred after March 1, 1989. for the
exclusive purpose of consummating outstanding Exchange Act contracts, involved a
,,

commissionM or a stock purchase confirmation from Respondent Johnson-Bowles. Your

affiant thus believes that such transactions were entirely private and between consenting
adults and such did not involve any such sellers as "customers'1 of either Respondent.
Based on the foregoing and the fact that anyone could have undertaken such purchases,
your affiant, in making such purchases, does not believe that he was acting in either his
capacity as a securities agent or otherwise as a principal of Johnson-Bowles.
10. That because your affiant purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock in issue from
"bona fide purchasers", he believes that he was also a "bona fide purchaser" in that such
transactions were undertaken in good faith, without notice of any "adverse claims" as
contemplated in Article 8 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, and your affiant paid
valuable consideration. Lastly, the purchases in issue were merely to effect "delivery" or
"transfer" as contemplated in Article 8 of the federal Uniform Commercial Code —
ministerial acts — and your affiant does not believe, in his professional experience, that the
Division's March 1989, Orders impaired or otherwise had an effect (or were designed to
have an effect) on Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED t h i s / ^ a y of November. 1989.

<X/
arl*n VernoiyJohnson
Notary Public
ATWYC.
^^H^MJB
J
8iindy,yi^ 84070 flL
•frCommitsion Expires «
- . 8.1992
1
oflitah
!
J

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.

B
Its: President

In re:

Johnson-Bowies Company. Inc.. and Marien V. Johnson
Case Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG
AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENTS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this^day of November. 1989.

My Commission Expires:

nitrite
J:AFDVT.20-21

O'jy j /.z5
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EXHIBIT "V"

NOV 29 TO

^
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ., No. 3639
72 East 400 South. St©. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:

AFFIDAVIT OF KARL SMITH

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.
Case No. SD-89-46BD

CRD NO. 07678

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
Case No. SD-89-47AG

MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
CRD NO. 2598888

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
)ss.
)

Karl Smith, on his oath, deposes and says as follows:
1. That your affiant has personal knowledge of that which is contained herein.
2. That sometime on or after April 1,1989. your affiant learned that
Respondent Johnson-Bowles was "short" the securities of U.S.A. Medical.
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OOOJUS'I

3. That as a result of the foregoing, your affiant, who knew Marlen V. Johnson,
gave Mr. Johnson, a Mr. John Dawson's telephone number because your affiant was
informed or under the impression that Mr. Dawson owned stock of U.S.A. Medical and might
be interested in selling the same.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this ^ f ^ a y of November, 1989.

-HCar^S
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this^?

at Salt Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires:

i/t/it
J:AF0Vf.7

OOUJI;£K5
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EXHIBIT »W"

^
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, ESQ., Np. 3639
72 East 400 South, Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

2 1 RFC
DEC 21RECD
DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:

AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE
EATCHEL IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.
CRD NO. 07678

Case No. SD-89-46BD
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON

Case No. SD-89-47AG

CRD NO. 2598888

STATE OF UTAH

)

SALT LAKE COUNTY

)ss.
)

Bruce Eatchel, being first put on his oath, deposes and says as follows:
1. That I have personal knowledge of and experience as to that which is
contained herein. I have also taken several federal and state courses and examinations with
respect to securities and based on this education and my six (6) year employment in the
brokerage industry, I consider myself to be as much of an expert as anyone with similar
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experience and training. That I am also a registered representative with the NASD and
licensed as an agent with the Utah Securities Division though I am no longer employed in the
securities business.
2. That during the beginning of 1989, up to and until, June thereof, I was
employed as a securities trader with Respondent Johnson-Bowles Co., Inc. That I was
terminated by Johnson-Bowles in June, 1989, and I am now employed with a company that
distributes art posters on a national basis.
3. That as a securities trader, I had discussions with traders from other
brokerage firms all day long and, during the time that I was employed by Johnson-Bowles, I
often conversed several times a day with Mr. Paul Jones, a trader with broker-dealer
Wasatch Stock Trading.
4. That I have read Exhibit "A" to the Division's Memorandum in Opposition to
Respondent's [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Petitioner's Cross
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and I can attest, of my own personal knowledge, that
its contents are wrong, misleading, and incorrect in several respects.
5. First, after March 1, 1989,1 had several discussions with Mr. Paul Jones
about the stock of U.S.A. Medical and I can attest that he knew of the Division's Order and
Judge Greene's ruling and their effect and was perhaps more aware of such than I was.
That Mr. Jones also knew that Johnson-Bowles was "short" stock of U.S.A. Medical and
during typical trading-related conversations we discussed his selling stock at 120 per
share. I can honestly say that I did not ever intentionally, deliberately, or continually "offer"
to buy such stock and to the extent we did discuss it, we only discussed prices at which he
might have been interested in selling it. These kinds of discussions are typical of traders in
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the securities industry. In other words, I certainly did not call Mr. Jones "hundreds" of times
to "solicit" him to sell his U.S.A. Medical stock as set forth in Exhibit "A". This is because as
a trader, I conversed with Mr. Jones regularly about lots and lots of stocks, including what
was happening with various issuers. I might add that any conversations I engaged in with
Mr. Jones after March 1, 1989, wherein the subject of U.S.A. Medical came up, I can attest
that I was not acting under the direction of Marlen V. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles when I
engaged in such conversations with Mr. Jones or anyone else about U.S.A. Medical; such
were just ordinary, every day conversations which included "small talk". Mr. Jones and I had
both been trading the stock of U.S.A. Medical prior to March 1, and so it was quite natural
to discuss it after that date as it was a highly unusual situation — one that had not
occurred in my several years of experience in the brokerage industry.
6. That sometime during April, 1989,1 received a call from Paul Jones who
asked me if I thought Johnson-Bowles was interested in buying U.S.A. Medical stock or
whether it had in fact covered all of its "short" positions. I informed Mr. Jones that I
thought Mr. Johnson had purchased some stock at 50 per share and that Johnson-Bowles
may have already completed its outstanding pre-March 1, Exchange Act contracts. Hearing
this, Mr. Jones became anxious and expressed a great interest in selling his U.S.A. Medical
stock. This is because I gathered that he then realized that he would not be able to sell his
stock at 120 or at any other price once Marlen Johnson was able to consummate
Johnson-Bowles' open and outstanding, out-of-state Exchange Act contracts. Mr. Jones
then offered to sell his U.S.A. Medical stock for 80 per share at which point either he asked
me or I simply put him in contact with Mr. Marlen V. Johnson as I had nothing to do with the
situation and "covering" Johnson-Bowles' "short" positions was not my responsibility.
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7. Lastly, having been a securities trader, I can attest that in the industry, a
broker cannot "solicit" another broker or trader to buy or sell anything. This is because in
my experience — and because of my previous employment and experience I believe I may be
deemed an expert — the "unsolicited order exemption", by its own language, applies only to
a broker's "customers" (i.e., to the general public); it does not apply to another broker,
trader, or dealer, including Mr. Jones. Furthermore. I am aware of the allegations in the
Division's amended petitions and I do not see how either "solicitation", "encouragement", or
"aiding", the crux of Count I to the amended petitions, applies to Respondents' conduct in
even the most remote of senses. For what it's worth. I also do not believe that what
Respondents did in order to honor their Exchange Act contracts is "dishonest or unethical"
from a broker's standpoint as I do not see who such conduct is "dishonest or unethical"
towards and it would seem to me that there must be an object or recipient of such
adjectives.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this 20th day of December, 1989
.-— — — — — — — Notary Public

I

CATHY C.ARNOT
•
11171 Buddtoa Drive
|
Sandy, Utah 84070
ItyCommtafcton
•
VCommitiic Expires
--•-«November!

*SL°™„

I

^ R U C E EATCHEL

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before

Notary Pufcflic\
Residing aK§ilt Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires:

J:AFDVT.17-18
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EXHIBIT "X"

W-14-1909 12U7 FROM

UPNCE RSSOCIATES S.L.C.UT TO

3590837

P.02

DRAFT
PRESS REISASE
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION
September l, 1289
The Utah Securities Division .And tJSA Medical Company have
reached an agreement pursuant to which shares of the company may
resume trading at some future date, provided the Company files a
registration statement with the Division.

USA Medical stock was

the subject of an Order of the. bivision on March 1, 1989, denying
the availability

of all exemptions

from registration and, in

effect, shutting down trading c£ th« stock on the Utah market.
The Division1* Order remains in effect and shares bf USA Ma<Jical
cannot be traded in Utah until the. Division approves an as yet to
be filed registration statement for USA Medical and the Utah
Securities Advisory Board has rescinds the. Order•
In February, 1989, USA Medical stock was the subject of a
civil action filed in U. S; District Court for the Central Division
of Utah by Johnson-Bowles Coxwaanv- Ino., a local broker-dealer*
In that action,. Johnson-Bowles* made a Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction against further trading of USA Medical stock on the
basis that it had been illegally traded. Although Judge J. Thomas
Greene. denied the Motion, he found that the stock
w

* • ,was unlawfully issued, lias never been registered with
any proper regulatory authority, is not exempt from such
requisite registration
and. has been and is continuing to be
traded illegally.1*
As the basis for denying /Tnhnson-Bowlefi Motion, the Court
noted that
M

Johnson-Bowles - kriew. or
should
have. known
about*.. irregularities as, to non-registration, non-exempt

.OttO -714

pyHlniT

A

NOU-14-1989

12:18

FROM

UANCE ASSOCIATES S.L.C.UT

JO

3598837

P. 03

*tatus and illegal trading of USA Medical stock, and that
Johnson-Bowles participated in trading in the stock after it
became a market nmaker, and is charge with knowledge of these
irregularities.
Based upon the court's findinas. th^ Utah Securities Division
issued its Karch lr 1989 Order and initiated an investigation,
which Continues, into the irrecfularitie* with respect to trading
of USA Kedical stock • The Division1 s investigation of USA Medical
focuses on the use of nominees to make a public distribution of the
shares without registration, excessive markups by brokers trading
the shares, illegal price manipulation and possible fraudulent
statements and non-disclosures of material facts to some previous
purchasers of USA Medical stock.
I*> addition, in April, the Division of Securities filed, an
administrative proceeding against MArlen v, Johnson and. his firm,
Johnsor\~Bowles and Paul Jones,, a sales Representative of another
firm,

seeking to revoke the securities licenses of each for

engaging i n securities transactions involving USA Medical stock
while t&e Division's order is ** af****.
Before the Division will rescind i^a Order, allowing shares
to tra<**r USA Medical must file a registration statement with the
Divisionf

including filing audited financial statements and other

disclosures concerning USA Medicaids history. In addition, certain
requirements will be imposed. on broker* with respect to future
sales of USA Medical stock.
disclosures

to and

obtaining

Such requirements will include
representations

from

purchasers

concerning their status as purchasers. PQllowina completion of the
registration

process,

the

matter

will

be

presented

to

0900 715

the
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Securities Advisory Board with . the r«ou««t that : the Division's
Order

be

rescinded*

The

Division, cautioned

brokers

and

the

investing public that until the registration statement is effective
and the Advisory Board has approved the action, tne Marcn l Order
is still in effect prohibiting transactions involving USA Medical
stock in Utah*

OO'JWIG

EXHIBIT "Y"

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

FROM:

Dorothy Akins

DATE:

May 8, 1989

RE:

USA MEDICAL CORPORATION

@ 2:30 P.M.

FILE #: 89-02-15-01
TELEPHONE (^OFFICE ^O^FERENCE WITH WHOM:

Paul Jones

Jones a registered rep with Wasatch Stock Trading.

272-2700

He has been a

broker for approximately 3 years. He passed the Series 63 & 7.
Took the Series 24, however did not pass it.
Myself and Scott Frost talked with Paul Jones at his
attorney's office, Mark Van Wagoner

215 South State Street

Lake City, Utah on May 8, 1989, at 2:30 p.m.

Salt

Jones stated the

following:
1.

He was a broker at Wasatch Stock Trading.

2.

That Wasatch had a meeting with the agents, which he

attended, stating that the State Securities had suspended the
trading on USA Medical Corp. Jones could not remember the date
of the meeting, however it was soon after the Order was served on
the firm.
3.

That sometime prior to the suspension order issued by

the State, he had purchased 100,000 shares of USA Medical
Corporation at 30 cents a share for his own account*
4. That he was good friends with Bruce Eatchel, a trader at
Johnson-Bowles.

He had worked with Bruce numerous times with

good results.

0'»0 t83

5.

That Bruce Eatchel contacted Jones numerous times and

wanted him to sell his USA Medical Corporation stock.
6.

That on April 18, 1989, Bruce Eatchel again contacted

Jones and stated that other people had sold their USA Medical
Stock and that Johnson-Bowles shorts were being covered and
didn't he want to sell his shares?

Jones stated that he was

tired of Eatchel contacting him, that he had contacted him
hundreds of times to sell his shares, so finally he agreed to
sell for 8 cents a share.
7.

On April 18, 1989, Jones went to Johnson-Bowles, handed

Marlen Johnson his four or five certificates, which were in
street names, and Marlen handed him an $8000.00 check, written on
a Johnson-Bowles1 firm account.
8.

Jones stated that he knew of the suspension on USA

Medical, however he didnft think there was anything wrong with
doing a private transaction.
Jones stated he would provide a copy of the check and would
also get the certificate numbers.

000* bSl

BEFORE THE
D E P A R T M E N T
OP
C O M M E R C E
SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE
STATE OP UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF
JOHNSON-BOWLES

AFFIDAVIT
OF
DOROTHY A. AKINS

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
Having been duly sworn, Dorothy A. Akins, hereby deposes and
states the following:
1.

That I am an investigator for the Securities Division

of the Utah Department of Commerce,
2.

That I am investigating alleged violations of the Utah

Uniform Securities Act.
3.

The investigation involves USA Medical Corporation,

Johnson-Bowles and others.
4.

That on or about July 12, 1989, I contacted by telephone

John Dawson. Mr. Dawson stated that at the time Marlen Johnson had
contacted him to purchase his stock, he did not have a customer
account at Johnson-Bowles, however, he did have one several years
ago.
5.

That on or about July 12, 1989, I contacted by telephone

00U.tS3

Nick Julian.

Mr. Julian stated that he has and had an account at

Johnson-Bowles.
6.

That the above statements, to the best of my knowledge,

information and belief are true.

DATED this /T

day of

. 1989.

/LIU^U^AJ

DOROTHY A. AKINS appeared before me this.
1989, and attested that the foregoing information is true to the
best of her knowledge and belief,
^
NOTARY PUBLIC:

y^L

^ ^ ^ € ^

My commission expires:
Residing in:

C/^y

^

/??/

C

/o-c-t''.^£j>

My commission e x p i r e s :
Residing i n :

OOLKt^O

EXHIBIT

"Z"

•mfB
^

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ., No. 3639
72 East 400 South, Ste. 220
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

DEC 21RECD

DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:

OBJECTION AND MOTION
TO STRIKE AND MEMORANDUM

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.
CRD NO. 07678

Case No. SD-89-46BD

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
Case No. SD-89-47AG

MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
CRD NO. 2598888

Respondents, by and through their counsel, hereby lodge their objection to and
otherwise move the Court for an order striking Exhibits "A" and "C" to the Division's
Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Support of Petitioner's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, together dated
December 14,1989.
The basis for this formal objection and motion to strike is that Exhibits "A" and
"C" to such memorandums are gross hearsay and are otherwise not legally acceptable.
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proper, or in valid format under the express provisions of Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Such exhibits are further totally irrelevant to the simple legal issues before
this tribunal and should be further striken based on their attempted prejudicial value.
Respondents thus pray for an order striking such exhibits In their entirety in that they
should not become part of the record in this case and should otherwise not be considered
in any respect by the Court in ruling on Respondents' Rule 56 motion. D & L Supply
v. Saurini 775 P.2d 420, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, (Sup. Ct. 06/08/89); Bruno v. Plateau Mining
Company, 747 P.2d 1055, 73 Utah Adv. Rep 89, (Ct. App. 12/22/87); Guardian State Bank
v. Humpherys, 762 P.2d 1084, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Sup. Ct. 09/28/88); Arnica Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, (Ct. App. 01/12/89);
Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co., 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, (Ct. App. 03/28/89);
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170. (12/13/83); Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224. (10/07/83);
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, (08/23/83); Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100.
(04/27/83).
Since this objection and motion are merely procedural in nature, no opposing
or reply memorandum will be necessary or expected to further perfect or address that
which is set forth herein. Oral argument is further waived, however. Respondents do
respectfully ask for a decision in this regard.
DATED this ^//tlayof December, 198

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the Q\_ day of December, 1989, (s)he
hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION AND MOTION TO
STRIKE to John C. Baldwin, Director and Kathleen C. McGinley, Director of Broker-Dealer
Section, Securities Division, Utah Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box
45802, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge J. Steven Eklund, Esq.,
Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0802; and mailed the same to Craig F. McCullough. Esq.. Callister. Duncan, &
Nebeker. Co-Counsel to Respondents, 8th Floor, Kennecott Bldg., 10 East South Temple
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 and Mark J. Griffin. Esq.. Assistant Attorney General, 115
State Capitol Building. Salt Lake City. Utah 84114.

J obj.5

i*<\
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EXHIBIT "AA

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Registration of
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.
CRD No. 07678

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, OTHER RELATED MOTIONS
AND ACCOMPANYING ORDER

In the Matter of the Registration of
Marlen Vernon Johnson
CRD No. 2598888

Case No. SD-89-46BD

Case No. SD-89-47AG

Appearances:
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents
Mark J. Griffin for the Division of Securities
By the Administrative Law Judge:
By Motion, dated November 28, 1989, Respondents seek entry of summary judgment
in the instant adjudicative proceedings. On December 14, 1989, the Division filed a crossmotion for partial summary judgment. Respondents' reply memorandum was filed on
December 21, 1989, as was Respondents' objection and motion to strike with a supporting
memorandum. On December 22, 1989, Respondents filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit in opposition
to the Division's cross-motion for partial summary judgment.
On January 5, 1990, the Division filed replies to Respondents' objection and motion
to strike and memorandum, and also to Respondents' opposition to the Division's crossmotion for partial summary judgment. The Division also requested a hearing a Respondents'
motion for summary judgment. On January 9, 1990, Respondents filed a reply regarding the
December 21, 1989 objection and motion to strike and also filed an objection and motion to
strike with respect to the Division's January 5, 1990 pleadings and supporting memorandum.
A conference call was conducted with respective counsel on January 11, 1990. At
that time, Respondents' January 9, 1990 motion to strike matters which had already been
filed by the Division on January 5, 1990 was denied. Further, the Court advised respective
(Jiu . , . ; , ;

counsel that oral argument would not be necessary as to either of the pending motions and the
parties agreed that no oral argument would be warranted in that regard. The Court further
advised respective counsel that Respondents' December 21, 1989 petition for permission to
take depositions would be taken under advisement and thus subsequently addressed during a
discovery conference to be conducted, if necessary, after issuance of a ruling on the pending
motions.
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents contend that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether they
"solicited", "encouraged" or "aided" the sale of USA Medical Corporation securities by third
parties to Respondent Johnson. Respondents thus contend that Count I of the July 19, 1989
Amended Petition should be dismissed. Respondent further asserts that the Division does not
have the authority, pursuant to Section 61-1-14(3) Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, to
summarily suspend all exemptions from registration. Respondents thus urge that: (1) the
March 1, 1989 Summary Order did not, as a matter of law, prohibit Respondents from
purchasing the above-named securities; and (2) such conduct does not constitute a "dishonest
or unethical practice" as to subject Respondents to possible disciplinary sanction in these
proceedings.
In response, the Division initially asserts that there is a disputed issue of fact as to
whether Respondents solicited the sale of USA Medical Corporation securities. The Division
also contends that it has the authority to suspend all possible exemptions from registration in
this case. In support of its' cross-motion for partial summary judgment, the Division urges
that: (1) Respondents' mere participation in the sale of USA Medical Corporation securities,
during the pendency of the March 1, 1989 Order, was a dishonest or unethical practice; (2)
Respondents' admission of having purchased the securities after entry of the just-stated order
provides an undisputed basis upon which to conclude that Respondents thus engaged in
dishonest and unethical conduct; and (3) a determination as to the disciplinary sanction to be
entered is the only remaining issue to be addressed.
Section 63-46b-l(4) provides that, during an adjudicative proceeding, a presiding
officer may grant "a timely motion . . . for summary judgment if the requirements of . . .

2
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Rule 56 • . . of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are met by the moving party".
Comments of the Utah Administrative Law Advisory Committee on the drafting and
interpretation of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act further provide as follows:
A presiding officer is . . . authorized to grant a timely
motion either to dismiss or for summary judgment, if the
requirements of Rule 12(b) or 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and the UAPA are met. The well-developed caselaw
concerning Rules 12(b) and 56 should assist presiding officers
in deciding [such] motions . . . .
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The standards which govern the disposition of a motion for summary judgment are
well-established. In Bowen v. Riverton City, 565 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme
Court stated as follows:
If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact,
the doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing party. Thus,
the court must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences
fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment. Id. at 436.
It has also been stated that a motion for summary judgment:
. . .should be granted only when it clearly appears that there is
no reasonable probability that the party moved against could prevail.
Frisbee v.K&K

Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). Further, the Court has

recognized that a genuine issue of material fact exists if "reasonable minds could differ on
whether . . . conduct measures up to the required standard". Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d
613, 615 (Utah 1982).
The July 19, 1989 Amended Petition sets forth various factual allegations. For the
purpose of addressing the pending motion, all of the factual allegations contained in the
amended petition are incorporated herein by reference. To generalize, the amended petition
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contains allegations that: (1) Respondents purchased USA Medical Corporation securities
during such time that all transactional exemptions from registration of those securities were
unavailable; (2) the unavailability of transactional exemptions from registration as to the
securities in question was based on a March 1, 1989 Summary Order and a March 27, 1989
Default Order; (3) Respondents' purchase of the securities occurred within the State of Utah;
and (4) Respondents contacted an existing shareholder of USA Medical Corporation securities
in an attempt to purchase said securities, actually purchased USA Medical Corporation
securities from five other named individuals and may have also purchased USA Medical
Corporation securities from other unnamed sources after the March 27, 1989 Order.
Based on the factual allegations set forth in the amended petition, Paragraphs 16 and
17 of that petition reflect the Division's assertions that Respondent Johnson, "in soliciting
and/or purchasing" the securities during the pendency of the Division's Order, encouraged or
otherwise aided in the violation of Section 61-1-7 and that Respondent Johnson, acting on
behalf of Respondent Johnson-Bowles, "in soliciting, encouraging, or aiding the violation of
the Division's Order" engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business,
violative of Section 61-l-6(l)(g).
In an Amended Answer, dated November 21, 1989, Respondents admit that the
March 1, 1989 Order revoked the availability of exemptions in Utah for the offer and sale of
USA Medical Corporation securities, but deny the just-stated order had any effect whatsoever
on purchases of those securities by anyone as a matter of law. Relative to Paragraph 12(a) of
the amended petition, Respondent Johnson has admitted that he called a John Dawson, but
that such only occurred after he was informed by one Karl Smith that Mr. Dawson was
anxious to sell his "worthless" USA Medical Corporation stock to anyone who wanted to buy
it. Respondents have otherwise denied any remaining allegations as set forth in Paragraph
12(a). Respondents have also denied the applicability and relevance of all allegations
otherwise set forth in Paragraph 12 of the amended petition. Respondents further denied
allegations set forth in Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the amended petition.
Respondents have submitted seven (7) affidavits in support of their pending motion.
Five of those affidavits are from the individuals who sold USA Medical Corporation
securities to Respondent Johnson. In each affidavit, the affiant states that he was not
"encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or "solicited" by either Respondent
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Johnson or anyone else to sell the securities in question. In his affidavit, Respondent Johnson
has stated that he was contacted by several individuals in March and April 1989, who each
expressed a desire to sell the USA Medical Corporation stock which they held. Respondent
Johnson has also averred that none of his agents or employees ever engaged in any conduct to
"solicit", "aidH, "counsel", "command", "induce", "recommend", or otherwise "encourage"
any of the owners of USA Medical Corporation securities to sell those securities to, or for the
benefit of, either Respondent.
The Division has filed a May 8, 1989 memorandum from a Dorothy Akins and Ms
Akins* December 14, 1989 affidavit with its' cross-motion for partial summary judgment.
Ms. Akins1 memorandum references a May 8, 1989 conversation she and a Scott Frost had
with a Mr. Paul Jones, wherein the latter stated he was contacted by a Bruce Eatchel on April
18, 1989, Mr. Eatchel inquired if he (Mr. Jones) wanted to sell his USA Medical
Corporation securities and Mr. Jones met with Respondent Johnson later that day and sold
such securities at that time. In her affidavit, Ms. Akins has stated that she was told by Mr.
Dawson that Respondent Johnson "had contacted him to purchase his stock." In support of
its' motion, the Division urges that Respondent Johnson has admitted that he purchased USA
Medical Corporation securities from seven (7) individuals in April 1989.
Respondents have also filed two additional affidavits with respect to the Division's
cross-motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Respondents have filed an affidavit from
Mr. Eatchel, who has stated that any conversation he had with Mr. Jones after March 1,
1989 were not undertaken pursuant to the direction of Respondent Johnson or Respondent
Johnson-Bowles, that Mr. Jones contacted the affiant in April 1989 and expressed an interest
in selling his USA Medical Corporation securities and that Mr. Jones either asked the affiant
to put him in contact with Respondent Johnson as to the possible sale of said securities or that
the affiant simply did so. Mr. Eatchel also stated that he was not acting under Respondents'
directions when he discussed the above-stated matters with Mr. Jones.
Counsel for Respondent has also filed an affidavit, where he has stated that discovery
is not complete as to potential defenses which Respondents may have in the instant
proceeding and, thus, any favorable ruling on the Division's cross-motion for summary
judgment would effectively preclude Respondents from continuing in discovery as to present
whatever defenses may be applicable in this proceeding.

5
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Prior to addressing the respective motions filed by the parties, various preliminary
issues must be resolved. In tiieir December 19, 1989 motion to strike, Respondents urge that
the May 8, 1989 memorandum from Ms. Akins and her December 14, 1989 affidavit are
gross hearsay, not otherwise proper or legally acceptable and do not conform to the
provisions of Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The just-stated rule provides
as follows:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein . . . .
In Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (1972),
the Utah Supreme Court stated:
An affidavit, supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment
is an evidentiary affidavit, whose form and content is governed by Rule
56(e), U.R.C.P. Such an affidavit must be made on personal
knowledge of the affiant, set forth facts that would be admissible in
evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify
to the matters stated therein.
Affidavits containing statements made merely "on information and
belief1 will be disregarded. Hearsay testimony and opinion testimony
that would not be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly
be set forth in an affidavit. Id. at 506.
See also Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973).
Concededly, the statements contained in the May 8, 1989 memorandum have not been
presented by a document identified as an affidavit and there is no indication that Ms. Akins
was duly sworn as to those matters. With respect to a motion for summary judgment, the
proper practice in administrative adjudicative proceedings would be to present evidentiary
affidavits in typical format. More importantly, the Court notes that the truth of the
statements attributed by Ms. Akins to Mr. Jones in the May 8, 1989 memorandum is not
based on Ms. Akins* personal knowledge and her December 14, 1989 affidavit contains a
recital that the statements therein are true "to the best of my knowledge, information and
belief."
However, Section 63-46b-8(l)(c) provides that the presiding officer in a formal
adjudicative proceeding "may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay". Further,
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while Section 63-46b-10(3) provides that no finding of fact that was contested may be based
solely on hearsay evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence, hearsay testimony is admissible in formal adjudicative proceedings. Thus, such
testimony may be considered with respect to the pending motions and Respondents' assertion
to the contrary is not persuasive. While such testimony is cognizable for the just-stated
purpose, the Court acknowledges that a question remains whether proper and sufficient
evidence will be presented during any subsequent hearing on the merits to sustain the
Division's burden of proof at that time.
In support of their pending motions, both parties have referenced language set forth
by this Court as to other motions previously addressed during the course of these
proceedings. Respondents contend that it cannot be established that they participated in the
sales of USA Medical Corporation securities unless they have "solicited", "encouraged",
"aided" or, as the Court purportedly indicated in its' December 18, 1989 Conclusions of
Law, "urged" existing shareholders to sell their securities. The pertinent language from the
just-referenced order is as follows:
Notwithstanding Respondents* assertions, Count I is not based on an
allegation that Respondents aided and abetted or solicited a sale of the
securities to themselves. Rather, the essence of Count I is that Respondents9
purchase of the securities resulted in the violation of the March 27, 1989
Default Order and, as a corollary, Section 61-1-7. Whether Respondents
urged USA Medical shareholders to sell their securities is a matter adequately
and properly pled in the amended petition and relevant as an aggravating
factor with respect to whatever disciplinary sanction should enter if it is found
that Respondents engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities
business.
The amended petition sets forth a number of factual questions, to wit:
(1) Did Respondent Johnson solicit the sale of USA Medical Corporation
securities during the pendency of the Division's March 1, 1989 and
March 27, 1989 orders;
(2) Did Respondent Johnson purchase USA Medical Corporation securities
during the pendency of the just-referenced orders;
(3) If Respondent Johnson solicited the sale of USA Medical Corporation
securities, did that conduct encourage or otherwise aid in the
violation of Section 61-1-7;
(4) If Respondent Johnson purchased the securities in question, did such
conduct encourage or otherwise aid in the violation of Section 61-1-7; and
(5) If Respondent Johnson, acting on behalf of Respondent Johnson-Bowles,
either solicited a possible sale of USA Medical Corporation securities or
7
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purchased such securities and such conduct encouraged or otherwise
aided in the violation of the above-referenced orders, does such conduct
constitute a dishonest or unethical practice within the meaning of
Section 61-l-6(l)(g).
The Division correctly asserts that a disciplinary sanction could enter in these proceedings,
absent any finding that Respondents solicited the sale of USA Medical Corporation securities.
As indicated in the December 18, 19989 Conclusions of Law, whether Respondents urged
existing shareholders to sell their securities would be relevant as an aggravating factor with
respect to whatever disciplinary action may be warranted, should it be found that Respondents
engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business.
In support of its' cross-motion for summary judgment, the Division references
language of this Court in its' August 29, 1989 Conclusions of Law:
Whether Respondents solicited the sale of USA Medical Corporation
securities (and Respondents have strenuously urged that they did not), it
is obvious that their participation in those transactions as a purchaser of
those securities facilitated a violation of the Summary Order as to
potentially subject them to disciplinary sanction in these proceedings.
In its' December 18, 1989 Order, this Court stated as follows:
A considered review of the amended petition clearly reflects two
matters which must be recognized. First, the factual allegation of
critical relevance in the amended petition is that Respondents purchased
USA Medical Corporation securities. It is that conduct which
potentially subjects Respondents to disciplinary sanction in these
proceedings.
Further, if the facts alleged in the amended petition were proved, it
could be concluded that Respondents' participation as a purchaser of the
securities facilitated the violation of a March 27, 1989 Order issued by
the Division to suspend the trading (both buying and selling) of
securities which had been the subject of market manipulation and
securities fraud.
As further reflected in the December 18, 1989 Conclusions of Law, the amended petition
properly raises the issue "whether Respondents' purchase of the securities in question
constituted dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business".
At various times during these proceedings, the Court has attempted to articulate the
factual and legal basis underlying the amended petition. However, nothing contained in
either the August 29, 1989 or December 18, 1989 Conclusions of Law should be construed to
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suggest that this Court has concluded, as a matter of law, that Respondents have engaged in
conduct constituting a dishonest or unethical practice which necessarily subjects them to the
entry of a disciplinary sanction in these proceedings. Simply put, there has been no
determination of facts, or of the law applicable thereto, which would warrant such a
conclusion at this point in these proceedings.
A review of the pleadings, admissions and affidavits on file reveals a dispute as to
whether Respondents solicited the sale of the securities in question, whether any such alleged
conduct thus encouraged or aided a violation of Section 61-1-7, whether any such alleged
conduct encouraged or aided a violation of the March 1, 1989 and March 27, 1989 Orders
and whether any such alleged conduct constitutes a dishonest and unethical practice, within
the meaning of Section 61-l-6(l)(g). Given the case law set forth below, the Court
concludes that the foregoing matters reflect mixed questions of law and fact to be addressed
by the Securities Advisory Board and there is no proper basis to grant Respondents' motion.
Consistent with the foregoing, and upon further review of the pleadings, admissions,
affidavits and the May 8, 1989 memorandum on file, there is no genuine issue as to the
material fact that Respondent Johnson purchased USA Medical Corporation securities during
the pendency of the Division's March 1, 989 and March 27, 1989 Orders. However, it is
inappropriate for this Court to conclude, as a matter of law, that the purchase of those
securities constituted a dishonest or unethical practice and, thus, that the Division is entitled
to summary relief. In Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme
Court addressed whether an osteopath could be held to a general statutory standard of
"unprofessional conduct," as to invoke a disciplinary sanction regarding treatment he had
rendered to various patients. The Court stated as follows:
Once a professional is certified, however, the public's interest in his
or her professional performance in the treatment of patients (or in
services to clients) is paramount. It is therefore appropriate for the
public to place great reliance on the self-governing functions and
standards of the profession As applied to the treatment of patients (or
services to clients), a general statutory standard like "unprofessional
conduct" is acceptable for three reasons: (1) The subject of professional
performance is too comprehensive to codified in detail. (2) Members of
a profession can properly be held to understand its' standards of
performance. (3) Standards of performance will be interpreted by
members of the same profession in the process of administrative
adjudication. Id. at 129.
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The Court further stated that whether a licensee has engaged in unprofessional conduct is a
determination to be made by the members of the licensing committee "on a case-by-case basis
by drawing on the statutory standards . . . and on its own knowledge of (the patient-care
standards of the profession." Id.
In a subsequent case, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed whether a real estate
broker could be held to a general statutory standard of being "unworthy or incompetent" as to
justify entry of a disciplinary sanction. In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah App. 1988). The
Court stated as follows:
We find that the general standard found in section 61-2-11(8), "being
unworthy or incompetent," meets the three justifications required by
Vance and is not vague and indefinite so long as the Commission
carefully considers the A.LJ. 's recommendation and reviews the
evidence and filings prior to rendering its final decision. Of course, as
in this case, the final decision maker's review is enhanced by detailed
factual findings. The findings in this case described each fact situation
with such particularity that the Commission could readily understand
the circumstances of each alleged violation in evaluating whether the
conduct was consistent with the general professionalism standard. Id at
36.
Importantly, the Court then stated as follows:
The Commission's application of section 61-2-11 to a particular fact
situation, including the meaning of "unworthy or incompetent,H is a
mixed question of law and fact. On appeal, an appellate court must
inquire whether the Commission's determination was within the limits of
reasonableness and rationality . . . . So long as there is evidence of
substance to support the Commission's factual findings, we defer to the
Commission's factual findings. Id. (Citations omitted)
Consistent with the rationale set forth in the above-cited cases, this Court concludes
that whether Respondents' conduct constitutes "dishonest and unethical practices in the
securities business" is a mixed question of law and fact which should be properly addressed
to, and resolved by, the Securities Advisory Board. Without the application of the Board's
expertise (i.e., its' understanding of the securities industry) to the questions which must be
addressed in this adjudicative proceeding, this Court cannot rule, as a matter of law, that
Respondents' purchase of the securities in question properly justifies entry of the summary
relief now sought by the Division.
Respondents also assert that the Division has no authority to summarily suspend all
10
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exemptions from registration. However, in Capitol General Corp. v. Utah Dept of Business
Regulation, Til P.2d 494 (Utah App.1989), the Court reviewed an order suspending "all
possible secondary trading exemptions" for certain stock. The Court characterized the nature
of such an order as follows:
The primary effect of such an order is to force each party holding the
affected shares to register with the division prior to any further trading.
Absent such an order, holders of shares may avoid registration and trade their
shares freely if a secondary exemption can be claimed. See Utah Code Ann.
Section 61-1-14 (1986). Id. at 496.
Importantly, the Court further stated:
The [Utah Securities Advisory] Board has the power to remedy a violation
of Section 61-1-7 under Section 61-1-20, which includes the power to issue an
order of similar legal effect to the order involved here. Id. at 498. (All
emphasis herein added.)
Concededly, the instant proceedings were not initiated on the basis that Respondents sold or
offered to sell an unregistered or non-exempt security. Further, the relief sought by the
Division in these proceedings concerns the possible entry of a disciplinary sanction regarding
Respondents' registration, not the issuance of an order to prevent the sale of unregistered
securities. Thus, Capitol General Corp. v. Utah Dept. of Business Regulation, supra, is not
directly on point.
Nevertheless, the Division clearly had the authority to enter the March 1, 1989 and
March 27, 1989 Orders in this case and the remaining pivotal issue is whether Respondents
engaged in "dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business" by reason of either
admitted purchases of USA Medical Corporation securities or, upon sufficient proof, that
Respondents solicited a sale of those securities.
One further matter should be addressed. The Court notes the Rule 56(f) affidavit
filed by counsel for Respondents, wherein it is stated that Respondents' discovery is not
complete and further discovery may disclose the applicability of various defenses set forth in
Respondents' amended answer. In Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah
App. 1987), the Court generally stated that summary judgment should not be granted if
discovery is incomplete, " since information sought in discovery may create genuine issues of
material fact sufficient to defeat the motion/ Id. at 278. In the instant proceeding, this
Court notes that little, if any, discovery, has been completed. Under such circumstances, it
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would be premature to grant the Division's cross-motion for partial summary judgment and
the Court thus declines to enter any such relief at this time. See Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d
311, 315 (Utah 1984), quoting Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah, 561 P.2d
191 (Utah 1977).
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondents' motion for summary judgment,
dated November 28, 1989, is hereby denied.
It is further ordered that the Division's cross-motion for partial summary judgment,
dated December 14, 1989, is also denied.
It is further ordered that Respondents' December 21, 1989 motion to strike is also
denied.
It is further ordered that Respondents' December 21, 1989 petition for permission to
take depositions is taken under advisement. Within five (5) days from the date of this Order,
the Court will contact respective counsel to schedule a discovery conference. Said conference
shall be conducted as soon as practicable thereafter as the means to address the appropriate
scope of allowable discovery and to prompt the subsequent disposition of this case in an
expeditious manner.
Dated this

of March, 1990.

J.rSteven
Aaministrative Law Judge
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed the foregoing Motion for
Summary Judgment, Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, other related motions and
Accompanying Order, properly addressed, postage prepaid to: John Michael
Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Craig F.
McCullough, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 8th Floor, Kennecott Building, 10

East South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah

84113,

co-counsel

for

Respondents; and to Mark J. Griffin, Assistant Attorney General for the
Division of Securities at Tax & Business Regulation Division, 130 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. A copy of the foregoing was also hand
delivered to Kathleen C. McGinley, Director, Broker/Dealer Section, Division
of Securities, Department of Commerce*
Dated this

Q^3

day of March, 1990
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EXHIBIT "BB"

BEF<

1)1 V I! SI ON Ml' SKCIIKITIKS
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
T HE

IN THE MATTER OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

ORDER ON AGENCY REVIEW

REGISTRATION

Case No. SD-89-46B

JOHNSON-BOWLES
CRD N o . 0 7 6 7 8
ill THM M, VI VVh

.""I1' THI'"

REGISTRATION
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
CRD No. 259888

C i V t P

Nl,

. j ) -in i

,| i'A i

Respondents', Request for Agency Review dated April 5. 19 9 0 is
hereby denied because the Order dated March -1" l, 199H does not
constitute f i na ] agency acti oi i ace or ::I:I n g t ::: i HI )s, i t m 1 1 s \»i e v J o u s J y
, 11 .i1 e 11 11 i) i 11«»r f; dated October 3 0, 19 8 9 and November 2 2 , 19 H 9 i n
the above-captioned matter.
Dated tr:

)hn C. Baldwin
Director, Division of Securities
Presiding Officer

EXHIBIT "CC"

/.;p 3
%
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
HE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STIPULATION OF FACTS FOR
PURPOSES OF HEARING

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.

Case No. SD-89-46BD

IN 1 HE MA I ITU 01 I HI REGISTRATION
OF
Case No. SD-89-47AG

JOHNSON
CRD NO. 2598888

The petitioner and respondents, by and through their respective and mutual
counsel, hereby stipulate to the followiinj lm I . Im i < i > • i

I I M " ' ^ " " ) 'I' 1, respective

hearing in the above-matter before the Securities Advisory Board.
STIPULATION OF FACTS
1. I

ison-Bowles Company, Inc., and Marlen V. Johnson are

registered with the Utah Division of Securities as a securities broker-dealer and agent,
respectively.

OUDlKvl

-1 -

2. As of January 22. 1989, respondent Johnson-Bowles was "short" exactly
53,500 shares of the securities of U.S.A. Medical Corporation, a Wyoming Corporation
("U.S.A. Medical" or "Company").
3. Effective January 23. 1989, U.S.A. Medical effected a 10 for 1 forward split
which automatically increased Johnson-Bowles' "short" position tenfold. For example,
instead of being "short" only 53,500 shares, Johnson-Bowles suddenly was "short" 535,000
shares.
4. Following the January 23, forward split, the price of U.S.A. Medical stock
rapidly increased to approximately $1 per share.
5. On February 16, 1989, Johnson-Bowles brought a 10b-5 securities fraud
action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Utah seeking a preliminary
injunction and declaration that Johnson-Bowies' outstanding contracts and obligations to
certain brokerage firms and clearing corporations to whom Johnson-Bowles owed U.S.A.
Medical stock were void for illegality. In such action, Johnson-Bowles, alleged improprieties
and fraud in the issuance and trading of U.S.A. Medical's securities.
6. The U.S. District Court granted Johnson-Bowies' Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order on February 17. 1989 as against Midwest Clearing, thereby preventing
Midwest Clearing from effecting any "buy-ins" for ten (10) days as against Johnson-Bowles.
7. Following a hearing for Preliminary Injunction held on February 27 and 28,
1989. the Court denied Johnson-Bowles' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. However, U.S.
District Judge J. Thomas Greene did rule that the securities of U.S.A. Medical were and had
been the subject of market manipulation and securities fraud.
8. During February. 1989, Marlen Johnson furnished information to the Division
relative to the problems associated with U.S.A. Medical and its securities.
0UUJ.JL55
-2-

9. On March 1,1989, the Division issued a Summary Order si ispending all
§14(2)

registration under the Utah Uniform Securities Act relative to U.S.A.

Medical's securities. On March 29.1989, the Division's March 1, 1989 Order was made
permanent by default. I i i ie ai ic I correct ::: spies of tl ie petitioner's March, 1989, Orders are
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibits HA" and "B" respectively.
On March 6, 1989, the U.S. fiei unties t\ I I M IIHIK.|H \ IHIMINVIII i
suspended trading in the securities of U.S.A. Medical for ten (10) days. A true and correct
copy of such Order is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit MC".
received copies of the Division's March 1 and 29, 1989
Orders (Exhibits "A" and MBM hereto) on or about the date of their respective issuance.
shares ol

As of March 1# 1989 litiiiM<ii H. IAIIJ»

A-

I suv nal hundred thousand

.A. Medical stock to several broker-dealers and clearing corporations. During

March, 1989, respondents purchased a total of 397,900 shares
f i if

i

^ u Mies

ts and one (1) New York resident.
Of the seven (7) individuals from whom respondents purchased U.S.A.

Medical

have submitted affidavits that they were not

"solicited" by respondents or any of their agents and such individuals have further attested
that they were aware of not only Judge Greene's Febi I.II ' I'H 1989 nln ij I n, i IIM i liny
1989 orders. True and correct copies of such
affidavits, including their respective exhibits, are attached hereto as Exhibits "D", "E". "F
"G". and "I f\
4

""he remaining two (2) individuals from whom respondents purchased

U.S.A. Medical stock after March i

Flateman and Utah

_3_

resident Paul Jones. Such individuals were also aware of Judge Greene's ruling and the
Division's March 1989 Orders. Further, both individuals are registered representatives with
the National Association of Securities Dealers. Inc.. ("NASD") and prior to the Division's
March 1.1989, order. Paul Jones, a licensed securities agent with Wasatch Stock Trading,
was involved in the trading of the securities of U.S.A. Medical. Because Flateman is a New
York resident, and. in an effort to expedite these proceedings, whether respondents
"solicited" him or not will not be an issue in these proceedings.
15. During April. 1989. respondent Marlen V. Johnson was informed by one
Karl Smith that a Mr. John Dawson had stock of U.S.A. Medical that Smith thought Dawson
was desirous of selling. Based on Mr. Johnson's conversation with Mr. Smith. Mr. Johnson
contacted Mr. Dawson to determine if he was interested in selling his U.S.A. Medical stock.
Such conversation never resulted in either a sale of U.S.A. Medical stock or a violation of
the Division's March 1989 orders.
16. The purchases undertaken by the respondents in U.S.A. Medical stock
during the pendency of the Division's order from six (6) Utah residents and one (1) New York
resident are as follows in the amounts indicated:
SELLER

AMOUNT OF SHARES

Paul Jones
Richard Sax
Philip Tanzini
Jim Coleman
Nick Julian
Leo Pavich

180.900
18,000
20.000
30.000
69.500
67,500

Sheldon Flateman,
a New York resident

12,000

TOTAL

397,900
(Jlk>JL±57

-4-

DATED this 0 th day of July. 1990.

Codmbs
\ttomey for Respondent*

In re:

Johnson-Bowles Compai i, 111L
' '
Case No. SD-89-45BD
STIPULATION OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF HEARING

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the
day of July, 1990, (s)he
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATION OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF
HEARING by regular mail, postage prepaid to John C. Baldwin. Director and Kathleen C.
McGinley, Director of Broker-Dealer Section, Securities Division, Utah Department of
Commerce, 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0802;
Administrative Law Judge J. Steven Ekiund. Esq., Department of Commerce, 160 East 300
South. P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802; Craig F. McCullough, Esq.,
Callister, Duncan, & Nebeker, Co-Counsel to Respondents, 8th Floor. Kennecott Bldg., 10
East South Temple Street. Salt Lake City. Utah 84133: and Mark J. Griffin. Esq.. Assistant
Attorney General, 115 State Capitol Building, Salt I ake City. Utah 84114.

J.M1P.J-4
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ., No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)369-0833
Attorney tor Respondents

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF JIM COLEMAN

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.

Case No. SD-89-46BD

CRD NO. 07678

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
Case No. SD-89-47AG

MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
CRD NO. 2598888

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
)ss.
)

Jim Coleman on his oath deposes and says as follows:
1. That the representation letter I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson when I sold
him stock of U.S.A. Medical, is attached hereto and incorporated by reference and it is true
and correct.

•*'K,^±71
1 -

2, That 1

i ii l "inn < in HIJIHT, "H! 1 nl", "i-ommanded". "counseled", or

"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That I
in fact sold such stock on my own initiative withoul any IJIUSWIHI horn rinyniui 1 also do not
consider myself to have been a "customer" of Mr. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even if I
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transactir
IM11ii oh' |nil' 11II Hit1 i* 11*10 because the isolated transaction did not involve the payment of
a commission to anyone.
i

I hit I pnrrhTw1 thn 11

l

i\ hi

i I sold to Mr. Johnson

without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of to the Uniform
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the tin i n • "i | mini 1 i r ii >i ii t "ii i 11 us
i

j

consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the

right to sell it when I wanted and to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behatt
of anyone else i ""

"'

chased or when I sold such stock. ! am

also not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation.
4. At the time I sold the stock in t\nn .imn i • • "' '

;>n »n> ' '" < »»at lion

was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives.
I) I have not received any additional compensation froni Mi Johnson oi
anyone nh n Inr my CM i uln

I 11 ir» affidavit.

FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this /<£ day of Novm

1989.

r

f

\

r

Jiff] Coleman

*'),*

* rJ'>

In re:

In the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company. Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson. Case
Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG
AFFIDAVIT OF JIM COLEMAN

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before

My Commission Expires:

l/Offl
J:AF0VT.12
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Ma< 16, 1989

To Whom It May Concern:

hi

HI Ul MI "JI.JI i", I!, » -I

Hediral

1,01 p/ - i,»U00.00

I, James Coleman, sold U.S.A. Medical Corp shares to Marl en Johr s<-n,
I was aware of Judge J. Thomas Greene's court ruling concerning
U.S..A. Medical dated February 29, 1989 as well as being aware of
State of Utah's action dated March 1? IMWi,
'Marlen Johnson did not solicit me for shares. I contacted him and
asked him if there was interest to buy shares of U.S.A. Medical
stock to close open contracts with other broker-dealers.

IHUUiV-l

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)369-0833
Attorney for Respondents
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BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF PHILLIP TANZINI

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.

Case No. SD-89-46BD

CRD NO. 07678

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
Case No. SD-89-47AG

MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
CRD NO. 2598888

STATE OF UTAH

)

SALT LAKE COUNTY

)ss.
)

Phillip Tanzini on his oath deposes and says as follows:
1. That the representation letter or letters I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson
when I sold him stock of U.S.A. Medical is true and correct and it bears my signature.
2. That I was not "encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or
"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That
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in fact sold such stock on my own initiative without any pressure from anyone. I also do not
consider myself to have been a "customer" of Mr. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even if I
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transaction to have been
entirely private. This is also because the isolated transaction did not involve the payment of
a commission to anyone.
3. That I purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock which I sold to Mr. Johnson
without notice of any "adverse claims'* as contemplated in Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the time I purchased it. For this
reason, I consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the
right to sell it when I wanted to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behalf of
anyone else other than myself when I either purchased or when I sold such stock. I am also
not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation.
4. At the time I sold the stock in question to Mr. Johnson, such transaction
was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives.
5. I have not received any additional compensation from Mr. Johnson or
anyone else for my execution of this affidavit.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this ^

day of November, 1989.
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In re:

In the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company. Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson,
Case Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG
AFFIDAVIT OF PHILLIP TANZINI

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before

esiding at Salt Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires:

•\

^
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7 June 1989

To Whom It May Concern:
RE:

20,000 shares U.S.A. Medical Corp. .30c per share

I, Phillip Tanzini, sold U.S.A. Medical Corp. shares to Marlen
Johnson. I was aware of Judge J. Thomas Greene1s court ruling
concerning USA Medical dated February 28, 1989; as well as being
aware of the State of Utahfs action dated March 1, 1989.
Marlen Johnson did not solicit me for shares. I contacted him and
asked him if there was interest to buy shares of U.S.A. Medical
stock to close open contracts with other broker-dealers.
Sincerely yours,

Phillip Tanzini

^
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, ESQ., No. 3639
72 East 400 South, Ste. 220
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:

AFFIDAVIT OF NICK JULIAN

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.
CRD NO. 07678

Case No. SD-89-46BD

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON

Case No. SD-89-47AG

CRD NO. 2598888

STATE OF UTAH

)

SALT LAKE COUNTY

)ss.
)

Nick Julian on his oath deposes and says as follows:
1. That the representation letter or letters I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson
when I sold him stock of U.S.A. Medical is true and correct and it bears my signature.
2. That I was not "encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or
"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That

' > ' > ' j ^ l AS

-1 -

in fact sold such stock on my own initiative without any pressure from anyone. I also do not
consider myself to have been a McustomerH of Mr. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even If I
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transaction to have been
entirely private. This is also because the isolated transaction did not involve the payment of
a commission to anyone.
3. That I purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock which I sold to Mr. Johnson
without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the time I purchased it. For this
reason. I consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the
right to sell it when I wanted to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behalf of
anyone else other than myself when I either purchased or when I sold such stock. I am also
not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation.
4. At the time I sold the stock in question to Mr. Johnson, such transaction
was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives.
5. I have not received any additional compensation from Mr. Johnson or
anyone else for my execution of this affidavit.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this//jJay of November. 1989.
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In re:

In the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company. Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson
Case Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG
AFFIDAVIT OF NICK JULIAN

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this {j^day of November. 1989.

Notary Public
asking at Salt Lake City. UT
My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
JUSTEENE BLANKENSHIP
7655 So 2700 East
Sa't Lake City, UT 84121
COMMISSION EXPIRES
JUNE 4,1993
STATE OF UTAH

J:AFDVT.9
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May 16, 1989

To Whom It May Concern:
I, Nick Julian, called Marlen Johnson to ask him if he would be
interested in buying ray USA Medical stock. I told him I wanted
to sell 69,500 shares at .10c per share or $6,950.00. I also told
him that I was aware of the rulings of the State of Utah and Judge
Greenefs findings.

y

u
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Witnessed byJ

Dated

Subscribed and srorn to before me
on this

^ 3

day of /ty<*y

1989.

"UrO±±8'Z
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South, Ste. 220
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD SAX

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.

Case No. SD-89-46BD

CRD NO. 07678

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON

Case No. SD-89-47AG

CRD NO. 2598888

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
)ss.
)

Richard Sax on his oath deposes and says as follows:
1. That the representation letter or letters I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson
when I sold him stock of U.S.A. Medical is true and correct and it bears my signature.
2. That I was not "encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or
"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That
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in fact sold such stock on my own Initiative without any pressure from anyone, i also do not
consider myself to have been a McustomerH of Mr. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even If I
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transaction to have been
entirely private. This is also because the isolated transaction did not involve the payment of
a commission to anyone.
3. That I purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock which I sold to Mr. Johnson
without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the time I purchased it. For this
reason, I consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the
right to sell it when I wanted to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behalf of
anyone else other than myself when I either purchased or when I sold such stock. I am also
not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation.
4. At the time I sold the stock in question to Mr. Johnson, such transaction
was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives.
5. I have not received any additional compensation from Mr. Johnson or
anyone else for my execution of this affidavit.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.

upDATED this (*3 day of November. 1989.
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Richard Sax
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In re:

In the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., and Marlen V. Johnson
Case Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD SAX

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before hi t

N^ftry Public
^siding at Salt Lake City, UT

m

My CoTryitissjon Expires:

J:AF0VT.8
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May 16, 1989

To Whom It May Concern:

I, Richard Sax, offered to sell my U.S.A. Medical stock to Marlen
Johnson. At no time, did Marlen Johnson solicit me to sell him
my stock.
Very truly yours,

faul p-

Richard Sax

t±&
Witness

£l*2>l%Q
Date
Subscribed and sworn before me t h i s
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ., NO. 3639
72 East 400 South, Ste. 220
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:

AFFIDAVIT OF LEO PAVICH

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.
CRD NO. 07678

Case No. SD-89-46BD

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
Case No. SD-89-47AG

MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
CRD NO. 2598888

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
)ss.
)

Leo Pavich on his oath deposes and says as follows:
1. That the representation letter or letters I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson
when I sold him stock of U.S.A. Medical is true and correct and it bears my signature.
2. That I was not "encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or
"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That I
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in fact sold such stock on my own initiative without any pressure from anyone. I also do not
consider myself to have been a "customer11 of Mr. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even if I
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transaction to have been
entirely private. This is also because the isolated transaction did not involve involve the
payment of a commission to anyone.
3. That I purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock which I sold to Mr. Johnson
without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the time I purchased it. For this
reason, I consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the
right to sell it when I wanted to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behalf of
anyone else other than myself when I either purchased or when I sold such stock. I am also
not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation.
4. At the time I sold the stock in question to Mr. Johnson, such transaction
was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives.
5. I have not received any additional compensation from Mr. Johnson or
anyone else for my execution of this affidavit.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this _/£ day of November. 1989.

Leo Pavitch
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In re:

In the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company. Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson. Case
Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG
AFFIDAVIT OF LEO PAVICH

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before

'Residing at Salt Lake City. UT
My Commission Expires:

J:AFDVT.I.O

'Mrjiiao

-3-

20 June 1989

To Whom It May Concern:
RE:

67,500 shares U.S.A. Medical Corp., .145$ per share, $9,787.50

I,
flH^m^l,
sold U.S.A. Medical Corp. shares to Marlen Johnson.
I was aware of Judge J. Thomas Greene's court ruling concerning
U.S.A. Medical dated February 28, 1989; as well as being aware of
the State of Utah,rs pending actions against Marlen Johnson and
Johnson-Bowles Co., Inc.
Sincerely yours,

'1UO-U91

EXHIBIT "DD"

(KING - Direct by Coombs)
satisfied.
MR. GRIFFIN*

Your witness.

Thank you.

We have nothing further.

MR. COOMBS:

Any questions by the board of this

THE COURT:
witness; Ms. Wickens?
MS. WICKENS i
THE COURT:

No.

Mr. Cannon?

MR. CANNON:

No.

THE COURT:

Mr. Burgon?

MR. BURGONx

No.

THE COURT:

Mr. Bowler?

MR. BOWLER:

No.
Tou're excused, Mr. Sorensen.

THE COURT:
Thank you.
MR. COOMBS:

Respondants call David King.

DAVID KING
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Respondants,
having first been duly sworn, was examined and testified
as follows:
THE COURTt

Mr. Coombs?

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. COOMBS:
Q.

Mr. King, would you state your full name and

address for the record?
A.

My name is David King.

My home address is
190
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(KING - Direct by Coombs)
3388 East Enchanted View Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah.
My business address is SO West Broadway; that's the
Valley Tower.

And the firm that I work for, Kruse,

Landa and Maycock is on the eighth floor of that
building.
Q.

So I take it you're in private practice as an

attorney?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Do you have a specialty?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What is that specialty please?

A.

I specialize —

Q.

First of all, let's do this:

Are you a member

of the bar?
h.

Yes, I am.

I'm a member of the Utah bar, and

I'm an associate member of the Washington D.C. bar and
the Idaho bar.
Q.

Let's start from the beginning.

What was your

first employment out of law school?
A.

I left law school in 1970 —

graduated from

law school in 1970 with a juris doctorate degree and
went to work for the Securities and Exchange Commission
in Washington D.C. as a trial attorney.

I was in

Washington D.C. for five years, transferred to the Salt
Lake branch office of the commission as a trial attorney
191
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(KING - Direct by Coombs)
and spent seven years there.

I left the Salt Lake

branch office in February of 1983.
Q.

Okay, so how many years total did you work for

the Securities and Exchange Commission?
A.

A little over -fewe- years.

Q.

What did you do then when you you left the

S.E.C?
A.

I went directly to Kruse, Landa and Maycock,

the firm that I'm with now.

Our firm does a

considerable amount of securities work.
the litigation side of that.

I am more on

Our firm represents

broker/dealers in litigation, principally defensive
litigation; defense of arbitration proceedings in which
broker/dealers are named as respondants; defense of
S.E.C. enforcement actions; and defense of state and
NASD enforcement actions.
Q.

Are you familiar with the NASD Rules of Fair

Practice?
A.

I'm familiar with both the NASD Rules of Fair

Practice, which is the basis for most of the NASD
disciplinary actions, and also the corresponding state
provision, Unethical and Dishonest Business Practices,
which is often the basis of a state enforcement action.
Q.

Are you also familiar with the Uniform

Practice Code?
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(KING - Direct by Coombs)
1

A*

I have some familiarity with the Uniform

2

Practice Code, inasmuch as from time to time our

3

broker/dealer clients will call me and ask me questions,

4

particularly related to buy-in procedures, which is a

5

subject that is covered by the Uniform Practice Code*

6

Q.

And I assume you're also familiar with Article

7

3, Section 1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice

8

requiring brokers to observe high standards of

9

commercial honor?

10
11

A.

High standards of commercial honesty, and fair

and equitable pgAaorpals of trade.

12 I

Q.

Now, have you sat through this hearing today?

13

A*

Yes I have, beginning to this point.

14

Q.

So you are familiar with the facts of this

16

A.

Yes, I am.

17

Q.

And you're familiar with what the respondants

15

18
19

case?

are charged with?
A*

Yes, I am.

It's my understanding that the

20

basis for this action by the state —

or the factual

21

basis is a purchase by Marlen Johnson and Johnson-Bowles

22

of securities from a Utah resident.

23

of a company with respect to which all exemptions from

24

registrations have been suspended by the State of

25

Utah.

The securities were
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(KING - Direct by Coombs)
1

The State of Utah contends in this proceeding that

2

that set of circumstances constitutes dishonest and

3

unethical business practices on the part of

4

Johnson-Bowles and Marlen Johnson.

5 1

Q.

And you understand that they are contending

6

that, even though the purchases were made to fulfill

7

NASD contracts?

8

A.

Yes, I understand that to be the case.

9

Q.

So knowing that that's the fact of this case,

10

and knowing that —

or at least understanding the

11

division's theory of liability, do you have an opinion

12 I as to whether or not Johnson-Bowles and Marlen Johnson
13

engaged in dishonest or unethical practice under section

14

6(9) °£ the Uniform Securities Act?

15

A.

I do have an opinion*

16

Q.

Would you tell us that opinion, and tell us

17
18

the basis of that opinion?
A.

My opinion is that they did not engage in

19 I unethical or dishonest business practices as a result of
20

those circumstances.

21

with an analysis of the provisions that we're dealing

22

with and their origins.

23

The Utah Uniform Securities Act, section 6(g) has
e
been flashed out by the Utah Securities Division in rule
6-l(g), which is a rule that prohibits particular

24
25

The basis for my opinion starts
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(XING - Direct by Coombs)
conduct that is considered to be dishonest and
unethical.

That provision states unequivocally that it

doesn't cover the field, that other things can in fact
be considered to be dishonest and unethical business
practices as well.
The Utah rule setting forth dishonest and unethical
business practices states that it is drawn from similar
provisions of the NASD, the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the organization called NASA; that's the
North American Securities Administrators Association.
If you look at the 1983 NASA policy statement that
is entitled Dishonest and Unethical Business Practices,
you will see that they state at the outset that the
purpose is to prescribe certain conduct the
broker/dealer should not engage in.
And when saying that, they use the exact language
of Article 3 section 1 of the NASD's Rules of Fair
Practice.

So it's clear that the NASD's Rules of Fair

Practice, the state rules, the NASA policy guidelines,
and also as a result of reading those provisions, the
S.B.C. rules series under section 15(c) all give a
person an idea of what is dishonest and unethical
business practices.
If you line those up side by side, you come out
with about four —

if I'm allowed to generalise, and I
195
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(KING - Direct by Coombs)
don't know that all persons with my experience would
generalize in the same way.

But if I can generalize the

categories of conduct that are generally provided by
these sets of regulations, they fall into approximately
four areas.
One is a prescription against activities that
impeach the integrity, if I can say that, of the
broker/dealer in a registration process.

Another is

harm to the integrity of the securities market or the
securities industry itself.
customers.

Another area is harm to

And the fourth area is any time someone

violates a particular statutory provision, rule
provision, or the like, then that too will constitute
unethical and dishonest business practices.
In analyzing the facts of this case in the terms of
these four generally prescribed areas, I first looked at
and I eliminated the harm to the broker/dealer and agent
registration process, because that's really not what
we're dealing with here.
I secondly looked at the area of harm to the
securities industry and the securities market in
general.

And in that category, you have to look at both

sides of the picture.

Tou can't concentrate on one

aspect of a transaction or a set of circumstances, you
have to look at the whole impact.
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(KING - Direct by Coombs)
When you look at the whole impact here, you have on
one side of the spectrum that the seller of the
securities in the transaction is a person who can be
considered to be violating state lav.

On the other

side, you have the specter of a SIPC liquidation, which
is generally understood in the industry to be avoided at
all cost because of the length of time and the black eye
that it gives the securities industry.
In addition, you also have the integrity of the
contractual process at stake.

And there are cases under

the NASD Rules of Fair Practice where a broker can be
held to be in violation of Article 3 section 1 by
failing to honor his contractual obligations.
I arrive at the conclusion, and in my opinion there
has not been harm given these facts and circumstances to
the securities industry and the integrity of the
securities market in general.

Next, you look at harm to

customers.
Here I have looked at the stipulations entered into
between the state and Johnson-Bowles and Marlen
Johnson.

And that stipulation indicates that the

customers were fully knowledgeable of all the facts and
circumstances.

They knew that there was a court

proceeding; many of them attended that court
proceeding.
197
Kelly Hollenbeck - CSR, RPR

(KING - Direct by Coombs)
They knew that the state had entered orders; they
knew what those orders were all about.

And if we

believe Ms. McGinley's statement of facts, Marlen
Johnson even possibly advised participants in the
transaction that they might be violating state law in
connection with the trades•
So you have customers that are walking into the
transaction with their eyes wide open, arms length
negotiations, and it doesn't appear that there is any
possibility for Johnson-Bowles to take advantage of
them.

So I don't see any harm to customers.
The last area:

Where there is a violation of a

law, or a statute, or regulation, or even an order
entered by a securities division.

There's been some

talk about violating the state order in this
proceeding.

In my judgment, you don't have a violation

of the state order, because the state's order suspended
exemptions•
If the state's order had prevented trading, then of
course a trade would have been in violation of the
order.

But the order simply says there are no

exemptions available to you who are a seller and engaged
in this traction, and therefore you have to find an
exemption —

or «*e have .ywi register the stock in order

to sell it.
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(KING - Direct by Coombs)
I don't see a violation of a statutory provision or
a rule.

And I draw principally upon a Utah Supreme

Court case decided in 1959.
Hoy-Burn.

It's called Schvanavelt vs.

In that particular case the court was asked

to decide whether or not a purchaser of stock was able
to successfully contest the contract that he had entered
into.
Here is a purchaser who bought stock of a
corporation, knowing that the transaction had not been
registered by the seller, and was also a participant in
similar transactions himself as a seller.

He's trying

to set aside his contract, and the court is asked to
decide whether he is in pari delicto with the seller,
who has violated the law.
In other words, is he a co-participant in the
illegality and therefore unable to take advantage of the
law to set aside that contract?

The court held that the

Utah Securities Registration Provision was designed to
protect purchasers, and it was designed to require
performance on the part of sellers.
And they indicated in the decision that a purchaser
who has knowledge of the illegality of the transaction
is still not in pari delicto with the seller.
very much —

This is

well, they cite Fletcher's Encyclopedia of

Corporations, which indicates that there are
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1 { circumstances where the buyer will be considered to be a
2

culpable party in the transaction; in other words, in

3

pari delicto.

4

actively participated in some aspect of the transaction,

5

causing it to be illegal.

And that is in instances where the buyer

6

For instance, if a buyer signs a document that is

7

committed by the seller to a state securities division

8

for the purpose of qualifying for an exemption from

9

registration, then that is active participation in

10

making the transaction illegal.

But the cases are very

11 I clear that mere knowledge that the seller is violating
12
13 I

the law does not make a buyer a co-participant.
This is very akin to your concept developed in

14

particularly in abortion cases in Utah, where you have

15

State vs. Fetiq and State vs. Craig;

16

1951, and State vs. Craig in 1934.

17

woman seeking an abortion cannot be considered to be an

18

aider and abettor or a principal violator in the act,

19

as much as —

20

MR. GRIFFIN:

Objection.

State vs. Fetio,

They say that the

At this point we're

21 I off on a narration and we're into abortion and
22

everything else, and I simply don't think it's

23

relevant.

24

criminal actions here and we're far afield from

25

administrative action.

And I think Mr. King is going into some
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(KING - Direct by Coombs)
THE COURT:

He's expressing his opinion and

the basis for it, and I think if he has anything else he
may proceed.
Q.

(BY MR, COOMBS)

Well?

A,

The Fifth Circuit in 1981 decided the G.A.

Thompson and Company vs. Partridge case.

And in dicta

that case indicated that if a purchaser was a victim of
a 33 act or 34 act violation, that he could not be
considered to have violated section 7(c) —

I'm sorry,

section 5(c) of the 33 act registration provision, by
virtue of an offer to purchase.

And section 5(c) of the

33 act proscribes not only offers to sell when a
registration statement is not in effect or is subject of
a 8top order, but also orders to buy.
And the court said in dicta again that if the
purchaser is a victim of a 33 act or a 34 act violation
in that context, he cannot be considered to be in
violation of the 5(c) provision.

On that basis I have

reached the conclusion that, and in my opinion, there
have been no dishonest or unethical business practices
as a result of the facts and circumstances that gave
rise to this action.
Q.

Let me ask you two more questions.

I assume

you heard Ms. McGinley testify that the thrust of the
division's action was that the respondants were aiding
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(KING - Direct by Coombs)
and abetting the sellers; do you recall her saying
that?
A.

I heard her saying that.

Q.

So then is it your opinion that as a matter of

law the respondants could not aid and abet their
sellers?
A.

It's my opinion that the case law supports the

position that there is no aiding and abetting violation
by a purchaser, as much as he is in a protected
category.
Q.

Now, drawing your attention to Article 3

section 1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice; are you
familiar with any cases whereby an NASD member was
disciplined as a result of not honoring trades?
A.

Yes.

In the matter of Shaskan and Company,

1976 case, it's reported in Securities and Exchange.
Q.

So it's possible if Johnson-Bowles and Marlen

Johnson had been bought in and didn't honor those
contracts, that they could have faced disciplinary
action by the NASD?
A.

The case law under section ~

Article 3

section 1 indicates that under certain circumstances a
buyer or a seller —
or seller —

broker/dealer who is either a buyer

who doesn't honor his contracts can be

considered to be in violation of that provision.
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{KING - Cross by Griffin)
1 I

Q.

So one last question, and this goes to

2

inconsistent regulation.

3

conflict between the NASD Rules of Fair Practice and how

4

the division is attempting to enforce its own

5

interpretation of what is dishonest and ethical?

6

A.

Do you see in this case a

I don't know if I can render an expert opinion

7

on that.

But there certainly is clear to have been a

8

conflict where on one side it is considered to be

9

unethical or dishonest to make a purchase and you are

10

subject to a disciplinary action, and on the other side

11

there was not only the possibility of going out of

12

business, but also the possibility of failing to honor

13

those contracts being the subject a disciplinary

14

proceeding.

15 I

MR. COOMBS:

16

THE COURT:

17
18

I have nothing further.
Mr. Griffin, cross?

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. GRIFFIN:

19

Q.

Mr. King, good afternoon.

20 I

X.

Afternoon.

21

Q.

is the MASO a sovereign entity?

22

A.

Mo.

23

Q.

Is the State of Utah a sovereign entity?

24

A.

There are legal concepts that give state

25

action immunity that are based upon sovereign immunity
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EXHIBIT "EE"

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the
Registration of
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc,
CRD No. 7678

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER
Case No. SD-89-46BD

In the Matter of the
Registration of
Marlen Vernon Johnson
CRD No. 259888

Case No. SD-89-47AG

Appearances:
Mark J. Griffin and Kathleen C. McGinley for the Division of
Securities
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents
BY THE SECURITIES ADVISORY BOARD:
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
July 16, 1990 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for
the Department of Commerce, and the Securities Advisory Board.
Four (4) members of the Board were present for the hearing, to wit:
Keith Cannon, Kent Burgon, Margaret Wickens and Truman Bowler.
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received.
The Board, being fully advised on the premises, now submits
the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order to
John C. Baldwin, Director of the Division of Securities,

for his

review:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondents Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. and Marlen

Vernon Johnson are, and all times relevant to these proceedings
have been, registered with the Division of Securities as a brokerdealer and agent, respectively.

Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson

is the President of Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.
2.

As

of

January

22,

1989,

Respondent

Johnson-Bowles

Company, Inc. was short 53,500 shares of the securities of U.S.A.
Medical Corporation, a Wyoming corporation.

On January 23, 1989,

U.S.A. Medical Corporation effected a 10 for 1 forward split, which
increased Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.'s short position
to 535,000 shares. Following the just-described forward split, the
price of U.S.A. Medical Corporation stock rapidly increased to
approximately $1 per share.
3.
had

During February 1989, Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson

furnished

information to the Division

as to the problems

associated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation and its securities.

On

February 6, 1989, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. received
notice from Otra Clearing, Inc. of the latters' buy-in of 150,000
shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities at $.10 per share
and that Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. had until February
15, 1989 to make delivery of those securities.

As of February 14,

1989, the price of those securities had risen to approximately $10
per share.
4.
Vernon

By letter, dated February 15, 1989, Respondent Marlen
Johnson

informed

Otra

Clearing,

Inc.

that

Respondent

Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. would not honor the buy-in notice
because it (Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.) considered
- 2 -
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U.S.A.

Medical

Corporation

common

stock

to

be

unregistered

securities and it declined to "engage or participate in an unlawful
distribution of unregistered securities".
5.

On February 16, 1989 Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company,

Inc. filed a 10b-5 securities fraud action in Federal District
Court

seeking

a

preliminary

injunction

and

declaration

that

Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. 's outstanding contracts and
obligations to certain brokerage firms and clearing corporations,
to whom Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. owed U.S.A. Medical
Corporation securities, were void for illegality.

In the just-

described action, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. alleged
improprieties and fraud in the issuance and trading of U.S.A.
Medical Corporation securities.
6.

On February 17, 1989, the Court in the just-referenced

litigation granted Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. ' s motion
for

a

temporary

restraining

order

as

to

Midwest

Clearing

Corporation, thus preventing Midwest Clearing Corporation from
effecting any "buy-ins" for ten (10) days as against Respondent
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.

A hearing on the pending motion for

a preliminary injunction was conducted on February 27-28, 1989.
The Court denied that motion, but found as follows:
"...the stock of U.S.A. Medical was unlawfully
issued, has never been registered with any proper
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such
requisite registration and has been and is
continuing to be traded illegally.
The stock of U.S.A. Medical has been and
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent
scheme and device to manipulate and artificially
- 3 -

inflate the price of that stock in violation of the
securities laws."
7.

On March 1, 1989, the Division issued a summary order

suspending all Section 14(2) exemptions under the Utah Uniform
Securities Act relative to U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities.
Also on March 1, 1989, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.
received notice from Otra Clearing, Inc. of the latters1 buy-in of
150,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities.
8.

On March

6,

1989, the U.S. Securities

and

Exchange

Commission suspended trading in the securities of U.S.A. Medical
Corporation for ten (10) days.

By letter, dated March 21, 1989,

Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson advised the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD), Inc. of the March 1, 1989 notice from
Otra Clearing and stated as follows:
"On March 1, 1989 at 2:00 p.m. (MST) , Otra
Clearing called, buying-in 150,000 shares of U.S.A.
Medical Corp. The buy-in price was $.70 based on
guaranteed delivery of 148,000 (P.B. Jameson,
seller) and the buy-in price of $.50, 2,000 shares
(R.A. Johnson, seller). See attached confirmation
of Execution of Buy-ins:
It is Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.'s position
that these buy-ins were illegal. First, shares of
stock in U.S.A. Medical Corp. were unlawfully
issued, were never lawfully registered and do not
qualify for any valid exemption under federal or
state law. As such, any trading of or transaction
involving U.S.A. Medical stock has been, would have
been and is unlawful under Section 5 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77e, and Section
10 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §78j(b).
Second,
all open trades or outstanding
contracts for the purchase or sale of shares of
stock in U.S.A. Medical Corp. are illegal contracts
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and therefore unenforceable.
The enforcement or
performance of any and all such open trades or
contracts would constitute and serve to complete
illegal trades and unenforceable contracts. This
would violate securities laws."
Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson sent the just-stated letter to
prompt

the

initiation

of an NASD arbitration

proceeding with

respect to the dispute concerning the buy-in of U.S.A. Medical
Corporation securities by Otra Clearing, Inc.
9.

On March 29, 1989, the Division's March 1, 1989 Summary

Order was made permanent by default.

Respondents received copies

of the Division's March 1, 1989 and March 29, 1989 Orders on or
about the date of their respective issuance.
10.
Inc.

As of March 1, 1989, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company,

owed

several

Corporation

hundred

securities

corporations.

thousand

to several

shares

of

U.S.A.

broker-dealers

and

Medical
clearing

Sometime after the just-stated date, Respondents

purchased a total of 397,900 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation
securities

from

six

(6) Utah residents

and one

(1) New York

resident. The Utah residents and the amount of shares so purchased
were: Paul Jones

(180,900), Nick Julian

(69,500),

Leo

Pavich

(67,500), Jim Coleman (30,000), Philip Tanzani (20,000) and Richard
Sax (18,000). The New York resident was Sheldon Flateman (12,000).
Respondents purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities as the
means to satisfy outstanding contracts for the delivery of those
securities to several broker-dealers and clearing corporations.
11.

Prior

to

Respondents'

purchase

of

U.S.A.

Medical

Corporation securities from the above-named seven individuals,
- 5 -

Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson informed Mr. Julian, Mr. Pavich,
Mr. Coleman, Mr. Tanzani and Mr. Sax of the February 28, 1989
ruling which had been entered by the Court in the previouslyreferenced security fraud action and the March 1, 1989 and March
29, 1989 Orders entered by the Division.

Mr. Flateman and Mr.

Jones, who were both registered NASD representatives, were also
aware of the Federal Court ruling and the Division's Orders. Prior
to March 1, 1989, Mr. Jones, a licensed securities agent with
Wasatch Stock Trading, was involved with the trading of U.S.A.
Medical Corporation securities.
12.

During April 1989, Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson was

informed by a Karl Smith that a John Dawson had U.S.A. Medical
Corporation securities which Mr. Smith believed Mr. Dawson was
desirous of selling.
Vernon

Johnson

Based on that information, Respondent Marlen

contacted

Mr.

Dawson

interested in selling those securities.
conversation

to

determine

if

he

was

No sale resulted and the

between Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson

and Mr.

Dawson did not constitute a violation of the Division's March 1989
Order.

Further, there is no sufficient evidence to find that

Respondents or their agents solicited any of the above-named seven
(7)

individuals

to

sell

their

U.S.A.

Mediceil

Corporation

securities.
13.

Given the price which Respondents sold U.S.A. Medical

Corporation securities prior to entry of the March 1, 1989 Order
and the subsequent price which Respondents paid the above-named
seven (7) individuals to purchase said securities after March 1,
- 6 (HJvUJUi4

1989, Respondents realized a profit totalling $6,538 in that regard
to thus deliver those securities to satisfy existing contracts with
various broker-dealers and clearing corporations.
14.

On March 20, 1990, Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson

purchased 54,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities
from Mr. Sax. During the instant proceeding, Respondent testified
that he purchased those securities for an entity known as the
January Corporation as the means to possibly satisfy a pending NASD
arbitration proceeding between Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company,
Inc. and Otra Clearing, Inc. regarding the March 1, 1989 buy-in of
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities by Otra Clearing, Inc.

On

March 29, 1990 Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson - through the
January Corporation - sold the 54,000 shares to a firm known as
Sorenson, Chiddo & May.
15.

Sometime within the last two (2) months, Respondent

Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. filed a Form BDW with the Division to
request that its1 broker-dealer registration be withdrawn.

Said

request was denied, given the pending disciplinary proceeding as to
that registration.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents contend they did not engage in any dishonest or
unethical conduct and that no disciplinary sanction should enter
with regard to their registration as a securities broker-dealer and
agent, respectively.

Specifically, Respondents assert that: (1)

the Division's March 1, 1989 Order prevented only the sale of
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities; (2) Respondents purchased
- 7 <M>'JJL1-5

those securities to satisfy existing contracts to thus deliver the
securities to various broker-dealers and clearing corporations; and
(3) Section 61-1-6(1)(g), Utah Code Ann. 1953 (as amended), quoted
below, may not be applied to interfere with Respondents' attempts
to honor their contractual obligations to such third parties.
Respondents urge that the Division has taken no action against
other individuals who may have participated in the purchase or sale
of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities after entry of the March
1, 1989 Order. Respondents also contend that the imposition of any
sanction in this proceeding would be inconsistent with their duty
to have complied with NASD requirements which prompted their
purchase of the securities in order to avoid entry of a possible
sanction with regard to their NASD affiliation.
Section 61-1-6(1) provides as follows:
"Upon approval by a majority of the Securities
Advisory Board, the director...may issue an
order... suspending,
or
revoking
any
registration,...if the director finds that it is in
the public interest and if he finds...with respect
to the.. .registrant or, in the case of a brokerdealer..., any partner, officer, or director or any
person occupying a similar status or performing
similar functions, or any person directly or
indirectly controlling the broker-dealer..., that
such person:
(g)
engaged
in
dishonest
or
unethical
practicesff
in
the
securities business...
To be further noted is Section 61-1-7, which provides:
"It is unlawful for any person to offer or
sell any security in this state unless it is
registered under this chapter or the security or
transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14."
The proper scope and operative effect of the March 1, 1989 Order
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entered by the Division was to prohibit any trading of U.S.A.
Medical Corporation securities within this state.

Since those

securities were neither registered nor exempt from registration and
had been traded in a fraudulent scheme designed to manipulate the
price of those securities, the just-stated order was duly entered
to protect the public interest.

It is specious to argue, as

Respondents assert, that the order only prohibited the sale of
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities. Given the unlawful issuance
of those securities and that the subsequent trading of those
securities was tainted by fraudulent and manipulative practices,
the proper scope of the March 1, 1989 Order must be broadly
interpreted and in a manner consistent with the purpose for the
issuance of that order.
Concededly, Respondents had an existing contractual obligation
to deliver U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities to various brokerdealers and clearing corporations prior to the entry of the March
1, 1989 Order. It is obvious that Respondents elected to trade in
the securities at issue in an effort to mitigate their "short"
position, avoid potentially severe economic consequences and escape
the entry of a possible sanction on their NASD membership. Under
the circumstances, no other alternative existed to thus foster
Respondents1

economic interests and the motivation for their

conduct is clearly understandable.
Nevertheless, Respondents purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation
securities after March 1, 1989 with knowledge that a sale of those
securities would constitute a violation of the March 1, 1989 Order.
- 9 -
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Such

conduct

clearly

constitutes

a

"dishonest

or

unethical

practice11 within the meaning of Section 61-1-6(1) (g) and provides
a sufficient basis upon which to enter a disciplinary sanction as
to Respondents1 registration.
Regardless of the factors which prompted Respondents purchase
of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities, that conduct frustrated
the Division's appropriate efforts to preclude trading in those
securities and thus partially emasculated the effect of the March
1, 1989 Order. While the record does not identify when Respondents
purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities after March 1,
1989, any delay between entry of the March 1, 1989 Order and
Respondents' subsequent purchase of the securities appears to be
more reflective of the common knowledge that the price of those
securities would decrease after entry of the March 1, 1989 Order
rather than any intended compliance by Respondents with that order.
Respondents1

contention

that the Division has engaged

in

selective enforcement of the March 1, 1989 Order lacks serious
merit.

The Board notes that a disciplinary proceeding has been

initiated as to Mr. Jones.

It is unknown whether any disciplinary

proceeding may be subsequently initiated as to Otra Clearing, Inc.,
P.B. Jameson, R.A. Johnson or any of their agents with regard to
the buy-in notice issued to Respondents by Otra Clearing, Inc.

In

any event, the fact remains that Respondents engaged in misconduct
which subjects them to entry of a disciplinary sanction regardless
of whether other proceedings are initiated by the Division as to
other entities or individuals.
- 10 -

Given the circumstances of this case, it may well have been
impossible for Respondents to have either satisfied their existing
contractual obligations to various broker-dealers and clearing
corporations and avoid the subsequent entry of a disciplinary
sanction in the proceeding or to have scrupulously avoided trading
in U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities and escape possible action
on their NASD membership.

However, the existence of that dilemma

does not support Respondents1 assertions that their duty to comply
with the March 1, 1989 Order was inferior and subordinate to their
satisfaction of any NASD requirements and that no disciplinary
sanction can enter in this forum because they could have been
potentially subject to adverse NASD action if they did not satisfy
their contractual obligations to third parties.
Concededly, there is no evidence that Respondents' violation
of the March 1, 1989 Order resulted in any harm to the investing
public.

Nevertheless, entry of a disciplinary sanction in this

proceeding is in the public interest and clearly warranted due to
Respondents' non-compliance with the March 1, 1989 Order which was
duly entered to regulate the trading of U.S.A. Medical Corporation
securities.

The record reflects that Respondents' dishonest and

unethical conduct was driven by a desire to realize monetary gain
and/or avoid financial loss and that Respondents' willingness to
engage in trading the securities shifted over time, depending upon
whatever would promote Respondents' economic interests. Adherence
to orders duly entered by the Division which govern the practices
of broker-dealers and agents engaged in the securities business
- 11 -
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should not be a matter dictated by the potential for monetary gain.
By reason of the serious nature of Respondents' misconduct, an
appropriately severe sanction should be entered.
ORDER
WHEREFOREf IT IS ORDERED that the registration of Respondent
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. as a broker-dealer in the State of
Utah and the registration of Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson as an
agent in this state shall be suspended for one (1) year.
It is further ordered that said suspensions shall be deemed
retroactively effective from the date that Respondent JohnsonBowles Company, inc. filed its' Form BDW with the Division of
Securities.
It is further ordered that, upon expiration of the period of
suspension set forth above, Respondents' registration shall be
placed on probation for two (2) years.

Should Respondents fail to

comply with the statutes and rules which govern their registration
during that time, further proceedings shall be conducted and a
determination made whether a sanction of greater severity than that
set forth herein i£ warranted.
Dated this

iDfadav of August, 1990.
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BY THE DIRECTOR:
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
are hereby approved.

Said Order shall become effective thirty (30)

days from the date set forth below.
Dated this

day of August, 1990.

hn C. Baldwin
Director
Administrative Review of this Order may be obtained by filing
a Request for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of
this Order.
Any request for a review shall comply with the
requirements set forth in Sections 61-1-23, 63-46b-12(l) and the
departmental rules which govern agency review.
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of
this Order. Any petition for such Review shall comply with the
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-16.
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EXHIBIT " F F "

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.

OBJECTION TO FORM AND
CONTENT OF AUGUST 13.1990
FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW. AND ORDER

CRD NO. 07678

Case No. SD-89-46BD

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
Case No. SD-89-47AG

MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
CRD NO. 2598888

Respondents, by and through counsel, hereby lodge their strenuous objection
to the unconstitutional and prejudicial means or manner by which the August 13.1990.
Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law. and Order (hereinafter "Order") was unilaterally
prepared without their knowledge, input, or participation — a prejudicial ruling that
Respondents will no doubt be saddled with on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Respondents further object to the form and content of such Order. In support of this
objection. Respondents file an affidavit of their counsel. The basis for this objection is as
follows.
oiv,i^i>B
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Respondents believe, after having studied the August 13.1990. Findings of
Fact. Conclusions of Law. and Order, that it was not prepared solely by the Administrative
Law Judge ("ALT) and the Securities Advisory Board as Respondents and their counsel were
repeatedly told in these proceedings. For instance, the document embraces the Division's
closing argument at the July 16.1990. hearing, virtually verbatim (even as if Its counsel. Mr.
Griffin, drafted it) and wholly ignores not only Respondents' best arguments put forth at the
hearing, but even goes further to dismiss Mr. David R. King's entire expert testimony as
"specious". [See page 9. second full sentence.] This is ironic in that Mr. King is undoubtedly
the foremost authority In Utah in this area of the law. This is even more peculiar when one
considers that Ms. McGinley testified that the Division's entire case rested on the theory of
"aiding and abetting*— a legal theory never even alluded to in passing in the August 13,
1990. Order. The Order thus miserably fails to address the core legal issues present in this
case.
Furthermore, in a conference call that the ALJ. Respondents' counsel, and
Mr. Griffin engaged in on or about July 17.1990. concerning the March 1990. purchase
from Richard Sax. the ALJ informed counsel that the Board neyw even discussed such
purchase. Since the Board admittedly never took such into consideration in determining
that there was indeed a violation, Respondents find it peculiar that such is not just referred
to in the Findings of Fact but that the "Board" went further and determined that such
ultimately resulted In an unlawful "sale" to Sorensen. Chido & May — an argument never
presented at trial by the Division to even, in turn, legitimately support such a finding. To be
sure, no one of sane mind would purchase something for $4,000, only to sell it for $30, and
Respondents submit that Mr. Johnson's pension and profit sharing plan, January
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Corporation, neither needed nor was quite that desperate for a $3,970. out-of-pocket, tax
-write-off" for 1990. This is also not to ignore that Respondents fail to see the relevance of
quoting, among other things. Mr. Johnson's letter to the NASD concerning the OTRA
"buy-in", especially when it and numerous other "findings" were never, in the least, tied in to
the Conclusions of Law. Respondents thus find It difficult to believe that either the ALJ
and/or the "Board" would find it necessary to "pad" the findings with such gratuitous and
admittedly irrelevant "facts." This is also not to further ignore that Respondents and their
counsel have become familiar with the ALJ's own personal style of drafting the same kinds
of orders, a style or practice that is far more thorough, impartial, logical, and Judicious —
adjectives which Respondents are unable to sincerely ascribe to the August 13. Order.
The purpose of this formal Objection IS that Respondents believe the August
13.1990. Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law. and Order, is grossly one-sided and
because they were unable to participate in it to the same degree that they believe Messrs.
Baldwin. Qriff in and Ms. McQinley did. they are. without question, enormously and
intentionally prejudiced on appeal. For instance, the way the Order is plugged with
irrelevant "findings" and otherwise skirts the real legal issues Involved. Respondents9
prospects of prevailing on appeal are strictly predicated on the luck of drawings
intelligent and thorough enough appellate judge who will read the transcript and discover
that the August 13.1990. document is far afield from reflecting what either the law Is as
applied to this case or what actually transpired at the trial. By way of example and to put it
another way. Respondents are horrified at the prospect of a judge, jury and prosecutor
secretly meeting behind closed doors after a district court trial and scheming on how to
front-end load or doctor the findings and conclusions — behind the defendant's back — so
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that the prosecution can prevail on appeal. In this context, Withrow v. Larkln, 421 U.S. 35,
43 LEd.2d 712.95 S.Ct. 1456 (1975), is entirely on point. In Withrow, a unanimous U.S.
Supreme Court held that in the administrative adjudicative arena, It is unconstitutional for
any person (i.e., Baldwin, McQinley, and /or Griffin) to act as investigator, prosecutor and
judge in the same proceeding. The short point is that if the Division cannot allow itself to
prevail fairly, it should not be entitled to prevail at all.
In sum, Humpty Dumpty said that words are what he said they meant, and by
the same token, the Division has been no more eloquent in the August 13, Order, than
stating that the law is similarly nothing more than what they say it is. In fact, It is clear that
the Division was hell bent on getting to the August 13, Order, no matter what. Knowing that
there was never a prospect of prevailing on anything, and looking back objectively on the
last 1% years, what Respondents should have done on April 27,1989. is stipulate to the
August 13.1990. Order, and simply have appealed it to the Court of Appeals at that time.
Unfortunately for Respondents, this approach would be too honest for a government
agency.
Based on the loregoing. Respondents request that the Order be set aside, that
the Division fully disclose who participated, directly or indirectly,fanthe drafting of such
Order — and to what extent — and that the Division declare that the proceedings have
continued against Respondents in an unconstitutional manner, thereby meriting either
dismissal, arrest of judgment, or a new trial.
DATED this 20th day of August. 1
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In re:

Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson, Case Nos.
SD-89-45BD and SD-89-47AG
Objection to Form and Content of August 13.1990 Findings of Fact.
Conclusions of Law, and Order

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 20th day of August. 1990, (s)he
hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO ORDER to John C.
Baldwin. Director and Kathleen C. McQiniey. Director of Broker-Dealer Section, Securities
Division. Utah Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake
City. Utah 84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge J. Stephen Ekiund, Esq.. Department of
Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802; Craig F.
McCullough. Esq.. Callister. Duncan. & Nebeker. Co-Counsel to Respondents. 8th Floor.
Kennecott Btdg.. 10 East South Temple Street. Salt Lake City. Utah 84133. and Mark J.
Griffin, located at 115 State Capitol Building. Salt Lake City. Utah 84114.
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EXHIBIT "GG"

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE
OF HOW AND BY WHOM THE
AUGUST 13.1990. FINDINGS
OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW. AND ORDER. WAS PREPARED

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.
CRD NO. 07678

Case No. SD-89-46BD

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON

Case No. SD-89-47AG

CRD NO. 2598888

Respondents, by and through counsel, hereby demand immediate disclosure of
how and by whom the Division's August 13.1990. Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law, and
Order ("Order"), was prepared and the extent of participation by each. In support of this
demand. Respondents incorporate by reference their contemporaneous Objection and a
Supporting Affidavit of their counsel. Respondents further request that this demand be
ruled upon regardless of whether Respondents will be shortly filing a Request for Agency
Review, in other words, under Department of Commerce Rules, Respondents are required
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to file a Request for Agency Review no later than August 23.1990, and in so doing.
Respondents have no intention of making this Demand moot.
Respondents were informed in no uncertain terms that only the Securities
Advisory Board would be ruling at the July 16,1990. trial of this matter. They were
subsequently told by the ALJ on the afternoon of July 16, that the ALJ had been asked by
the Board to assist it in the preparation of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order. The ALJ further indicated in a conversation with respective counsel on July 17,
1990, that if counsel were consulted on the form of the Order, it would be counsel to both
parties. However, Respondents and their counsel were never consulted relative to such
Order. On Monday, August 13,1990, Respondents received a copy of the Order in issue.
Such was the first time they had seen such Order. In addition, the Order has not been
prepared on the same word processor that the ALJ has previously used and the tone and
content of such Order is not consistent, by any means, with the ALJ's logical, thorough, and
judicial style to which Respondents are, by now, well familiar. (In this regard, reference is
made to Respondents' Objection filed contemporaneously herewith.)
On August 16,1990, Respondents' counsel had a telephone conversation with
Mark J. Qrif fin, counsel to the Division. When asked, point blank, whether he prepared the
Order, Mr. Qrif fin dodged the question and Joked about the fact that Respondents wouldn't
be able to discover whether he did or didn't unless his deposition was taken — which he
said tt could not. The only thing that Mr. Qrif fin stated of significance Is that he claimed he
had no advance knowledge of what the sanction Imposed on Respondents was until the
Order was ultimately issued last Monday. This obviously does not mean that Mr. Qrlff In did
not participate and have a direct or indirect hand In drafting pages 1-11 of the Order. In
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fact, Respondents believe and assert that Mr. Griffin, In conjunction with Ms. McQInley. who
in turn may have consulted directly with Mr. Baldwin, actually drafted and determined what
would be in the Order and that It was then shoved before the Board members for their
respective signatures. Respondents believe this is unfair and unconstitutional as the Order,
in its present inaccurate state, will significantly prejudice them on appeal. The Order has
further been prepared contrary to the spirit of Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial
Administration, a rule which has every reason to apply in administrative adjudicative
proceedings. Respondents further assert that this behind-the-back, surreptitious conduct,
designed solely to insulate and guarantee the Division against losing on appeal. Is repugnant
to all notions of fair play and substantial Justice. It is also violative of the Rules of
Professional Conduct governing attorneys, aside from being unconstitutional, all as set
forth in Respondents' Objection. The foregoing Is not to ignore that the Board may have
shirked its duties in allowing Division personnel to put words in their mouths and simply
present an Order to them for their signatures that Respondents believe they were
"railroaded" into signing.
In light of the above, Respondents respectfully demand disclosure of how the
August 13,1990, document was prepared, by whom, and what input was given, directly or
indirectly, by anyone other than the ALJ and the Board. Respondents think it is absolutely
necessary that this itself become an issue on appeal because if not, the Identified abuse in
issue wffi surely prejudice Respondents and similarly prejudice others in the future — others
who will, no doubt, be unwitting victims of the same underhanded, covert abuse and
prejudice. This Information is also necessary for the Respondents to determine whether a
Request for Agency Review, while procedurally necessary, would be a meaningless exercise.
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There should also be no objection to making this disclosure unless the Division does Indeed
have something to hide in this respect and unless the Order was in fact crammed down the
Board's throat.
Based on the foregoing, unless tha requisite disciosure ia made and further
made part of the record, Respondents should be given the opportunity to immediately take
the depositions of Mr. Qrlffln, Mr. Baldwin. Ms. McQinley. the ALJ. and each of the
Securities Advisory Board members.
DATED thlsj 20th day of August. 19S

licTtael Coombs
Jralg F. McCullough
^Attorney for Respondents
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 20th day of August. 1990. (s)he
hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO ORDER to John C.
Baldwin. Director and Kathleen C. McQinley, Director of Broker-Dealer Section. Securities
Division. Utah Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake
City. Utah 84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge J. Stephen EHund. Esq.. Department of
Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802; Craig F.
McCullough. Esq.. Calllater. Duncan. & Nebeker. Co-Counsel to Respondents. 8th Floor.
Kennecott Bldg.. 10 East South Temple Street. Salt Lake City. Utah £14133. and Mark J.
Qrlffln. located at 115 State Capitol Building. Salt Lake City. Utah 84114.
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EXHIBIT "HH"

JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

te^i-vc

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENTS'
COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF
DEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.

Case No. SD-89-46BD

CRD NO. 07678

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
Case No. SD-89-47AQ

MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
CRD NO. 2598888

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
)ss.
)

John Michael Coombs, on his oath, deposes and says the following on behalf of
Respondents in the above-entitled matters and in support of their demand for disclosure of
how and by whom the August 13,1990. Order was prepared and otherwise came about.
The following is also submitted in support of Respondents' formal Objection to the same:
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1. That your affiant is Respondents' counsel in the above-matters and he has
personal knowledge and experience as to the matters contained herein and he is otherwise
competent to make this affidavit on their behalf in these proceedings.
2. That Respondents were informed in no uncertain terms that only the
Securities Advisory Board would be ruling on the matters tried before them on July 16,
1990. That the only exception to this was that Respondents were informed that Division
Director Baldwin would probably be required to "sign o f f on their exclusive decision. That
Mr. Baldwin would only be required to "sign off" on the Order is understandable in that he
was not present at the hearing and for this reason, he would obviously be incompetent to
participate any further.
3. That after the hearing on July 16.1990, the ALJ informed respective
counsel that the Board had requested that he prepare the formal form of the Order.
4. On or about July 17,1990. your affiant, the ALJ and Mr. Qriffin had a phone
conversation in which the ALJ stated that the Board had not taken the March 1990,
purchase from Richard Sax into consideration in determining whether or not there was
violation. It thus comes as a surprise that the Findings of Fact do not stop short at such a
finding but that they go several steps further to "find" that Respondents subsequently "sold'
the same stock to Sorensen, Chido & May. This Is not to ignore other incongruities in the
Order that Respondents have articulated in their formal Objection filed herewith.
5. That in the same conversation that Mr. Qriffin and your affiant engaged in
with the ALJ, your affiant recalls the ALJ saying that if any counsel participated In drafting
the Order, both counsel would have that opportunity.
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6. That Respondents received the "BoarcT's alleged Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order on August 13,1990, and your affiant can attest that it is not
prepared on the same word processor as previously used by the ALJ in drafting each and
every one of his previous orders and rulings In this case. He can also attest than neither he
nor Respondents ever saw such Order, or a draft thereof, until August 13.1990.
7. That, in addition, based on your affiant having read and reviewed numerous
other orders of the ALJ during the last 1% years of this case, your affiant Is of the opinion
that the ALJ did not prepare the Order in issue and he may well not have participated in it at
all. (See Respondents' Objection filed herewith.)
8. That on August 16.1990, your affiant had a telephone conversation with
Mark J. Griffin, the co-prosecutor with Ms. McQinley. in this case. Your affiant asked him
point blank whether he participated in drafting the Order in Issue. Mr, Griffin was unable
and unwilling to give a straight answer. In fact. Mr. Griffin Joked about Respondents not
being able to find out whether he did or not and after asking why your affiant wanted to
know, he informed your affiant that Respondents would have to take his deposition —
something which, under the circumstances, they would not be able to do. After having a
moment to collect himself from a question that took him by surprise. Mr. Griffin did state
that he was unaware of what the sanction was that was to be imposed on Respondents.
However, this certainly does not mean that Ms. McQinley and/or Mr. Baldwin did not seek
and utilize his assistance, directly or indirectly, hi drafting pages 1-11 of the Order — the
pages which exclude any reference to a sanction.
9. That your affiant believes that if Messrs. Baldwin, Griffin and/or Ms.
McQinley unilaterally drafted the Order and submitted It to the Board for their signatures,

-3-

000-123

Respondents are tremendously prejudiced on appeal. This is because your affiant believes
that the Order does not reflect what actually transpired at the July 16.1990. hearing. Your
affiant can further attest that in his opinion — if it is indeed true that the Division and its
counsel unilateraffy drafted the Order — these entire proceedings have been
unconstitutional and unfair and Respondents should have been told at the outset that the
Division was hell bent on obtaining the August 13. Order, no matter what. Your affiant also
believes that Respondents have been damaged as a result of such Constitutional
deprivations.
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT.
DATED this 20th day of August. 1990
Notary Public
CATHY C.ARN0T
m i & j d d b a Drive

I
Novembers, 19ft

SOtaT'

Jfchn Michael Coombs

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to befor^ne this 20th d

Notary Pudnc
Residing at Salt Lake City. UT
My Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 20th day olf August, 1990. (s)he
hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENTS'
COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE to John C. Baldwin. Director and
Kathleen C. McQinley. Director of Broker-Dealer Section. Securities Division, Utah
Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City. Utah
84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge J. Stephen Eklund. Esq.. Department of Commerce,
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160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802; Craig F.
McCullough. Esq.. Cailister. Duncan. & Nebeker, Co-Counsel to Respondents, 8th Floor,
Kennecott BIdg.. 10 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake City. Utah 84133; and Mark J.
Griffin. 115 State Capitol Building. Salt Lake City. Utah 84114.

J:AFDVT.19-20

OUU-il-5
-5-

EXHIBIT " I I "

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF
THE REGISTRATION OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC.

ORDER ON REVIEW
CASE NO. SD-89-46BD

IN THE MATTER OF
THE REGISTRATION
OF: MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON

CASE NO. SD-89-47AG

SNTROPPCTION
1.

Orders for Which this Review is Sought
a.

Final Order

By order of the Securities Advisory Board dated August 10,
1990, and approved by the Director of the Securities Division (the
"Division") on August 13, 1990, the registration of Respondent
Johnson-Bowles

Company,

Inc.

("Johnson

Bowles")

and

the

registration of Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson ("Johnson") were
suspended for one year.
the "Final Order".)

(This order is hereinafter referred to as

Both Respondents also were ordered placed on

probation for two years following the suspension, with certain
conditions.
In summary, Respondents were sanctioned for violating the
terms of a Division order, dated March 1, 1989, and made permanent
on March 29, 1989 (the "March 1 Order").

This March 1 Order

suspended all exemptions available under Section 14(2) of the Utah
-1-
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Uniform Securities Act relative to trading in the stock of a
company known as U.S.A. Medical Corporation,
b.

Other Orders

The following interim orders were entered during the pendency
of this matter:
i.

Order Granting Division's Motion to Convert;

ii.

Order

Denying

Respondents'

Rule

12(b)(1)

Motion (lack of jurisdiction);
iii. Order Denying Respondents' 12(b)(6) Motion
(failure to state a claim);
iv.

Order

Granting

the

Division's

Motion

to

Dismiss Respondents' Counterclaim; and
v.

Order Denying Respondents' Motion for Summary
Judgement.

2.

Request for Agency Review

Respondents filed a "Request for Agency Review of Entire
Record

and

Supporting

Brief"

Review") on August 23, 1990.

(hereinafter,

the

"Request

for

This Request for Review requests

agency review (or, in this case, review by a superior agency) of
the Final Order and the interim orders described above.
Counsel for Respondents submitted a letter dated September 10,
1990, to the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce, who
is issuing this Order on Review.

This letter has been treated as

a memo supplementing the Request for Review. The Division did not
file a written response to the letter.
In support of its request that each of the above-named orders
- 2-
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be reversed and that the proceedings be dismissed and vacated,
Respondents have referenced the various motions, memoranda, and
affidavits which support each particular order.

The Request for

Review requests in general fashion that the reviewing officer
review all of these pleadings, as well as the audio tapes of oral
argument and the hearing transcript, to determine grounds for
reversal.

The reviewing officer also is requested to address all

issues presented in all of the documents.
Counsel for Respondents was invited by letter dated October 9,
1990, to supplement the Request for Review with a statement more
particularly stating the grounds for review.

Counsel

requested

and received permission to file such a statement within thirty
days; he thereafter declined the invitation and filed no more
memoranda.

The attachments to the Request for Review and the

documents incorporated by reference were reviewed in connection
with this Order on Review for purposes of clarification and
explanation but were not extensively mined to supply arguments or
issues or grounds which Respondents declined to specify in the
Request for Review.
3.

Statutes or Rules Permitting or Requiring Review

The review of this matter is being conducted by the Executive
Director of the Department of Commerce pursuant to Section 61-1-23
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (the "Act") . Rule 151-46b-12 of
the Department also allows for filing a request for agency review.
By letter dated August 29, 1990, counsel was advised that no oral
argument would be heard.

The Division did not file any written
-3 -

response to Respondent's Request for Review.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES REVIEWED
As previously noted, Respondents1 Request for Review did not
clearly enumerate each separate issue on appeal, but appeared to be
an attempt re-argue all motions previously made. Where particular
grounds for review were alleged in the Request for Review, they are
set forth below. The relief requested is assumed to be a reversal
of each contested order.
1.

The Final Order:
a.

Whether the Order is supported by the evidence, the

record, and the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of
Law;
b.

Whether the Conclusions of Law follow from the

Findings of Fact;
c.

Whether there should be no findings of fact nor

conclusions of law, simply a verdict and sanction;

2.

Qrfler granting Pivisipn's Motion to convert:
a.

Whether the Division waived any right or ability to

convert the proceeding from an informal proceeding to a
formal one;
b.

Whether the order granting the Division's motion to

convert to formal proceedings is erroneous;

3.

Qrfler Denying Resppntentg' R\il3 13(b) (11 flpfrion;
Whether t h e 12(b)(1) order was supported by the Findings
of Fact and the Conclusions of Law;
- 4 -
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4.

Order Denying Respondents8 12(bH61 Motion:
Whether denial of the 12(b)(6) motion was supported by
the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law;

5.

Order

Granting

the

Divisions

Motion

to

Dismiss

Respondents' Counterclaim:
Whether the order dismissing Respondents' Counterclaim
was supported by the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions
of Law;
6.

Order Denying Respondents8 Motion for Summary Judgement:
Whether the order denying Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgement was supported by the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of law.

The Final Order
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Division presented evidence in the hearing through

the testimony of Kathleen McGinley, Director of Licensing for the
Division. For Respondents, Respondent Marlen Johnson testified; as
did Don Sorenson, a Certified Public Accountant who performed some
accounting services for Respondent; and David King, who offered
testimony as an expert regarding "dishonest or unethical practices"
under the Utah Uniform Securities Act. Also entered into evidence
were certain stipulations of fact; an order issued by the Federal
District Court for the District of Utah which went to some of the
issues herein; correspondence regarding the USA Medical stock; and
other documents reflecting the transactions complained of herein.
-5-

2.
supported

All of the Findings of Fact in the Final Order were
by sufficient

and

credible testimony

and evidence

presented at the hearing.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
3.

It appears that there is no basis to modify or overturn

the Conclusions of Law in the Final Order, for the following
reasons:

the findings are supported by substantial and credible

evidence; no evidence supporting a contrary finding was presented
by Respondents1

counsel; the Board and the Director did not

misinterpret applicable law or rules, and the conclusions do not
reflect an abuse of discretion by the Board and the Director.

Order Granting Division's Motion to Convert to Formal Proceedings:
FILINGS or FACT
4.

Division rules designate all proceedings as informal.

Although Respondents argue that the Division waived any right it
had to convert the proceedings from informal to formal, nothing in
the record indicates that the Division waived this right. In their
original objection to the Division's motion to convert, Respondents
argue that simply by the act of filing the petition, the Division
waived its right to convert. However, this act by itself does not
indicate that the Division wished to waive conversion, especially
since there is no way for an agency to convert proceedings
they have even commenced.

before

Both Division and Department rules are

silent as to the ability to convert proceedings from formal to
informal; the Utah Administrative

Procedures Act

does allow

- 6-
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conversion where it is in the public interest and does not unfairly
prejudice a partyfs rights.
CQyqfryglQNS QF tJVW
5.

The order allowing the proceedings to be converted from

formal to informal did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
6.

The Administrative Law Judge's ruling that conversion was

in the public interest was not improper because the significant and
complicated issues in this case could be more fully and competently
disposed of with the expertise of the Board, pursuant to the
greater

discovery

and

other

rights

granted

under

formal

proceedings, and because conversion would allow for this matter to
be disposed of with one full and fair hearing at the administrative
level.

One of the most important issues in this case was whether

Respondents1 behavior constituted unethical and dishonest conduct.
These issues could better and more properly be explored within the
context of a formal proceeding.
7.
rights.

Conversion

did

not

unfairly

prejudice

Respondents1

Respondents are not harmed merely because they receive

only one full hearing, at the administrative level, rather than two
hearings —
8.

one in the administrative forum, one in the judicial.

Respondents argue that the order granting conversion was

erroneous but assigned no grounds for error.

Based on a review of

the record, and for the reasons noted above, I find that conversion
was not erroneous.
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Order Denying Respondents' Rule 12(b)(1) Motiont
FINPtfrGg QF FACT
9.

Respondents1 Request for Review assigns no grounds for

error or issues on appeal of the Administrative Law Judge's denial
of Respondent's motion to dismiss based on the Division's lack of
jurisdiction.
10.

Respondents were licensed by the Division at all times

relevant to these proceedings.

As are most other licensees

licensed by the Division, Respondents are subject to additional
regulation by the federal Securities and Exchange Commission, and
self-regulatory organizations such as the NASD which are under SEC
oversight.
11.

Respondents were charged in the Amended Petition with

violating Utah law emd Division rules.
qoyCfrV$ION5 QF LAW
12.

Concurrent regulation in these circumstances is not

improper or illegal and any applicable federal law or rules did not
supersede Utah law and rules.
13.

The Administrative Law Judge could reasonably conclude,

based on the facts before him at the time, that the Division had
subject matter jurisdiction over Respondents based on their license
and their alleged violation of Utah law and rules, and therefore
did not improperly decline to dismiss the Petition.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
14.

Respondents1 Motion to Dismiss based on failure to state

a claim was denied.

Respondents' Request for Review alleges no

particular grounds for error or issues on appeal.
15.

The Amended Petition indicated that Respondents purchased

securities of USA Medical Corporation during a time when all
transactional exemptions from registration for that stock were
suspended; that Respondents purchased the securities within Utah,
from Utah residents; that Respondents knew of the order suspending
exemptions; and that Respondents knew that the USA stock in fact
had been unlawfully issued, had never been registered and had no
exemption from registration and was traded illegally; and that
Respondents may have solicited shareholders of USA Medical to sell
their stock to Respondents.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
16.

The Amended Petition and other documents in the record at

the time Respondents filed their motion to dismiss based on failure
to state a claim indicated that there were disputed issues of
material fact.

Specifically, Respondent denied soliciting any of

the sales, and disputed the amount of profits from the sales; also,
questions of fact remained to be resolved regarding whether the
transactions by Respondents1 customers were "unsuitable". Finally,
based on the pleadings, it did not appear as a matter of law that
the Division could not recover under the theories alleged (aiding
and abetting and unsuitability).
-9 -
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FINDINGS OF FACT
17.

Respondents9 Counterclaim alleges various wrongdoings by

the Division and concludes with a request for an ciward of costs,
attorney's fees and expenses, alleging in support of the request
that the Division's petition is in violation of Rule* 11 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code
Ann.; and that an awaird is proper under the federal Equal Access to
Justice Act (no citation given).
18.

The Administrative Law Judge granted the Division's

motion to dismiss the counterclaim, holding that Section 63-46b7(1) does not

authorize

filing

of

a

counterclaim

in these

proceedings, hence that there was no subject matter jurisdiction
over Respondents' counterclaim. Thus, the Administrative Law Judge
did not address whether Section 78-27-56 or Rule 11 applied.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
19.

Section 63-46b-7(l) does not clearly bar Respondents'

counterclaim. It refers to the "claims or defenses" of parties and
read expansively, could be meant to refer to counterclaims.
Moveover, Section 63-46b-6 requires that a response be filed, which
must include a statement of the relief sought.

Again, read

expansively, "response" and "relief" could be extended to cover a
request for costs and attorney's fees. However, it is noted that
nowhere does the Utah Administrative Procedures Act incorporate
Rule 11 or the Rules of Civil Procedure, except those relating to
discovery.
-10-
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20.

Furthermore, Section 63-46b-6 states that the presiding

officer or the agency by rule "may* permit pleadings in addition to
the notice and response. Nowhere does the record reflect that the
presiding officer permitted this counterclaim. Neither Department
nor Division rules permit the counterclaim.

Department Rules do

not "expressly" adopt Rule 11; Respondents1 assertion in its
counterclaim that it did is patently incorrect.

Department Rule

151-46b-7 only partially quotes a passage from Rule 11 (that
signing pleadings constitutes certification that good grounds
exist) and does not quote the portion regarding award of fees,
costs or expenses.

Therefore, Respondents9 counterclaim was not

permitted Department rules.
21.

The proper forum for raising a Rule 11 claim, if at all,

would be upon motion, not through a counterclaim.

Regardless,

Respondents did not prevail below and therefore a Rule 11 claim is
moot.

Finally, the Divisionfs actions —

the signing of any

pleadings by its employees or by the Assistant Attorney General —
did not violate Rule 11 because each allegation was substantiated
through documentary evidence or testimony of witnesses, or by
stipulation.

Order Denying Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgement:
FINDINGS OF FACT
22.

The Administrative Law Judge denied Respondents9 Motion

for Summary Judgement, finding that sufficient factual issues
remained for resolution.
-11-
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23.

The various motions filed —

both before and after

disposition of the Motion for Summary Judgement —

as well as

testimony at the hearing bear this out. Several important factual
issues were in dispute. Specifically, the parties did not agree on
whether Respondents knew of the precise terms of the Division's
March 1 order when they purchased the USA Medical Securities; or,
if they did, on whether the order extended to Respondents and the
transactions complained

of

in the Petition; and on whether

Respondents may have solicited shareholders of USA Medical to sell
their stock to Respondents.

In addition, although some of the

unresolved issues perhaps may be better characterized as legal
issues rather than factual disputes, refusal to grant summary
judgement was not improper where the Administrative Law Judge
wished to allow the* Board to hear the evidence and lend their
expertise

in

determining

whether

Respondents1

actions

did

constitute violations of the Division's law and rules.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
24.

A

review of the record

indicates that there were

sufficient disputed issues that denial of the motion for summary
judgement was not erroneous.
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ORDER
IT IS ORDERED THAT the Final Order dated August 13, 1990, be
affirmed in its entirety.
Dated this

*Z4

day of

Oc-faber

, 1990

David L. Buhler, Executive Director
Department of Commerce

NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of
this Order. Any Petition for such Review shall comply with the
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16.

CERTIFICATE OF HMEINg
I certify that on the
day of
1990, I caused to be mailed (except as otherwise noted) a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order on Review, properly addressed,
postage prepaid, to:
Marlen Johnson
Johnson-Bowles Co., Inc.
430 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

John Michael Coombs
72 East 400 South
Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Earl S. Maeser, Director
Utah Securities Division
P.O Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
(HAND DELIVERED)

Mark Griffin, Assistant A.G,
115 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
(BUILDING MAIL)

Craig S. McCullough
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker
Kennecott Building
8th Floor
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
-13-
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EXHIBIT

"JJ"

* ,

DEE BENSON, United States Attorney (#0289) H*,x
^ U W* 9
STEWART C. WALZ, Assistant United States Attorne^(#3374)
Securities and Commodities Fifaud' Task-Ecrce
Chief, Criminal Division
MARY BETH WALZ, Special Assistant United States Attorney (#3373)
Attorneys for the United States of America
476 United States Courthouse
350 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 524-5682
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

90-CR-129S
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

A M E N D E D
FELONY INFORMATION

v.
JAMES LYNN AVERETT,
Defendant.

VIO. 18 U.S.C. § 371
(Conspiracy to Commit
Securities Fraud)

The United States Attorney charges:
COUNT ONE
Conspiracy to Commit Securities Fraud
INTRODUCTION
1.

Defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT, at times material to this

felony information, was an attorney working and residing in Salt
Lake City, Utah.
2.

U.S.A. Medical Corporation, at times material to this

felony information, was a private Utah corporation.

3.

S.M.I., Inc., at times material to this felony

information, was a Wyoming corporation that purportedly was a
public company.
4.

At times material to this felony information, S.M.I.,

Inc. acquired U.S.A. Medical Corporation and changed its name
from S.M.I., Inc. to U.S.A. Medical Corporation.
THE CONSPIRACY
5.

From on or about an unknown date in November, 1987,

until the date of this felony information, in the Central
Division of the District of Utah and elsewhere,
JAMES LYNN AVERETT,
defendant herein, together with others, did conspire, combine,
confederate, and agree together, with each other and with other
persons unknown to the United States, to commit offenses against
the United States of America in violation of one (1) or more of
the following groups of statutes:
a.

15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 77x (fraud in

the offer and sale of securities) ;
b.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, and 15

U.S.C. § 78ff (fraud in the purchase and sale of any security);
and
c.

15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) and 15 U.S.C. § 77x (securities

registration violation).
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FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY
1.

In furtherance of the conspiracy, defendant JAMES LYNN

AVERETT agreed with other co-conspirators to obtain three hundred
thousand dollars ($300,000.00) to develop a public company to
manufacture and sell aspirators.
2.

In furtherance of the conspiracy, defendant JAMES LYNN

AVERETT agreed with other co-conspirators to purchase all of the
stock of a corporation.
3.

In furtherance of the conspiracy, defendant JAMES LYNN

AVERETT agreed with other co-conspirators that defendant JAMES
LYNN AVERETT would contribute an asset (the aspirator), would
prepare merger documents for a corporate acquisition and name
change (for S.M.I., Inc. to acquire U.S.A. Medical Corporation
and for S.M.I., Inc. to change its name to U.S.A. Medical
Corporation), would secure a legal tradeability opinion letter,
and would arrange for a company to be listed in the "pink sheets"
published by the National Quotation Bureau, Inc.
4.

In furtherance of the conspiracy, defendant JAMES LYNN

AVERETT agreed with other co-conspirators that the other coconspirators would promote the company and its stock so as to
raise the above-mentioned three hundred thousand dollars
($300,000.00).
5.

In furtherance of the conspiracy, defendant JAMES LYNN

AVERETT and other co-conspirators agreed that a controlled market
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manipulation would take place to artificially raise the price of
the stock of the company.
6.

In furtherance of the conspiracy, defendant JAMES LYNN

AVERETT agreed with other co-conspirators that the three of them
would obtain one million (1,000,000) shares of the stock of the
company and would equally divide the one million (1,000,000)
shares of stock among themselves.
OVERT ACTS
The United States Attorney further charges that in
furtherance of said conspiracy and to effect the means and
objectives of the conspiracy, defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT and
his co-conspirators committed and caused to be committed within
the Central Division of the District of Utah and elsewhere the
following overt acts:
1.

On or about an unknown date in November, 1987, at Salt

Lake City, Utah, defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT observed the
delivery of one hundred percent (100%) of the stock of S.M.I.,
Inc. (the box).

This delivery took place between two co-

conspirators in the office of Efficient Transfer, Inc., a stock
transfer agency located in Salt Lake City, Utah.
2.

On or about some unknown date or dates in November,

1987, defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT prepared the acquisition and
name change documents for S.M.I., Inc. (purportedly a public
corporation) to acquire U.S.A. Medical Corporation (a private
corporation) and for S.M.I., Inc. to change its name to U.S.A.
- 4 -

Medical Corporation.

The "Agreement and Plan of Reorganization"

is dated December 7, 1987.
3.

On or about an unknown date in November, 1987,

defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT requested another attorney to
prepare the legal tradeability opinion letter for U.S.A. Medical
Corporation.

The legal tradeability opinion letter is dated

December 7, 1987.
4.

On or about some unknown date or dates in November,

1987, defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT prepared the N.Q.B. Form 211
and prepared the bulk of the S.E.C Rule 15c2-ll package to
submit to the National Quotation Bureau, Inc. to get U.S.A.
Medical Corporation listed in the "pink sheets."

The N.Q.B. Form

211 is dated December 17, 1987.
5.

On or about an unknown date in November, 1987,

defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT prepared and sent from Salt Lake
City, Utah, to Cheyenne, Wyoming a letter requesting a
certificate of good standing from the corporations authorities in
Wyoming.
6.

On or about an unknown date in November, 1987,

defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT conducted a meeting in defendant
JAMES LYNN AVERETTfs office in Salt Lake City, Utah.

At this

meeting, defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT informed the individuals in
attendance, some of whom are co-conspirators, that the initial
stock transactions for U.S.A. Medical Corporation would be
illegal;
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all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.

- •

This amended felony information is submitted on this ^
day of July, 1990.
DEE BENSON
United States Attorney
/

I hereby certify that the annexed document Is a true
and correct copy of the original on file in this office.
ATTEST MARKUS B 2IMMER
Clerk, U S Di^
DfStrxrt of Utfe

Date

^/^/^

/

'//>

STEWART C. WALZ
Assistant United States Attorney
Securities arid-Cbmmodities Fraud
Task Force
Chief, Criminal Division

^y
MARY7BETH WAfft

Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
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X r U N ^ s r ^ s l ^ f E D S T A T E s DISTRICT COL _JT
0FUTAH
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
SEP19

—

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

M

ev-____^ 5?. CLERK
^''^aST
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

90-CR-129S
Case No.

y.

James Lynn Averett
Stephen R. McCaughey
Defendant's Attorney

Defendant
2 3 0 E a s t Broadway # 1 0 0 5

528

48

/

^0162

Defendant's SSN
S a l t Lake C i t y ,

Utah

84111

unavilable

Defendant's Mailing Address
Dependent's Residence Address
TglE DEFENDANT ENTERED A PLEA OF: I o f t h e F e l o n y
[ guilty
nolo contendre] as to coont(s)
not guilty as to count(s)

TOERE WAS A:
[A findin£ verdict] of guilty as to count(s)

Information

Felony

}

and

Information
.

THERE WAS A:
I finding verdict] of not guilty as to oount(s)
judgment of acquittal as to count(s)
The defendant is acquitted and discharged as to this/these counts(s).

^^S^^^W^XS^SLV^mff-'iii

.

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371

IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT THAT:
..
Defendant is placed on two (2) years probation with special conditions
(listed on back).
1 hereby cert.fy *«• « * annexed d ° cum «"*'* * *"*

_

;<W/

In addition to any conditions imposed above, IT IS ORDERED that the conditions of supervised release or probation set
forth in PROBATION FORM 7A are imposed. In addition, IT IS ORDERED that the special conditions of supervised
release set out on the reverse of this judgment are imposed.

SPECIAL <\ JITIONS OF PROBATION OR SUPERY £D RELEASE
(1) Do not commit crimes, federal, state or local. (2) Obey standard
conditions of probation (3) No fine is imposed due to defendant's
inability to pay. (4) Defendant must complete five hundred (500)
hours of community service as directed by the United States Probation
Office. (5) Do not possess firearms or dangerous weapons.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall pay a total SMdal assessment of $
Title 18, U.S.C. Section 3013 for count(s) x o f t h e Felony Information

$50.00

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT count(s)_
the motion of the United States.

pursuant to

as follows:

are DISMISSED on

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall pay to the United States attorney for this district any amount
imposed as restitution. The defendant shall pay to the clerk of the court any amount imposed as a fine, special assessment,
or cost of prosecution. Until all fines, restitutions, special assessments, and costs are fully paid, the defendent shall notif)
the United States attorney for the District of Utah of any change in name immediately and any change of address within
30 days of the change.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of the court deliver a certified copy of this judgment to the United States
attorney and the United States marshal for the District of Utah.
The Court orders commitment to the custody of the Attorney Genera) and recommends:
9/19/90sm Stewart C. Walz, AUSA
9 / 7 / 9 0 Stephen McCaughey, Esq,
Date of Imposition of Sentence
>^

/t)U<^^m/CVd -,,
Signature of Judicial THficer
D a v i d Sam

Date

Name and Title of Judicial Officer
RETURN

I have executed this Judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on

to

at

Date
, the institution designated by the Attorney General, with a certified copy
of this Judgment In a Criminal Case.
United States Marshal
DU 11
11/88

By.
Deputy Marshal

\0'

V

of Probation and Supervised Release

TATES DISTRICT COURT S'F
M '

FOR THE
DISTRICT OF UTAH - NORIHERN DIVISION
James L. Averett
Address

Docket No.

JU

&r:

90-CR-00129-S

230 East Broadway, S a l t Lake City, UT 84111

Under the terms of your sentence, you have been placed on probation^8QS0QS©Pfi51SffiX(strike one) by the
Honorable

David Sam

Utah
commencing

, United States District Judge for the District of
. Your term of supervision is for a period of

two (2) years

,

September 7 . 1990

While on probation/§CpS5QS9QS39fii^strike one), you shall not commit another Federal, state, or local crime
and shall not illegally possess a controlled substance. Revocation of probation and supervised release is mandatory for
possession of a controlled substance.
CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:
•

As a condition of supervision, you are instructed to pay a fine in the amount ofit shall be paid in the following manner

•

As a condition of supervision, you are instructed to pay restitution in the amount oL
; it shall be paid in the following manner

to

|5C] The defendant shall not possess a firearm or destructive device. Probation must be revoked for possession of a
firearm.
•

The defendant shall report in person to the probation office in the district to which the defendant is released within
72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

•

The defendant shall report in person to the probation office in the district of release within 72 hours of release from
the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

It is the order of the Court that you shall comply with the following standard conditions:
(1) You shall not leave the judicial district without permission of the court or probation officer;
(2) You shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officer, and shall submit a
truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month;
(3) You shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation
officer;

<*v*.

(4) You shall support your dependents and meet other family responsibilities;

/*'"'-.

•^

(5) You shall work regularly at a lawful occupation unless excused by the probation officer for schooling,
training, or other acceptable reasons;
~"^ ^
\
(6) You shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of any changBSuxesidence or employment;
(7) You shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, user distribute, or
administer any narcotic or other controlled substance, or any paraphernalia related to such substances, except as
prescribed by a physician;
(8) You shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or
administered;
(9) You shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity, and shall not associate with any
person convicted of a felony unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;
(10) You shall permit a probation officer to visit you at any time at home or elsewhere, and shall permit
confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view by the probation officer;
(11) You shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law
enforcement officer;
(12) You shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency
without the permission of the court;
(13) As directed by the probation officer, you shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by your
criminal record or personal history or characteristics, and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications
and to confirm your compliance with such notification requirement.
The special conditions ordered by the court are as follows:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Do not commit crimes, federal, state or local.
Obey standard conditions of probation.
No fine i s imposed due to defendant's inability to pay.
Defendant must complete 500 (five hundred) hours of community servxce as directed
by the United States Probation Office.
Do not possess firearms or dangerous weapons.

6.

Defendant s h a l l pay a t o t a l s p e c i a l assessment of $50.00.
Upon a finding of a violation of probation or supervised release, I understand that the Court may (1) revoke
supervision or (2) extend the term of supervision and/or modify the conditions of supervision.
These conditions have been read to me. I fully understand the conditions, and have been provided a copy of them.

I here"
and c

'ocument is a true
Me in this office.

ATTE

^

(Signed)

f/*
Date

By
Datt

——"

U.S. ProbationOfficef/DesienatedWitness

/

Date

EXHIBIT "KK"

<?Tfev.
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Division of Securities
Norman H Bangerter
Governor

David L Buhler

160 East 300 South

Executive Director

P 0 Box 45802

John C Baldwin
Director

Salt Lake C ty Utah 84145 0802
(801) 5306600

CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS
I CERTIFY that I am custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah
Securities Division and that I am a public officer of the State of
Utah by virtue of Title 61-1-18 U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the attached is a true and correct copy of
the Stipulation and Order of Cregg Cannon found in the records of
the Utah Securities Division.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this
day of December, 1990.
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION

EARL S. MXESER
DIRECTOR

STATE OF UTAH
ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On the 28 day of December, 1990, personally appeared before
Earl
S. Maeser, the signer of the foregoing certificate, who
me
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
i

tmui ^L\
Notary Public

<

nipvih

Residing in Salt Lake County
State of Utah
NOTARY PUBLIC
KATHIE K. SCHWAg
160 East 300 South
S.LC..UT 84111
COMMISSION EXPIRES

DEC. 9, 1991

STATE OF UTAH

DIVISION OF SECURITEES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
JOHN C. BALDWIN, DIRECTOR
KATHLEEN C. MCGINLEY, DIRECTOR
BROKER-DEALER SECTION
P.O. BOX 45802
160 EAST 3 00 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8414 5-0802
TELEPHONE: (801) 530-6600
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Registration
of Cregg Cannon
to Act as a Securities Agent

:
:
:

STIPULATION & ORDER
CASE NO. SD-042-AG

The Securities Division of the Department of Commerce of the
State of Utah (the division), by and through its Director, John C.
Baldwin, and Cregg Cannon a registered securities agent hereby
stipulate and agree as follows:
STIPULATION
1.

Cannon is and has been a registrant of the Division at all

times relevant to this case, holding Registration NO. 1031203.
2.

A complaint in the matter has been brought and properly

filed pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section
61-1-1, et seq., (1953, as amended).
3.

Cannon admits the jurisdiction of the Division over him

and over the subject matter of this action.
4.
witnesses

Cannon specifically waives the right to confront adverse
and

the

right

to

a

hearing

pursuant

to Utah

Code

Annotated Section 61-1-1, et sea.. (1953, as amended), and the

rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
5.

The Division and Cannon recognize and agree that this

Stipulation alone shall not be binding upon the Advisory Board,
If the Advisory Board and the Executive Director of the Department
of Commerce do not concur in the disciplinary action proposed
herein, this Stipulation shall be of no further force or effect and
a formal hearing shall be scheduled for this licensure action.
6.

Cannon acknowledges that upon approval by the Advisory

Board and the Executive Director, this Stipulation shall be made
a part of the attached

final Order, and shall be the final

compromise and settlement of this registration action.
7.

Cannon acknowledges that he enters into this Stipulation

voluntarily, and that no promise or threat whatsoever has been made
by the Division, or any member, officer, agent, or representative
of the Division to induce him to enter into this Stipulation.
Cannon, without admitting or denying the allegations, consents
to the following Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
8.

On March 15, 1989, the Division served a Subpoena Duces

Tecum on Cannon requesting a complete list of all the investors in
two limited partnerships in which Cannon was a general partner.
9.

The Subpoena required that Cannon provide the information

to the Division by March 24, 1989. The information has not been
provided to the Division.
10.

Cannon

served

as

a

general

partner

of

a

limited

partnership known as ATC-Stanfield Limited Partnership (hereinafter
referred to as ATC.)

Cannon knew, prior to soliciting investors,

that

annual

payments

would

be

required

from

individual

investors.
11.

During

stipulation,

the

Cannon

securities agent.

time
was

relevant

associated

to
with

the

facts

Private

of

Ledger

this
as

a

Cannon did not inform Private Ledger that he

was selling interests in ATC.

Cannon had no written or verbal

authorization from Private Ledger to sell interests in ATC.
12.
ATC.

Cannon solicited Mr. and Mrs. Robert Cox to invest in

The Coxes were unaware that an annual payment was required

and Cannon did not inform the Coxes of the required annual payment.
13.

Cannon knew that the required annual payments made the

investment unsuitable for the Coxes.

Cannon knew the Coxes would

not have purchased the securities if they had known about the
annual payments.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
14.

The above acts and practices constitute violations of the

following sections of Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended):
a.

61-6-6 (b) "willfully violated or willfully failed

to comply with any provision of this chapter or a predecessor act
or any rule or order under this chapter or a predecessor act.11

The

sections willfully violated under this chapter are:
1.

61-1-1 (2) which states that it is unlawful for

a person to make an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state

a

material

fact

that

would

make

the

statements

made

misleading.
2.

61-1-1 (3) which states that it is unlawful for

a person to engage in any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
b.

61-1-6

(g) "engaged

in dishonest

practices in the securities business."
1.

or unethical

The rule violated was:

Rule 177-6-1 (g) (b) (2) which states that it

is dishonest or unethical conduct to effect transactions not
recorded on the regular books or records of the broker-dealer which
the agent represents unless the transactions are authorized in
writing by the broker-dealer.
15.

The

Division

and

Cannon

propose

that

Cannon's

registration to act as a securities agent be suspended for a period
of two years and immediately at the end of the suspension period,
Cannon's registration be on probation for 1 year, for a total of
three years of sanctions. The sanction is to begin on the date set
by the Utah Securities Advisory Board and the Executive Director
of the Department.
16. This Stipulation constitutes the entire agreement between
the parties herein and supersedes and cancels any and all prior
negotiations,

representations,

understandings,

or

agreements

between the parties. There are no verbal agreements which modify,
interpret, construe, or affect this agreement.

C. BALDWIN, Director
Utah Securities Division

VJKSHN

DATED

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing stipulation and for good cause
appearing therefore:
1989,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that effective Afr n
Cregg Cannon's registration to act as a securities agent be
suspended for two years and placed on probation for one year
immediately following the end of the suspension period.

UTAH SECURITIES ADVISORY BOARD

MARGARET;WICKENS

TRUMAN BOWLER

KEITH CANNON

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DEPT. OF COMMERCE

DAVID BUHLER

.*""*"'*»

/#>/"!**>
/<$<*.*>&\

I DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Division of Securities
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor

David L. Buhler
Executive Director

John C. Baldwin
Director

160 East 300 South
P 0. Box 45802
Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802
(801) 530-6600

CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS
I CERTIFY that I am custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah
Securities Division and that I am a public officer of the State of
Utah by virtue of Title 61-1-18 U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the attached is a true and correct copy of
the Notice of Agency Action, Petition, Exhibit A of Paul W. Jones
found in the records of the Utah Securities Division.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this
day of December, 1990.
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION

EARL S. 4#AESER
DIRECTOR

STATE OF UTAH
ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

On the 28 day of December, 1990, personally appeared before
me Earl S. Maeser, the signer of the foregoing certificate, who
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

-WLc j<-^hi

uca

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County
State of Utah
NOTARY PUBLIC
KATHIE K. SCHWAB
160 East 300 South
S.L.C..UT 84111
COMMISSION EXPIRES
OEC. 9,1991
STATE OF UTAH

COPY
R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312
Attorney General
MARK J. GRIFFIN #2773
Assistant Attorney General
115 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1331

BEFORE THE UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION
In the Matter of the Registration
of Paul W. Jones, to Act as
;
Securities Agent.
]
|
CRD NO. 1494831
]I

PETITION
Case No. EN-00059-17

The Securities Division of the Department of Commerce of the
State of Utah ("the Division"), hereby complains and alleges as
follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Facts supporting this cause of action were investigated by
the Division pursuant to §61-1-5 and §61-1-19 of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act ("the Act"), following complaints regarding the
sale of U.S.A Medical stock to Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., in
violation of §61-1-7 of the Act.
JURISDICTION
1.

Jurisdiction in this action is vested in the Executive

Director and the Securities Advisory Board at the Department of
Commerce pursuant to §61-1-6(1) of the Act.

2.

Paul W. Jones is a Securities Agent registered with the

State of Utah under §61-1-4 of the Act and Rule R177-4-1 of the
Division, CRD registration number 1494831.
3.

Paul W. Jones ("Jones") is an agent of Wasatch Stock

Trading Company, broker-dealer registered with the Division.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
4.

Prior to March 1, 1989, Jones, as an agent for Wasatch

Stock Trading, was actively trading in the stock of U.S.A.
Medical Corporation.
5.

On or about March 1, 1989, the Division issued a Summary

Order (Case No. SD-89-030) denying the availability of all
transactional exemptions from registration for the securities of
U.S.A. Medical Corporation, pursuant to the authority granted to
the Division in §61-1-14(3) of the Act.

A copy of the Summary

Order was delivered to Wasatch Stock Trading Company on or about
March 1, 1989. The Order is and has been in effect continuously
since its issuance on March 1, 1989. The Summary Order is
attached hereto. (Exhibit A)
6.

On or about March 3, 1989, a compliance meeting was held

at Wasatch Stock Trading Company at which Mr. Jones was present.
At that meeting, were present several agents who had traded
U.S.A. Medical stock.

In that meeting, the compliance officers

of Wasatch Stock Trading Company notified the agents of the
existence of the Division's Order of March 1, 1989 and made
available a copy of that Order for the agents' examination.
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7.

On March 1, 1989 the Division commenced an

administrative action to deny the availability of all
transactional exemptions from registration pursuant to §61-114(3) of the Act for the securities of U.S.A. Medical (Case No.
SD-89-031).

A copy of the Notice Agency Action and Petition was

mailed to Wasatch Stock Trading Company on March 2, 1989.
8.

Upon approval of the Securities Advisory Board, the

Executive Director of the Department of Commerce accepted,
confirmed, and approved the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Default Order on March 27, 1989.

The Default Order denied

the availability of the transactional exemptions from
registration contained in §61-1-14(2) of the Act for the
securities of U.S.A. Medical Corporation, any affiliate or
successor to U.S.A. Medical organized by or on behalf of U.S.A.
Medical.

A copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

Default Order was mailed to Wasatch Stock Trading Company on
March 27, 1989.
9.

On or about April 18, 1989, Jones sold to Johnson-Bowles

Company through Marlen Vernon Johnson 100,000 shares of U.S.A.
Medical at $.08 per share.
10.

The sale of 100,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical stock on

April 18, 1989 was not recorded on the regular books and records
of Wasatch Stock Trading Company.

Jones did not secure before

the sale the written permission of Wasatch Stock Trading to
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engage in the sale of U.S.A. Medical stock and the Wasatch Stock
Trading Company did not know at the time of Jones' sale of U.S.A.
Medical stock.
COUNT I
11.

The Division realleges and incorporates by reference

the Facts set forth in paragraphs 1-10 above.
12.

§61-1-6(1) of the Act provides that the Division may

issue an Order suspending or revoking the registration of an
agent if it finds that such Order is in public interest and the
agent:
(b) Has willfully violated or willfully failed to comply
with any provision of this chapter or predecessor act or any
Rule or Order under this chapter of predecessor act; . . .
13.

The above-described sales of U.S.A. Medical were sales

effected in willful violation of §61-1-7 of the Act which
provides as follows:
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security
in this state unless it is registered under this chapter or
the security or transaction is exempted under §61-1-14.
14.

The actions of Jones in selling the 100,000 shares of

U.S.A. Medical during the pendency of the Division's Order
amounts to a willful violation of §61-1-7, and is grounds for
revocation under §61-1-6(1)(b).
COUNT II
15.

The petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference

the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 10 above.
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16.

§61-1-6(1)(g) provides that the Division may issue and

Order suspending or revoking the Registration of an agent if it
finds that such Order is in the public interest and the* agent has
engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the Securities
business.
17.

Rule R117--6-lg(b) (2) of the Division, promulgated under

the authority of §61-1-24 and §61-1-6(1)(g) of the Act
establishes that the following acts and practices by agents
constitute grounds for suspension or revocation of registration:
(2) Effecting securities transactions not recorded on the
regular books or records of the broker-dealer which the
agent represents, in the case of agents of broker-dealers,
unless the transactions are authorized in writing by the
broker-dealer prior to the execution of the transaction.
18.

Jones, in selling the 100,000 share of U.S.A. Medical stock

to Johnson-Bowles, effected securities transactions not recorded
on the regular books or records of the broker-dealer which the
agent represented.

In addition, the broker-dealer did not

supply, prior to the execution of the transaction, permission in
writing to effect those transactions.
19.

The above action by Jones constitutes dishonest and

unethical practices within the meaning of §61-1-6(1)(g) of the
Act and Division Rule R177-6-lg and is grounds for revocation.
COUNT III
20.

The Division realleges and incorporates by reference

its allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 20 as
specifically set our herein.

- 5-

4.

For such other relief as the Division deems appropriate.

DATED this

2L $L

of July, 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

GRIFFIN
Attorney General

- 7-

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Division of Securities
Norman H Bangerter
Governor

David L Buhler
Executive Director

John C Baldwin
Director

160 East 300 South
P O Box 45802
Sal* Lake C ty U'ah 84145 0802
(801)530 6600

CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS
I CERTIFY that I am custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah
Securities Division and that I am a public officer of the State of
Utah by virtue of Title 61-1-18 U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the attached is a true and correct copy of
Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Undertakings of Respondent
William R. Lambert found in the records of the Utah Securities
Division.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this
day of December, L990.
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION

EARL S. MANSER
DIRECTOR

STATE OF UTAH
ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On the 28 day of December, 1990, personally appeared before
Earl
S. Maeser, the signer of the foregoing certificate, who
me
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County
State of Utah
NOTARY PUBLIC
KATHIE K. SCHWAB
160 East 300 South
S.L.C..UT 84111
1 (iifli&flVr) COMMISSION
EXPIRES
DEC. 9, 1991
STATE OF UTAH

/0^%\

1
1
1
I
|

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

IN RE:
WILLIAM R. LAMBERT,
an individual,

)

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
UNDERTAKINGS OF RESPONDENT
CASE NO. 88-01-06-01

RESPONDENT
•)

The Utah Division of Securities having received a written
complaint against the above named Respondent, having investigated
the facts thereof and determined thereby that Respondent has
engaged in conduct which violates the Utah Uniform Securities Act
amd has so advised Respondent. Respondent is desirous of resolving
the charges against him without a formal hearing and the Utah
Securities Division is agreeable to such resolution, provided
Respondent agrees to certain sanctions and to undertake certain
corrective action with respect to the violations which have been
committed.
NOW, THEREFORE,
The Utah Division of Securities and the Respondent above
named, do hereby agree to the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and Respondent does hereby agree to the
following Undertakings:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. William R. Lambert is a resident of Provo, Utah, engaged
in the business of providing financial advice and receiving fees
therefor.

Lambert has never registered as an investment advisor

with the Utah Division of Securities as required by Section 61-13, Utah Uniform Securities Act.
2.

Commencing

on or about October

16, 1985, Respondent,

William R. Lambert, undertook to provide financial advice to Evelyn
H. Lofgran of Springville, Utah for which Lofgran paid him a fee.
Lambert engaged in market activity involving margin purchases of
options

which

were

beyond

the

experience,

understanding

and

financial capacity of, and therefore, unsuitable for, Lofgran who
invested approximately $70,000 through Lambert.
3. As

a result

of the actions

of the Respondent

herein

described, by October 30, 1987, the Lofgran had lost approximately
$38,500, a loss which she, an elderly widow, could not afford.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the conduct of Respondent William R. Lambert was a

violation of Section 61-1-3(3} of the Utah Uniform Securities Act
in that

Lambert

did

engage

in the business

of

acting

as an

investment advisor, as defined in Section 61-1-13(10) of the Act,
without being duly registered.
UNDERTAKING OF RESPONDENTS
Respondent William R. Lambert agrees as follows:
a. to refrain from engaging in the sale of securities,
providing investment advice or acting as a broker deaker until

properly and duly licensed with the appropriate authorities, and
b. to refrain from future violations of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act.
c. to contribute to the public education fund of the
Securities Division of the State of Utah the amount of $500.00
JDATED this /7 day of

Ce^Vi^

,1989.

UTAH DIVISION OF SECURITIES

RESPONDENT

f(oh?fiwC. B a l d w i n
Director

William

^

/u*t

-ru^J <~0~ f^<-^

c

^fHjM^A^^

•

/

J^n^

R.Lambert

^L^^ W

DEPARTMENT 0 F

+*TJ3PI*} I
COMMERCE
^C^x'V'* 1 Division of Securities
Norman H Bangerter
Governor
~
, T TI LI
David L Buhler
Executive Director
John C Baldwin
Director

1
f
f
|
j

160 East 300 South
P

°

Bo

*

™2

" Salt Lake Cty Utah 84145 0802
801)530 6600

CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS
I CERTIFY that I am custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah
Securities Division and that I am a public officer of the State of
Utah by virtue of Title 61-1-18 U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the attached is a true and correct copy of
the Order and Stipulation of Brahman Finanical Corp, found in the
records of the Utah Securities Division.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this
day of December, 1990.
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION

EARL S.
DIRECTOR

STATE OF UTAH
ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On the 28 day of December, 1990, personally appeared before
me Earl S. Maeser, the signer of the foregoing certificate, who
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County
State of Utah

NOTARY PUBLIC
* £ I H J E K SCHWAB
160 east 300 South
S L.C. UT 84111
COMMISSION EXPIRES
DEC 9, 1991
8TATB OP UTAH

1
2
3

RICHARD C. CAHOON - #A535
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
68 SOUTH MAIN, SUITE 500
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800

4
5
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

6
7
8
9

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
the UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
REGULATION,

ORDER

10
Plaintiff,
11
12
13
14
15
16

Civil No. 890901303AA
vs
BRAHAM FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
a Nevada corporation, dha
BRAHMAN SECURITIES, MARK
EAMES, MICHAEL COOPER, GARTH
POTTS, DAN W. PULLEY, LARRY
R. SIMMONS, ROBERT EAMES, and
GEORGE B. STARKS,

Judge Scott Daniels

Defendants.

17
18
19
20
21

Upon Stipulation

of the

parties hereto and good cause

appearing it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

22

substantially

23

attached hereto

as Exhibit

24

reference

case

this

comply

with

shall

the

that
terms

"A" and
be

if
of

made a

dismissed

the Defendants
the Stipulation
part hereof by
with

prejudice

1
pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation.
2
3
4
DATED this

/ 3> day of March, 1989.

5
BY THE COURT:
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

/s/Sd^^
||

«D^^s^

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

2
3

RICHARD C. CAHOON - #A535
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
68 SOUTH MAIN, SUITE 500
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800

4
5

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

6

OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

7
8
9
10

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
the UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
REGULATION,
Plaintiff,

11
12
13
14
15
16

STIPULATION
Civil No. 890901303AA

vs

Judge Scott Daniels

BRAHMAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
a Nevada corporation, dba
BRAHMAN SECURITIES, MARK
EAMES, MICHAEL COOPER, GARTH
POTTS, DAN W. PULLEY, LARRY R.
SIMMONS, ROBERT EAMES, and
GEORGE B. STARKS,

17

Defendants.

18
19

The State

of Utah by and through the Utah Security Division

20

of the Department of

21

to

22

Corporation, a Nevada corporation,

23

Garth Potts,

24

George B. Starks, hereby stipulate, so long as the Defendants are

as

the

Business Regulations,

"Plaintiff,"

Dan W.

and

hereinafter referred

the Defendants, Brahman Financial

Pulley, Larry

ZxiUJ^-'

Mark

Eames,

Michael Cooper,

R. Simmons, Robert Eames and

employed

as

independent

contractors

of the Investment Center,

Inc•, as follows:
1.
will

All of the business forms, business cards and stationary

clearly

indicate

that

the Investment Center, Inc. is the

Broker-Dealer.
2.

All

new

account

forms

for

Brahman,

the Investment

Center, Inc. will be signed by a duly authorized principal of the
Investment
signature

Center,
will

be

Inc.

and

a

maintained

copy
in

bearing

the

the principals'

Brahman

office

of the

Investment Center.
3.

There will be kept in the Brahman office

of the Invest-

ment Center, Trie, in a centi'al location for the inspection of the
Utah Securities Commission the following:
(a)

Daily Trade Blotter of al] trades;

(b)

An alphabetical

(c)

Check ledger;

(d)

Copies of all checks received and forwarded to the

listing of all new accounts;

Investment Center, Inc.; and
(e)

Copies

of

all

stock

certificates

received and

forwarded to the Investment Center, Inc.
4.
copy of

Each individual Defendant

will

keep

his

own personal

the new account form and a record of all trades which he

has made with regard to each of his clients.
5.

All monies received
2

from

the

sale

of

stock

will be

forwarded to the Investment Center, Inc.
9

6.

~

Brahman, the

A

checks to

c

an assignment of commission

^

Center, Inc.

7

tionate share of the cost of the operations of the branch office,

g

No

9

activities unless the individual

10

The

Investment
Investment

Center,
Center,

Inc.
Inc.

will
and

issue a check to

Brahman

will issue

the other Defendants for services rendered pursuant to
form

executed

with

the Investment

by each of the Defendants after deducting a propor-

additional

compensation

shall

be

recei\ed for supervisor}

assuming those responsibilities

meets N.A.S.D. requirements to act in that capacity.

11

7.

The Defendants agree that the Investment Center, Inc. is

12

the Broker-Dealer having supervisory responsibility

13

transactions made

14

Defendants shall have the right to sell all

15

Investment Center, Inc. has approved for sale.

16

8.

b> Brahman,

The Defendants

the Investment

18

the bid

19

Investment Center, Inc. will not repurchase

20

price greater than the bid price.
9.

prices and

which

24

files.

their clients of

indicate to their customer that the
the securities

at a

The Defendants agree that they will not use any informa-

22 II tion in connection with
23

The

agree that in all solicitations for the

sale or purchase of securities they will inform

21

Center, Inc.

securities which the

17

and ask

over securi t\

is

not

in

the purchase

writing

or sale

of any securities

and contained in their due diligence

10.

The Defendant,

Investment Center

Michael Cooper,

branch office

shall not

until such

work at the

time as he has been

duly registered by the N.A.S.D. and the Utah Securities Division.
11.

Brahman, the Investment Center,

any individual

to work

is duly registered with

Inc., shall

not allow

as a broker until such time as he or she
the

N.A.S.D.

and

the

Utah Securities

Division.
12.
has been

The parties acknowledge and agree that this Stipulation
made

for

allegations set

the

purpose

of

compromising

the disputed

forth in the Plaintiff's Complaint and shall not

be construed as an admission by any party of the

allegations set

forth in the Plaintiff's Complaint.
13.

This Stipulation

shall be • in effect

twelve (12) months or so long

as the

for a period of

Defendants are independent

contractors employed by the Investment Center, Inc., whichever is
longer.

Unless the Plaintiff fiJes

an objection

with the Court

within three (3) days after a Defendant delivers to the Plaintiff
and the

Court an

employed as

Affidavit stating

an independent

At

is no longer

for the Investment Center, Inc., the

Plaintiff's Complaint against the
with prejudice.

the Defendant

Defendants shall

be dismissed

the end of the twelve (12) month period, if

the Defendants have substantially complied with the terms of this
Stipulation, this

action shall

motion of the Defendants.
4

be dismissed with prejudice upon

of March, 1989

Ridhard C. Cahoon
Attorney for Defendants

lark J. Griy
Attorney fdjp/ PlaintifJ
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH SECURITIES
DIVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUSINESS REGULATION

BRAHMAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION
By:

6y ZjtT

Mark E^mes
fijzfhael Coape
Garth Potts
Dan W.^ Pulley

George/B. "61:arks

/

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Division of Securities
Norman H Bangerter
Governor

David L Buhler
Executive Director

John C Baldwin
Director

160 East 300 South
PO Box 45802
Salt Lake C ty Uta^ 84145 0802
(801) 530 6600

CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS
I CERTIFY that I am custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah
Securities Division and that I am a public officer of the State of
Utah by virtue of Title 61-1-18 U.C.A. 1953, as amended,
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the attached is a true and correct copy of
the Settlement Agreement of Mark K. Hesterman found in the records
of the Utah Securities Division.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this
day of December, 1990.
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION
< ^ ^

/

EARL S.
DIRECTOR

STATE OF UTAH
ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

On the 28 day of December, 1990, personally appeared before
me Earl S. Maeser, the signer of the foregoing certificate, who
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the Scime,

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County
State of Utah
NOTARY PUBLIC
KATHIE K. SCHWAB

160 East 300 South
S.LC.UT 84111
COMMISSION EXPIRES
DEC. 9, 1991
STATE OF UTAH

DIVISION OF SECURITIES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
JOHN C. BALDWIN, DIRECTOR
KATHLEEN C. MCGINLEY, DIRECTOR
BROKER-DEALER SECTION
P.O. BOX 45802
160 EAST 300 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-0802
TELEPHONE:
(801) 530-6600

/,

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Registration
of Mark K. Hesterman
to Act as a Securities Agent

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

CRD No.

CASE NO. EN-00549-16

1537637

The Securities Division of the Department of Commerce of the
State of Utah (the Division) , by and through its Director, John
Baldwin, and Mark K. Hesterman, a registered

C

securities agent,

nereby stipulate and agree as follows:
STIPULATION
1.

Hesterman is and has been a registrant of the Division at

all times relevant to this case, holding CRD No. 1537637.
2.

Hesterman admits the jurisdiction of the Division over

him and over the subject matter of this action.
3.

Hesterman

specifically

waives

the

right

to

confront

adverse witnesses and the right to a hearing pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 61-1-1, et seq. (1953, as amended), and the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder.
4.

Hesterman acknowledges that upon approval by the Division

Director, this

Stipulation

shall

be the

final

compromise

and

&

settlement of this registration action.
5.

Hesterman

acknowledges

that

he

enters

into

this

Stipulation voluntarily, and that no promise or threat whatsoever
has been made by the Division, or any member, officer, agent, or
representative of the Division to induce him to enter into this
Stipulation.
Hesterman, without admitting or denying

the allegations,

consents to the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
6.

At

all

times

relevant

to the

facts

of

this case,

Hesterman was a registered representative at Main Street Securities
or Covey & Co.
7.

On or about June 26, 1987, Hesterman sold Paul Stephan

(purchaser) 8,000 shares of Peanuts, Inc. at $1.25 per share.
Peanuts later became Covest, Inc.
8.

During

the

first

quareter

of

1988, Hesterman

told

purchaser that Covest shares were trading at approximately $1.60
per share. The actual trading price at this time was between .460
and .87^0 per share.
9.

Also during the first quarter of 1988, Hesterman told

purchaser that Covest shares had gone through a 2 for 1 forward
stock split causing purchaser to own 16,000 rather that 8,000
shares.
10.

The stock split never occurred.
In January 1989, Hesterman told purchaser that Covest,

Inc. shares were trading for approximately $1.00 per share.

The

actual trading price of Covest, Inc. at this time was approximately
.12^0. At this time, purchaser requested that Hesterman sell 2,500

shares of Covest. Hesterman attempted to make the trade but could
find no buyers for more than .12^0 per share. The trade was never
executed, but Hesterman verbally confirmed to purchaser that the
trade had been executed and that purchaser would receive payment in
approximately one week.
11.

On March 15, 1989, Hesterman sent purchaser $948 from

Hestermanfs personal funds.

Hesterman told purchaser the funds

were from the sale of a portion of purchaser's Covest, Inc. shares.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
12.

The above acts and practices constxtute violations of the

following sections of Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended):
a.

61-1-6

(g)

"engaged

in dishonest

or unethical

practices in the securities business.11
13.

The Division and Hesterman agree:
a.

that Hestermanfs registration to act as a securities

agent be suspended for ten (10) days from June 27, 1990 through
July 6, 1990; preventing Hesterman from engaging in any activity in
any capacity as a securities agent during that time: and
b.

that Hesterman1s registration to act as a securities

agent be placed on probation for a period of one (1) year beginning
July 7, 1990 through July 7, 1991; and
c.

that during the time of the probation, Hesterman

will receive daily supervision of all trades as follows:

Mark

Hesterman, while associated with any broker-dealer registered in
the state of Utah, shall have all trade tickets he has written that
day reviewed and initialed on a daily basis by the firm's principle
or the Head Trader so that such review is completed prior to the

time confirmations of sale are mailed to the customers; and
d.

that

failure to comply with

the provisions of

Paragraph 14 (c), above, shall constitute a separate violation of
Hesterman1s probation and this Settlement Agreement; and
e.

that Hesterman shall pay a $500 fine, by July 6,

1990 to the Division.

The fine will be placed in the Securities

Investor Training and Education Fund.
14.

This Stipulation constitutes the entire agreement between

the parties herein and supersedes and cancels any and all prior
negotiations, representation, understandings, or agreements between
the

parties.

There

are no verbal

agreements

which modify,

interpret, construe, or affect this agreement.

K m>

C. BALDWIN, Director
Utah Securities Division

DATED

I, Mark K. Hesterman, swear under oath that I have not
knowingly participated in the practice of trading in nominee
accounts for the purpose of unfairly manipulating market prices or
to hide or disguise the beneficial ownership of stock or for any
other purpose not acceptable under the law.
^

V(AM K.

County of Salt Lake )
)

State of Utah

)

ss.

On this IS**\ day d>f rcr(JA\l
, 1990, before me personally
appeared Mark K. Hesterman, to me known to the pesrson described in
and who^jgettg&ed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that
she e^o^t^dPfch^Scime as her free act and deed.
My

es:
Notary Public

Sta^

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Division of Securities

Norman H Bangerter
Governor

David L Buhler
Executive Director

John C Baldwin
Director

160 East 300Soufh
PO Box 45802
Salt Lake C ty Utah 84145 0802
(801)530 6600

CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS
I CERTIFY that I am custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah
Securities Division and that I am a public officer of the State of
Utah by virtue of Title 61-1-18 U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the attached is a true and correct statement
of the order suspending the license of Paul Ira Nixon as a
registered securities agent found in the records of the Utah
Securities Division.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this
day of December, 1990.
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION

/£&
EARL S
DIRECTOR

STATE OF UTAH
ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On the 28 day of December, 1990, personally appeared before
me Earl S. Maeser, the signer of the foregoing certificate, who
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County
State of Utah
NOTARY PUBLIC
KATHIE K. SCHWAB
160 East 300 South
S L . C , U T 84111
COMMISSION EXPIRES
DEC. 9,1991
STATE OF UTAH

SECURITIES AGENT SUSPENDED...
SOLD SECURITIES TO INVESTORS AT UNFAIR MARKUPS
The Securities Division in the Utah Department of Commerce
issued an Order suspending the license of Paul Irai Nixon as a
registered securities agent for eighteen (18) months and placing
him on probation for two years.
The Order was part of a
Stipulation agreement wherein Mr. Nixon admitted the allegations
and consented to a finding that he had engaged in dishonest or
unethical practices in the securities business.
The Division's Stipulation and Order was based on a previous
action taken by the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) against Mr. Nixon.
The NASD complaint alleged Mr. Nixon effected 78 principle
sale transactions in the securities of Rimrock Industries, Inc.
with retail customers at prices that included unfair markups. The
complaint also alleged that 77 of those transactions were executed
at prices that reflected markups exceeding 10 percent. A markup is
the profit earned by the brokerage firm and the agent on the sale
of securities.
In a stipulation with the NASD, Mr. Nixon, without admitting
or denying the charges, agreed to pay a fine and to the suspension
of his securities license by the NASD.
In order to act as a
securities agent in this state, an individual must be licensed with
both the state of Utah and the NASD, a self-regulatory organization
of the securities industry.
Nixon was a securities agent with Western Capital &
Securities, now out of business, at the time the alleged acts took
place. 6

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Division of Securities
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor

David L. Buhler

160 East 300 South

Executive Director

P 0 Box 45802

John C. Baldwin
Director

Salt Lake City Utah 84145-0802
(801) 530-6600

CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS
I CERTIFY that I am custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah
Securities Division and that I am a public officer of the State of
Utah by virtue of Title 61-1-18 U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the attached is a true and correct copy of
the Stipulation and Order, Petition for Suspension of Warren &
Brown Associates found in the records of the Utah Securities
Division.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this
day of December, 1990.

28

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION

EARL S.
DIRECTOR

STATE OF UTAH
ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

On the 28 day of December, 1990, personally appeared before
me Earl S. Maeser, the signer of the foregoing certificate, who
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County
State of Utah
NOTARY PUBLIC
KATHIE K. SCHWAB
160 East 300 South
S.L.CUT 84111
COMMISSION EXPIRES
DEC. 9, 1991
STATE OF UTAH

SECURITIES DIVISION
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Heber M. Wells Building, Second Floor
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45802
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801)
530-6600
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF
t h e R e g i s t r a t i o n of
Warren & Brown
A s s o c i a t e s I n c . and
Thomas R. Warren

STIPULATION AND ORDER
Case No.

$H?Ay?/J?

STIPULATION
Come now t h e p a r t i e s in t h i s p r o c e e d i n g and
and a g r e e a s
1.

stipulate

follows:
The p e t i t i o n e r

i s a d i v i s i o n of t h e D e p a r t m e n t of

Business Regulation established

by Utah Code Ann. § 6 1 - 1 - 1 3

(1983) , a s amended, of t h e Act and i s empowered u n d e r

t h e Act

i n v e s t i g a t e v i o l a t i o n s of t h e Act and t o b r i n g a c t i o n s t o
t h e Act by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e

and c i v i l

6 1 - 1 - 1 ( 1 9 8 3 ) , a s amended, e t
2.

actions.

enforce

Utah Code Ann. §

seq.

R e s p o n d e n t Brown i s a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n

with the p e t i t i o n e r

to

as a b r o k e r - d e a l e r .

Formerly,

Brown was known a s Edward Brown S e c u r i t i e s .

registered

respondent

3.

Respondent Warren is an individual registered with

the petitioner as agent*

Warren also acts as a principal and is

president of respondent Brown.
M.

On or about February 11, 1986, Robin Hales applied

with the petitioner to become a registered agent of respondent
Brown.
5.

On or about February 19, 1986, and continuing until

July 1986, while her application for registration was pending
with the petitioner, Robin Hales represented Warren & Brown in
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of
securities for certain existing Warren & Brown customers and for
certain customers which Robin hales introduced to the firm.
6.

During the period of February 1986 through August

1986, Robin Hales took the required practice knowledge
examination and passed said examination on the eighth attempt.
7.

On or about September 20, 1986, Robin hales passed

the required practice knowledge examination, and October 1,
1986, she was registered with the petitioner as an agent of
respondent Brown.
8.

During the period of February 1986 through June

1986, respondent Warren was aware of and supervised Hales1
activity at the firm.
9.

By allowing Hales to represent Warren & Brown in

effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of
securities for certain existing Warren & Brown customers and for
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certain customers which Robin Hales introduced to the firm,
respondents violated Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (1983), as amended.
10. The parties consent to the entry of the following
order.

^DATED this

<*1

day of May, 1987.
WARREN & BROWN AfSSOpIATES, INC,
/

C(/\{Cd
By Thomas R. Warren, President

_Jko4*
THOMAS R. WARREN, Individually
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for ^Respondents

UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION

1ARK C-r-MC
Assistant Attorney General
ORDER
Pursuant to the above stipulation, which is incorporated
herein by reference, and for good cause appearing therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the licenses of Warren & Brown
Associates, Inc. and Thomas R. Warren are suspended for a period
of one day, which suspension shall take place on May 25, 1987,
and;
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Warren & Brown w i l l pay an amount of $1,000 to the
S t a t e of Utah, $250 of which w i l l reimburse t h e Utah S e c u r i t i e s
D i v i s i o n for the c o s t of i t s i n v e s t i g a t i o n and $750 to which w i l l
go the Department of Business Regulation Consumer Education Fund.
DATED t h i s _jAJjt^^"i

of Jta?, 1987.

EKLUND
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law J u d g e
Confirmed,
this

L r ^ day of

a p p r o v e d , and a d o p t e d by t h e A d v i s o r y Board

^W^JL.

Confirmed,

, 19 8 7 .

a p p r o v e d , and a d o p t e d by t h e

Director.

r^N

WILLIAM E. DUNN

-

4

-

Executive

